Settling a criminal case out of court — what you can and can't compound
Compounding is the statutory bilateral settlement between the victim and the accused that ends a criminal prosecution by operation of law. Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Section 320 CrPC, 1973] is the exhaustive route. This guide reads the old and new schemes side by side and traces the controlling Supreme Court line from Gian Singh and Narinder Singh.
A criminal prosecution in India can end before judgment in three statutory ways — withdrawal by the public prosecutor under Section 360 BNSS [Section 321 CrPC], composition of the offence under Section 359 BNSS [Section 320 CrPC], and quashing of the proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS [Section 482 CrPC]. Compounding is the only one of the three that is initiated by the victim. It rests on a statutory premise that the State permits in some offences: that where the harm is essentially personal and the injured party is content to abandon the prosecution, the criminal process should not continue to grind regardless. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 has described the section as "articulating public policy with regard to the compounding of an offence" — it is not a procedural switch but a substantive permission, and it is exhaustive of itself. With the BNSS, the provision has migrated — Section 320 CrPC is now Section 359 BNSS, the two tables travel forward, and the statutory architecture remains almost untouched. The practical landscape, however, has shifted — partly because of Gian Singh and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, partly because of the BNS renumbering of the substantive offences listed in the tables.
Under CrPC Section 320 — the legacy scheme
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 set out the compounding regime that operated for fifty-one years until the BNSS came into force on 1 July 2024. The architecture had four moving parts.
The first table — composition without the court's permission. Sub-section (1) listed offences punishable under specified sections of the Indian Penal Code that could be compounded by the persons named in column three of the table, without the leave of any court. Voluntarily causing hurt under Section 323 IPC, wrongful restraint under Sections 341 and 342 IPC, criminal trespass under Section 447 IPC, defamation under Section 500 IPC (subject to a carve-out for public servants), criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, theft under Section 379 IPC, dishonest misappropriation under Section 403 IPC — these and roughly thirty more offences sat in the first table. Composition of an offence in this table could take place out of court and even before the prosecution had started: the Patna High Court in Prithvi v. Birju AIR 1962 Pat 316 held that on the filing of a petition of compromise by the person specified in column three, the court was bound to record the composition and acquit the accused.
The second table — composition with the court's permission. Sub-section (2) listed a smaller set of offences that could be compounded only with the leave of the court before which the prosecution was pending. The list included voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325 IPC, rash and negligent hurt under Sections 337 and 338 IPC, criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC, cheating under Section 420 IPC, bigamy under Section 494 IPC, and outraging the modesty of a woman under Section 509 IPC (insulting modesty). The permission requirement was substantive: the court had to apply its mind to the nature of the offence, the parties, the stage of the proceeding, and the public interest in continued prosecution.
The structural rules in sub-sections (3) to (8). Sub-section (3) extended the composition machinery to the abetment of, attempt at, and Section 34 / Section 149 IPC liability for, a compoundable offence. Sub-section (4) provided that where the person competent to compound was a minor, idiot, lunatic or deceased, a person competent to contract on his behalf or his legal representative could compound, with the court's permission or consent. Sub-section (5) required the leave of the committal court or the appellate court for compositions after commitment for trial or pending appeal. Sub-section (6) extended a similar power to the High Court or Court of Session in revisional jurisdiction. Sub-section (7) barred composition where the accused was liable, by reason of a previous conviction, to enhanced or different punishment. Sub-section (8) made the effect of composition equivalent to an acquittal.
The exhaustive bar in sub-section (9). The last sub-section declared that no offence "shall be compounded except as provided by this section." The Supreme Court in Biswabahan Das v. Gopen Chandra Hazarika AIR 1967 SC 895 read this as a hard limit: the general rule of criminal law is that a charge, however trivial, must be inquired into and result in conviction or acquittal; Section 320 was a defined exception, and the exception extended only to the offences enumerated in the two tables, not a clause beyond.
Under BNSS Section 359 — what's the same
Section 359 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in force from 1 July 2024, retains the architecture of Section 320 CrPC almost without alteration. The two-table structure is preserved: sub-section (1) of Section 359 BNSS lists offences compoundable without the court's permission, sub-section (2) lists offences compoundable only with the court's permission. The drafting language tracks the old section. The structural sub-sections (3) to (9) of Section 320 CrPC find their counterparts in Section 359 BNSS in the same sequence and to the same effect: extension to abetment and Section 3(5) BNS liability (the BNS equivalent of Section 34 IPC), composition by persons competent to contract on behalf of minors and lunatics, composition by legal representatives of deceased persons, the leave-of-court requirement at committal and appellate stages, revisional power in the High Court and Court of Session, the bar on composition where the accused is liable to enhanced or different punishment by reason of a previous conviction, the acquittal effect of composition, and the exhaustive bar in sub-section (9).
Two doctrinal anchors carry forward unchanged. First, composition is a bilateral act — it is not the same as withdrawal under Section 360 BNSS [Section 321 CrPC], which is the unilateral act of the public prosecutor. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh drew this distinction sharply: compounding rests on the agreement between the accused and the person injured, whereas withdrawal is the State exercising its prosecutorial discretion. Second, composition under Section 359 BNSS has the immediate effect of acquittal — the same as Section 320(8) CrPC. The Calcutta High Court in Suravi v. State AIR 1965 Cal 469 (still good law) held that once a petition of compromise has been filed in court, the criminal court cannot reopen the proceedings on the allegation that the terms of composition have not been honoured; the breach of the settlement may give rise to other remedies, but it does not revive the criminal case.
The pre-BNSS Supreme Court jurisprudence on Section 320 CrPC therefore continues to govern Section 359 BNSS. Practitioners reading the old case law on Section 320 do not need to translate doctrine; they need only translate the section number.
Under BNSS Section 359 — what changed
The shifts are quiet but real. Three are worth flagging.
The substantive offences in the tables are now BNS offences. Both tables in Section 359 BNSS refer to offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, not the Indian Penal Code. The mapping is mostly one-to-one but the section numbers have changed. Voluntarily causing hurt — Section 323 IPC is now Section 115(2) BNS. Wrongful restraint — Section 341 IPC is now Section 126(2) BNS; wrongful confinement — Section 342 IPC is now Section 127(2) BNS. Theft — Section 379 IPC is now Section 303(2) BNS. Criminal trespass — Section 447 IPC is now Section 329(3) BNS. Defamation — Section 500 IPC is now Section 356(2) BNS. Criminal intimidation — Section 506 IPC is now Section 351(2) and (3) BNS. Cheating — Section 420 IPC is now Section 318(4) BNS. Grievous hurt — Section 325 IPC is now Section 117(2) BNS. Criminal breach of trust — Section 406 IPC is now Section 316(2) BNS. The substantive ingredients of these offences are unchanged but the citation form has shifted. During the 2024 to 2026 transition window, charge-sheets and complaints carry both numbers in brackets; petitions of compromise under Section 359 BNSS now name the BNS sections.
Section 498A IPC remains non-compoundable at the central level, but State amendments remain. The Andhra Pradesh and a few other State amendments to Section 320 CrPC that made offences under Section 498A IPC compoundable (with a three-month cooling-off period before the court could accept compromise) continue to operate by force of the saving provisions in Section 531(2) BNSS — the BNSS preserves the operation of State amendments to the CrPC to the extent they are not inconsistent with the BNSS. The position is unsettled in States that did not have a Section 320 CrPC amendment: the Section 86 BNS / Section 498A IPC offence is not in either Section 359 BNSS table, so it is not compoundable at the central level, but quashing under Section 528 BNSS on the basis of a settlement remains available under the Gian Singh line. This is one of the points where the regime is genuinely contested and will need first-instance and High-Court clarifications.
The BNSS does not extend compoundability to special statute offences. Special-statute offences remain outside Section 359 BNSS unless the special statute itself permits composition. The Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 read Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as a special provision making cheque-bounce offences under Section 138 NI Act compoundable, and that position is unaltered. Offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and most environment and economic-offence statutes remain non-compoundable, and that line travels into the BNSS unchanged.
The two-table schedule — without-court and with-court compounding
The practical difference between the two tables is procedural, but it carries doctrinal weight.
Without the court's permission — sub-section (1). For offences in the first table, composition is effectively a contract between the parties. The Allahabad High Court in Mahadeo AIR 1934 All 1025 held that on a petition of compromise being placed before the trial court, if the court is satisfied that the offence is compoundable under sub-section (1) and that the person in column three has compounded the offence, the court has no discretion to refuse — it is bound to record the composition and acquit the accused. The court's role is ministerial, not adjudicatory. The composition is "in the nature of a bilateral agreement between the accused and the person injured who consents to abstain from prosecution in consideration of some gratification or inducement," as Justice Sarkaria's classic formulation in early cases put it. The complainant can compound even before the prosecution has started; the trial court can record the composition at any stage before judgment is pronounced. After judgment, the trial court becomes functus officio and the prayer for compounding must go to the appellate court — the Supreme Court in Tanveer v. State of M.P. (1990) Supp SCC 63 settled this point.
With the court's permission — sub-section (2). For offences in the second table, the court applies its mind to whether to permit composition. The discretion is not unfettered; the Karnataka High Court in Mannur v. State of Mysore AIR 1965 Mys 238 held that the court must examine the nature of the offence and the evidence on record. The factors that recur in High Court orders are: the relationship between the parties (a quarrel between neighbours or family members invites permission more readily than a quarrel between strangers); the age of the incident (older incidents where relations have settled invite permission); the gravity of the injury (grievous hurt with deep lasting consequences is harder to compound than a moderate hurt where the victim has recovered); the conduct of the accused (a record of previous convictions cuts against permission); and the public interest, which in some cases overrides settlement — the Delhi High Court in Anita v. State 2008 CrLJ (NOC) 8 (Del) refused permission to compound an offence of outraging modesty even though the victim was willing, on the ground that the offence "was a crime against the society."
Two settled procedural rules govern with-permission compositions. First, the court cannot make permission conditional on terms not included in the joint petition of compromise — Mannur (cited above) struck down a permission order that required the accused to pay compensation as a condition of leave. Second, where the offences include both compoundable and non-compoundable items, the court cannot grant indivisible permission and the entire permission order is vitiated — the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhavery AIR 1973 SC 84 made this clear.
When the court can refuse compounding — and the Gian Singh line
The most consequential development since 2012 is the Supreme Court's articulation of a separate quashing power that runs alongside Section 320 CrPC / Section 359 BNSS. This is the Gian Singh doctrine.
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 was decided by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court on a reference about whether the High Court could, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, quash a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence on the basis of a settlement between the parties. The bench answered yes, with significant qualifications. Compounding under Section 320 CrPC is exhaustive of itself — sub-section (9) means what it says — but the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) is a separate constitutional source of power, and it can be invoked to quash even non-compoundable offences where the parties have settled, provided certain conditions are met. The court drew a line between two categories. For offences of a personal civil flavour — matrimonial disputes, family quarrels, commercial disputes, partnership fall-outs — the High Court can quash on settlement even where Section 320 does not list the offence. For heinous offences against society — murder, rape, dacoity, offences under special statutes carrying public-interest concerns — quashing on the basis of settlement is impermissible even with the victim's consent.
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 then refined the test with seven guidelines on the exercise of Section 482 power in settlement cases. Among the operative directions: (i) the power must be exercised sparingly and with caution; (ii) the nature of the offence governs the analysis — offences predominantly civil or personal in character invite quashing more readily; (iii) timing matters — quashing at the FIR or chargesheet stage is more readily justified than quashing after the trial has substantially progressed; (iv) the gravity of the offence and the duty of the State to prosecute weigh against quashing; (v) Section 307 IPC offences and similar grave offences against the body should not be quashed on settlement merely because the victim has been compensated, because the State's interest in prosecuting the attempt to kill is independent of the victim's wishes.
State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688 and Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641 further consolidated the line. The result, as the law now stands under the BNSS, is a two-track regime. Track one: composition under Section 359 BNSS. This is mechanical for offences in sub-section (1) and discretionary (but bounded) for offences in sub-section (2), and it is unavailable for offences not listed in either table. Track two: quashing under Section 528 BNSS [Section 482 CrPC] on the basis of settlement. This is available even for offences outside the Section 359 tables, but only where the offence is of a personal or civil character and the seven Narinder Singh guidelines are met. The two tracks are doctrinally distinct: composition under Section 359 BNSS acquits the accused as a matter of substantive criminal law; quashing under Section 528 BNSS sets aside the proceedings as an exercise of constitutional inherent power. They have different consequences for double-jeopardy analysis, for civil suits arising from the same facts, and for the question whether a fresh complaint on the same facts is barred.
The circumstances in which the court can refuse compounding (track one) or refuse quashing (track two) overlap but are not identical. Under Section 359(7) BNSS [Section 320(7) CrPC], the court cannot permit compounding where the accused is liable to enhanced or different punishment by reason of a previous conviction. The Bombay High Court in Madan v. State 1995 CrLJ 1419 refused composition for an offence under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) on the ground that the offence was not listed in either table — Gian Singh had not then been decided, and the route to relief in such cases is now through Section 528 BNSS quashing, not Section 359 BNSS compounding, and the Narinder Singh filter applies. Under the quashing track, the recurring grounds of refusal are the gravity of the offence, the absence of a personal or civil flavour to the dispute, the late stage of the proceeding, and a record of similar past conduct by the accused.
Effect, procedure, and unresolved questions
Once composition under Section 359 BNSS is recorded by the court (or, where leave is required, granted by the court), the effect under sub-section (8) is acquittal — immediate, complete, and not capable of being reopened by the criminal court even on the allegation that the terms of compromise have been breached. The acquittal is res judicata for the same offence on the same facts; a fresh prosecution by the same complainant for the same offence cannot lie. The Supreme Court in Khusheed v. State of U.P. (2007) 12 SCC 68 underlined that the acquittal is unconditional, and the High Court's power to impose payment of compensation as a condition of recording the composition is doubtful at best.
Procedurally, the petition of compromise should be a joint application signed by the complainant and the accused, narrating the offence, the FIR or complaint number, the stage of the proceeding, and the fact that the parties have settled the dispute. For with-permission compositions under sub-section (2), the application should also recite the grounds on which the court is being asked to grant permission — the relationship of the parties, the age of the incident, the absence of any continuing public-interest concern, and the willingness of the parties to bring the matter to a close. The Privy Council in Bhowanipur Banking Corp. v. Durgesh Nandini AIR 1944 PC 95 (still cited) held that even a unilateral petition by the person competent to compound suffices, but the better practice is a joint application. The court records the composition, hears the parties briefly, and passes an order of acquittal under sub-section (8).
Three points remain genuinely unresolved at the High Court level. First, whether composition before the start of prosecution (an out-of-court settlement) for an offence under sub-section (1) survives if the police later file a chargesheet on the same facts — the Allahabad High Court in Nanhe AIR 1938 All 394 took the view that such a composition is invalid as against the State, but the practice in some States is to treat it as valid. Second, whether composition by a complainant who is not the victim (e.g., a relative who lodged the FIR) is valid — the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Nanapur AIR 1960 Mys 325 (cited in Gian Singh) read column three strictly: only the person specified can compound. Third, the interaction between Section 359 BNSS and Section 528 BNSS in cases where one offence in a multi-offence prosecution is compoundable and another is not — Ramesh Chandra v. Jhavery remains the controlling authority, but its application across the BNS sections is yet to be tested.
Outcome
Section 359 of the BNSS carries Section 320 CrPC forward with the architecture intact and the doctrine unchanged. The two-table schedule, the with-permission and without-permission split, the acquittal effect, and the exhaustive bar in sub-section (9) all survive. What has shifted is the offence-citation form (BNS sections in place of IPC sections) and the wider doctrinal landscape: the Gian Singh and Narinder Singh line has clarified that Section 528 BNSS [Section 482 CrPC] supplies a second route to settlement-based termination of criminal proceedings for offences not listed in the Section 359 tables, but only for personal and civil-flavoured offences, and only under bounded conditions. A petition of compromise drafted today under Section 359 BNSS reads almost identically to one drafted three years ago under Section 320 CrPC; what differs is the section numbers cited and the awareness that for non-compoundable offences, the Gian Singh quashing route through the High Court is the alternative pathway. The procedural lesson is to identify, before drafting, which track applies: composition under Section 359 BNSS if the offence is listed, quashing under Section 528 BNSS if it is not but the dispute is of a personal or civil character, and continued prosecution if neither door is open.