Domestic Violence Act protection order — how to apply
Section 18 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 empowers a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class to pass a protection order restraining the respondent from committing further acts of domestic violence, communicating with the aggrieved person, alienating assets, entering her workplace, or causing violence to her relatives. The Constitution Bench in Satish Chander Ahuja v Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414 overruled S R Batra v Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 and substantially broadened the residence right under Section 19 by re-reading the definition of "shared household" in Section 2(s) of the Act. The protection-order machinery now sits as a parallel civil-shape regime alongside Section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 498A IPC], with Section 36 of the PWDVA preserving both.
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — the PWDVA — was Parliament's response to the structural inadequacy of the criminal-law route to addressing domestic violence. Section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] punishes cruelty by a husband or his relatives; it does not stop the cruelty, it does not secure the woman in her home, it does not provide her maintenance. The PWDVA was designed to do precisely those things — through a Magistrate-led civil-shape regime built around a protection order under Section 18, a residence order under Section 19, monetary relief under Section 20, custody under Section 21, compensation under Section 22, and interim orders ex parte under Section 23. The Constitution Bench in Satish Chander Ahuja v Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414 — overruling the long-standing two-judge view in S R Batra v Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 — is the central doctrinal pivot of the modern PWDVA: the residence right under Section 19 now reaches into homes that the earlier reading had placed beyond the Act's protection. This guide traces the protection-order machinery, the doctrinal pivot, and the overlap with the criminal-law cruelty regime.
The statutory architecture — what the PWDVA does
The PWDVA was enacted to address the civil consequences of domestic violence — the right to a violence-free home and to economic security — that the criminal-law framework under Section 498A IPC, now Section 80 BNS, did not reach. Section 36 of the PWDVA provides that the Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law in force; the criminal-law cruelty route runs in parallel, not in substitution.
Section 2(a) defines an "aggrieved person" as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. Section 2(f) defines a "domestic relationship" as a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. Section 2(q) defines the "respondent" — and the Supreme Court in Hiral P Harsora v Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 struck down as unconstitutional the words "adult male" in the original definition, holding that the restriction had no rational nexus with the object of the Act. After Harsora, female and minor relatives of the husband — mother-in-law, sister-in-law, adult daughter, minor son — can be impleaded as respondents.
Section 2(s) defines the "shared household" — the most litigated definition in the Act. The provision reads that a shared household means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent, and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them, in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity. The two-judge Bench in S R Batra v Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 had read the definition narrowly — only a house owned or tenanted by the husband, or a house belonging to the joint family of which the husband is a member, was a shared household. A house owned by the mother-in-law or any other relative was held to be outside the definition. The narrow reading held for fourteen years and excluded a substantial class of women from the residence right under Section 19. The Constitution Bench in Satish Chander Ahuja v Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414 overruled the narrow reading; the position is reconstructed below.
Section 3 defines "domestic violence" in four heads. The first is any conduct that harms, injures, or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person, or tends to do so — physical, sexual, verbal and emotional, and economic abuse. The second is harassment, harm, injury or endangering the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry, other property or valuable security. The third is having the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her. The fourth is otherwise injuring or causing harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person. The Explanation elaborates the four sub-heads of "physical abuse", "sexual abuse", "verbal and emotional abuse" and "economic abuse" — the last including deprivation of economic or financial resources, alienation of stridhan, and disposal of household effects.
Section 18 — what a protection order does
Section 18 of the PWDVA empowers the Magistrate, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, to pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person prohibiting the respondent from doing each of seven things. The list is the operative core of the Act.
The respondent may be prohibited from — first, committing any act of domestic violence; second, aiding or abetting acts of domestic violence; third, entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, her school; fourth, attempting to communicate in any form with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral, written, electronic or telephonic contact; fifth, alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or accounts jointly held or singly held by the respondent, including stridhan, without the leave of the Magistrate; sixth, causing violence to dependants, other relatives or any person who gives the aggrieved person assistance; and seventh, committing any other act as specified in the order.
The order is granted on a prima facie test, not on proof beyond reasonable doubt — the standard governing the PWDVA throughout is preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v Government of UP, (2014) 2 SCC 1 — though strictly a cognisable-offence FIR case under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — has been read by Magistrates as not extending to the PWDVA precisely because the PWDVA proceeding is civil-shape, not criminal. The order may be passed ex parte under Section 23 as an interim measure where the Magistrate is satisfied on the basis of an affidavit that the respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood of such commission.
The Section 18 protection order is the most frequently used relief under the Act. The order is enforceable through Section 31, which makes breach a cognisable and non-bailable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both. Section 31(3) empowers the Magistrate framing charges under Section 31 also to frame charges under Section 80 BNS [Section 498A IPC] or under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 if the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions, with the trial proceeding in accordance with the procedure under the Code.
Satish Chander Ahuja v Sneha Ahuja — the shared-household pivot
The Constitution Bench decision in Satish Chander Ahuja v Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414 — a three-judge Bench presided over by Justice Ashok Bhushan — is the central doctrinal event in the PWDVA's modern history. The facts were typical. The wife, Sneha Ahuja, was residing in a house that stood in the sole name of her father-in-law, Satish Chander Ahuja. The husband had left the matrimonial home. The father-in-law instituted a civil suit for possession of the property, contending that his daughter-in-law had no right to reside in a house that belonged to him and to which her husband had no title. The Delhi High Court, applying S R Batra v Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169, decreed possession.
The Supreme Court overruled Batra. The reasoning is statutory. The definition of "shared household" in Section 2(s) is in two parts — a household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship, either singly or along with the respondent; and an inclusive limb that brings within the definition households owned or tenanted by either party. The two-judge Bench in Batra had read the second limb as exhaustive and so excluded households owned by a third party (typically the mother-in-law or the father-in-law). The Constitution Bench held that the second limb is inclusive, not exhaustive — the operative definition is the first limb, and a household where the aggrieved person lives or has lived in a domestic relationship is a shared household regardless of who owns it. The right to reside under Section 17 and the residence order under Section 19 follow.
The judgment is doctrinally significant for three further reasons. First, the Bench expressly noted that Batra's narrow reading had operated as a "judicial amendment" of the Act, restricting the protection Parliament had intended to confer. Second, the Court worked out the relationship between a Section 19 residence order and a civil suit for possession by the owner of the property — the residence order is not a determination of title, but a determination of the right to reside, and a civil suit for possession by the owner does not displace the PWDVA right. Third, the Court flagged that the residence right is not an absolute right; it is a right to reside in the shared household, subject to the Magistrate's discretion under Section 19(1) to direct the respondent to remove himself, to restrain him from entering, or to direct him to provide alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f).
The practical effect of Ahuja is substantial. A wife living in her mother-in-law's house, a daughter-in-law in her father-in-law's flat, a deserted wife who has returned to her in-laws' joint household — each of these was, under Batra, outside the residence-order protection. Each is now within it. The Section 19 residence order can be passed against an owner-respondent who is not the husband, restraining dispossession, directing alternate accommodation, or directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household.
Section 12 — the procedural roadmap to the protection order
The procedural route from a domestic violence incident to a protection order runs through Section 12 of the PWDVA. The steps are as follows.
Stage 1: The application under Section 12. The aggrieved person — or a Protection Officer or any other person on her behalf — may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Act. The application is in Form II prescribed by the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006. It is signed by the aggrieved person and verified.
Stage 2: The Domestic Incident Report. Before the Magistrate passes any order on the application, he is required under Section 12(1) to take into consideration any Domestic Incident Report (DIR) prepared and received from the Protection Officer or the service provider. The DIR is in Form I and is prepared by the Protection Officer under Section 9(b) of the Act on receipt of information relating to an incident of domestic violence. Service providers registered under Section 10 — typically NGOs working in the field of women's rights — may also file a DIR.
Stage 3: Notice and the hearing. Section 13 requires the Magistrate to serve a notice on the respondent and on any other person as the Magistrate may direct, in the manner provided in Section 13. The first hearing is to be held ordinarily within three days of the application under Section 12(4). The Act, by Section 12(5), enjoins the Magistrate to dispose of the application within sixty days of the first hearing, "as far as possible".
Stage 4: Interim ex parte order under Section 23. At any stage, the Magistrate may pass interim orders, including ex parte orders under Section 23, on being satisfied on the basis of an affidavit in the prescribed form that the respondent is committing or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood of such commission. The interim order may include any of the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22.
Stage 5: Final order under Sections 18 to 22. After hearing the parties and considering the DIR, the Magistrate passes the final order — a protection order under Section 18, a residence order under Section 19, monetary relief under Section 20, a custody order under Section 21, and compensation under Section 22, or any combination of these.
Stage 6: Counselling and mediation. Section 14 empowers the Magistrate at any stage of the proceedings to direct the respondent or the aggrieved person, either singly or jointly, to undergo counselling with a member of a service provider possessing the prescribed qualifications. Section 13(2) read with Rule 14 of the 2006 Rules empowers the Magistrate to secure the services of a welfare expert, preferably a woman. PWDVA proceedings are, in practice, frequently settled at the counselling stage.
Stage 7: Appeal under Section 29. Section 29 provides an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date on which the order is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent. The appellate court hears the matter on its merits; no second appeal lies.
Section 27 — the jurisdictional reach
Section 27 of the PWDVA confers concurrent jurisdiction on any Magistrate within whose local limits the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed, or the cause of action arose. The provision is the most permissive jurisdictional clause in Indian matrimonial law — a wife who has returned to her parental home in another State may file the application in the local Magistrate's court at her present residence. The Supreme Court in Rupali Devi v State of UP, (2019) 5 SCC 384 — strictly a Section 498A IPC jurisdictional ruling — extended the principle of concurrent jurisdiction across the cruelty-protection regime; an FIR under Section 80 BNS [Section 498A IPC] may be lodged at the place where the consequences of cruelty have ensued. The two jurisdictional regimes — PWDVA Section 27 and BNS Section 80 / FIR jurisdiction — together give the aggrieved person substantial latitude in choosing the forum.
Section 28 of the Act provides that the proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — now read down to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 after the 2024 transition. However, Section 28(2) gives the court power to lay down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under Section 23(2) — the procedure is, in practice, hybrid: CPC-flexible on questions of evidence and pleading, BNSS-bound on enforcement and contempt-shape questions.
The overlap with Section 80 BNS [Section 498A IPC]
The PWDVA does not displace Section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] — the criminal-law cruelty provision. Section 36 PWDVA expressly preserves all other remedies. The two routes run in parallel and are routinely invoked together.
The differences are structural. Section 80 BNS is a criminal offence — cognisable, non-bailable, and triable by a Magistrate of the First Class. The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court in Rajesh Sharma v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 3869 — and the partial walk-back in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 443 — worked out safeguards against the alleged misuse of Section 498A, including the family welfare committee pre-screening that the latter judgment then dismantled. The arrest framework under Section 41 of the BNSS [Section 41 of the CrPC, 1973] — with the Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 protocol on arrest in offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years — applies.
The PWDVA proceeding, by contrast, is civil-shape — the standard is preponderance of probabilities, the relief is preventive and remedial (not punitive), and the only criminal-law element is Section 31, which makes breach of a protection order a cognisable and non-bailable offence. The two routes serve different functions: Section 80 BNS punishes; the PWDVA protects. A wife typically files both — an FIR under Section 80 BNS / Section 86 BNS [Section 304B IPC for dowry death where applicable] alongside a Section 12 PWDVA application — and the two run on separate tracks before different forums.
The Supreme Court in Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, (2016) 11 SCC 774 held that the PWDVA proceeding is essentially civil and that amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is permissible in a Section 12 application. The Court in V D Bhanot v Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183 held that the PWDVA applies retrospectively to acts of domestic violence occurring before the commencement of the Act on 26 October 2006 — the test is whether the aggrieved person was in a domestic relationship at the relevant time, not whether the acts complained of occurred after 2006.
Indra Sarma and the relationship in the nature of marriage
The PWDVA's definition of "domestic relationship" in Section 2(f) includes a relationship in the nature of marriage. The Supreme Court in Indra Sarma v V K V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755 worked out the five-fold test for what counts as such a relationship — duration of the period of relationship, shared household, pooling of resources and financial arrangements, domestic arrangements, sexual relationship, children, socialisation in public, and intention and conduct of the parties. The Court was clear that not every live-in relationship is a relationship in the nature of marriage; a relationship between a married man and another woman who was aware of the subsisting marriage was held not to qualify, since marriage requires monogamy.
The Court in Lalita Toppo v State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 796 carried the line further on the maintenance question — a live-in partner who would not have been entitled to maintenance under Section 144 BNSS [Section 125 CrPC] is nonetheless entitled to monetary relief under Section 20 of the PWDVA, since the PWDVA's definitions are broader. The doctrinal effect is that the protection-order machinery is available to a substantially wider class of women than the criminal cruelty provision under Section 80 BNS, which is restricted to "the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman".
The other reliefs — Sections 19, 20, 21, 22
The Section 18 protection order is typically accompanied by one or more of the other reliefs.
Section 19 — the residence order. The Magistrate may, on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order — restraining the respondent from dispossessing or disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household; directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; restraining the respondent from alienating, disposing of or encumbering the shared household; restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household, except with the leave of the Magistrate; or directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent for the same. The residence order does not operate against a woman respondent — Section 19(1) proviso. The reach of the residence order after Satish Chander Ahuja is the central practical pivot of the Act.
Section 20 — monetary relief. The Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence — loss of earnings, medical expenses, loss caused due to destruction of property, maintenance for the aggrieved person and her children, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 144 BNSS [Section 125 CrPC]. Monetary relief is in addition to, not in substitution for, maintenance under HMA Section 24 or HMA Section 25, or under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
Section 21 — custody order. The Magistrate may grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person, with visitation arrangements for the respondent. The order is interim — final custody is to be worked out under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 or the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
Section 22 — compensation order. The Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence. Compensation under Section 22 is distinct from monetary relief under Section 20; the former addresses dignitary harm, the latter economic loss.
What remains open
Three doctrinal questions sit on top of the post-Ahuja PWDVA.
The first is the application of Satish Chander Ahuja to the residence order against an owner-respondent who has neither participated in nor benefited from the acts of domestic violence. The Constitution Bench held that the residence right is not absolute, but did not fully work out the calibration between the owner's title and the aggrieved person's right to reside. The High Courts have been working out the calibration case by case; the Delhi High Court has read Ahuja as conferring a strong residence right that the owner must displace by providing alternate accommodation, the Bombay High Court has read it more cautiously. The Supreme Court has not revisited the issue post-2021.
The second is the relationship between the PWDVA proceeding and a parallel divorce or Section 80 BNS [Section 498A IPC] FIR. Cross-suit dynamics are now routine — a Section 12 PWDVA application, an FIR under Section 80 BNS, a Section 13 HMA divorce petition, and a Section 144 BNSS [Section 125 CrPC] maintenance application can all run simultaneously. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 has worked out the quashing framework for matrimonial settlement; the PWDVA proceeding, being civil-shape, sits within that framework as a settleable proceeding under Sections 14 and 28(2) read with the Magistrate's case-management powers.
The third is the constitutional question after Hiral P Harsora v Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165. The striking down of "adult male" in Section 2(q) opened the respondent definition to female and minor relatives. The Court has not since addressed the application of the protection-order machinery against a female respondent who is herself an aggrieved person — the typical fact pattern is the sister-in-law who is herself a victim of the husband's family's cruelty and who is being impleaded as a respondent by the wife. Family Court practice has worked out partial answers; appellate guidance is awaited.
The PWDVA was designed as a parallel regime — civil-shape protection alongside criminal-law punishment. Satish Chander Ahuja restored the regime to what its drafters intended; Hiral Harsora, V D Bhanot, and Indra Sarma have steadily extended its reach. The protection order under Section 18 is now the principal first-instance instrument of the Act — a Magistrate's order that secures the home, restrains the respondent, and runs in parallel with the criminal-law cruelty provision under Section 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860]. The two regimes, taken together, are the modern Indian matrimonial-violence framework.