Maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 codifies the personal-law obligation of a Hindu to maintain wife, children, aged or infirm parents, widowed daughter-in-law, and dependants. Sections 18 to 23 are the operative provisions. The route is a civil suit — slower than the summary criminal maintenance jurisdiction under BNSS Section 144 [Section 125 CrPC] and the ancillary-relief route under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but capable of fuller discovery, larger quantum, and a charge on immovable property under Section 27. Padmaja Sharma v Ratan Lal Sharma, (2000) 4 SCC 266 and Komalam Amma v Kumara Pillai Raghavan Pillai, (2008) 14 SCC 345 are the leading authorities; Rajnesh v Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 supplies the cumulation rule across statutes.
Maintenance practice in Indian Family Courts is dominated by Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Section 125 CrPC] — the summary criminal route — and Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — the ancillary route in a matrimonial proceeding. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 sits as a third route, less often invoked but doctrinally the most thorough. Section 18 HAMA is the substantive Hindu wife's right to maintenance; Section 19 is the widowed daughter-in-law's right against the father-in-law; Section 20 is the parent–child obligation; Sections 21 and 22 deal with dependants of a deceased Hindu; Section 23 codifies the quantum factors. The route is a civil suit before the District Court (or the Family Court where one has been constituted under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984), with the procedural advantages of full pleadings, discovery, and a final decree enforceable as a civil decree. This guide is the doctrinal map.
The architecture of HAMA Chapter III
Chapter III of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 codifies the maintenance obligations of a Hindu. The Chapter is short — twelve sections, 18 to 28 — but each carries weight. Section 3(b) HAMA gives the inclusive definition of "maintenance": provision for food, clothing, residence, education, and medical attendance and treatment; for an unmarried daughter, reasonable expenses of and incident to her marriage. The definition has been applied liberally — P Srinivasa Rao v P Indira, AIR 2002 AP 130 (FB) and a line of subsequent decisions have held that "maintenance" under Section 3(b) extends to a standard of living approximating that enjoyed during the marriage, not subsistence.
Section 18 HAMA is the substantive wife's right — entitled during her lifetime, with seven enumerated grounds in sub-section (2) for separate residence, and a disentitling clause in sub-section (3) for unchastity or cessation of being a Hindu. Section 19 HAMA is the widowed daughter-in-law's right against the father-in-law, contingent on the father-in-law having coparcenary property. Section 20 HAMA codifies the parent–child obligation — children entitled until majority (or, in the case of an unmarried daughter, until she is able to maintain herself), and aged or infirm parents entitled where unable to maintain themselves. Section 21 HAMA enumerates the "dependants" of a deceased Hindu; Section 22 HAMA fixes the liability of the heirs (and gratuitous transferees with notice) to maintain those dependants out of the inherited estate. Section 23 HAMA codifies the quantum factors the court is to consider. Section 25 HAMA permits variation on a material change of circumstances. Section 27 HAMA empowers the court to declare the maintenance a charge on immovable property where it so directs. Section 28 HAMA protects the dependant's right against alienees with notice — a corollary of Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The Act does not provide its own forum. The remedy is by way of a civil suit before the civil court of competent jurisdiction — typically the District Court, or, in States where Family Courts have been notified for HAMA matters under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Krishan Lal v Sudershan Kumari, 1978 PLR 147 confirmed that the District Court is the appropriate forum where no Family Court has been notified; the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Baldev Singh v Pooja Devi, AIR 2007 HP 16 reaffirmed the position.
Section 18 — the Hindu wife's right
Section 18(1) HAMA provides that a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of the Act, is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime. The right is rooted not in any consideration but in the matrimonial tie itself; the husband's obligation flows from the marriage, not from any property he holds. The Supreme Court in Kirti Kumar v State of Gujarat, (1996) 4 SCC 479 held that the obligation under Section 18 is personal and arises from the very existence of the relationship. The burden of proving disentitlement — that the wife is not entitled to maintenance — lies on the husband.
The "Hindu wife" in Section 18(1) is the lawfully wedded wife of the husband during the subsistence of the marriage. Once the marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce, the woman ceases to be a "wife" within Section 18 HAMA and must instead claim under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (permanent alimony post-decree). The Bombay High Court in Mangla v Dhondiba, AIR 2010 Bom 122 (DB) held that a woman whose marriage is void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot claim under Section 18 HAMA, though she may have a claim under Section 25 HMA on the marriage being declared null and void. The Delhi High Court in Suresh Khullar v Vijay Kumar, AIR 2008 Del 1 (DB) and Narinder Pal Kaur v Manjeet Singh, AIR 2008 Del 7 (DB) have taken a wider view in cases where the husband suppressed the fact of the subsisting first marriage, holding that the second wife in such circumstances retains protection — a reading anchored more in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 than in the literal text of Section 18.
Section 18(2) HAMA sets out seven grounds on which a wife is entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance. The grounds correspond, broadly, to the matrimonial grounds for divorce or judicial separation under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, but the standard of proof under HAMA is lower — a conduct of "lesser degree" than what is required to establish desertion under the HMA may justify a claim under Section 18 HAMA.
Clause (a) — desertion. Abandonment of the wife without reasonable cause and without her consent, or wilful neglect of her. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Neelam Singh v Vijay Narain Singh, AIR 1995 P&H 1 held that the husband leaving the wife in the village while taking up service elsewhere can suffice. The wife need not prove animus deserendi with the rigour required for a divorce on the same ground; the social-protection object of Section 18 entitles the court to a liberal construction.
Clause (b) — cruelty. Such treatment of the wife as to cause a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the husband. The cruelty may be physical or mental — dowry harassment, sustained verbal abuse, false allegations of unchastity, taunts of barrenness without the husband undergoing medical investigation himself — all have been held to qualify.
Clause (c) — virulent leprosy. A historical ground retained from the 1956 enactment; medical advances have made the clause practically dead, but it remains on the statute book.
Clause (d) — another wife living. The husband's having another wife living entitles the first wife (and, on the older Delhi High Court reading, the second wife of a bigamous marriage where the first wife's marriage subsisted) to separate residence and maintenance.
Clause (e) — concubine. The husband keeps a concubine in the matrimonial home or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere. The Orissa High Court in Bansidhar v Jyoshnarani, AIR 2002 Ori 121 held that "habitually resides" emphasises habit rather than ordinary place of residence — visits to the concubine at a separate house may suffice.
Clause (f) — conversion. The husband has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.
Clause (g) — any other cause justifying separate living. A residuary clause covering blameworthy conduct of a lesser degree than cruelty or desertion — for example, the husband selling the matrimonial home without the wife's knowledge and the purchasers wrongfully detaining the wife in a mental asylum, on the facts of Meera v Sukumar, AIR 1994 Mad 168 (DB).
Section 18(3) HAMA disentitles a wife who is unchaste or who has ceased to be a Hindu. Unchastity must be a continuing course of conduct; an isolated act will not disentitle. Cessation of being a Hindu (conversion) terminates the right on the date of conversion. Section 24 HAMA is the parallel disentitling provision for any claimant under the Act on cessation of being a Hindu.
Section 19 — the widowed daughter-in-law
Section 19 HAMA confers on a widowed daughter-in-law a right to maintenance from her father-in-law. The right is not personal to the father-in-law — it is contingent on the father-in-law holding coparcenary property out of which the deceased husband, had he lived, would have had a share. Where the father-in-law has no such coparcenary property, no obligation arises under Section 19.
The right is further qualified by the proviso to sub-section (1) and by sub-section (2). The widowed daughter-in-law must be unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or property, unable to obtain maintenance from the estate of her husband, her father, or her mother, and unable to obtain maintenance from her son or daughter (whose obligation under Section 20 is the primary one). The father-in-law's obligation is residual. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Raj Kishore v Meena, AIR 1995 AP 295 emphasised that a clear finding on each of these conditions is required before the father-in-law can be made liable. The right ceases on her remarriage.
The provision applies, by its terms, only to parties governed by the Mitakshara school. The Calcutta High Court in Kanailal v Puspa Rani, AIR 1979 Cal 105 held that Section 19(2) does not apply to Dayabhaga families — there being no concept of a widow inheriting a share in coparcenary property under the Dayabhaga school in the same way as under the Mitakshara school. The position is residual in any event, given that under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005) a widow is a Class I heir entitled to a share in her husband's interest in coparcenary property.
Section 20 — children and aged parents
Section 20(1) HAMA imposes a statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children and aged or infirm parents. Sub-section (2) entitles a child to maintenance during minority. The provision is gender-neutral on the obligor — both father and mother are liable, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in N Sree Ramudu v N Lahiri, AIR 2005 AP 9 has affirmed that the obligation on the mother to maintain children is on the same footing as the father's.
The obligation under Section 20 is statutory and absolute. The father in Tulsi Kumar v Raghavan, AIR 1985 Mad 159 attempted to escape liability on the basis that the mother had, by an agreement at the time of separation, undertaken to maintain the child; the Madras High Court rejected the plea, holding that the child's statutory right cannot be contracted away. The father's lack of means is relevant only to quantum, not to the existence of the obligation.
Section 20(3) HAMA confers on an unmarried daughter a right to maintenance from the parent "so long as she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property". The provision distinguishes HAMA from Section 144 BNSS [Section 125 CrPC] and from Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — under the criminal-procedure route, a major child (other than one with physical or mental abnormality) is not entitled; under HAMA Section 20(3), an unmarried adult daughter remains entitled until marriage or until she becomes able to maintain herself. The Kerala High Court in Viswambharan v Dhanga, AIR 2005 Ker 130 confirmed that the liability under Section 20(3) extends until the daughter's remarriage.
Maintenance under Section 20 HAMA includes the reasonable expenses of marriage of the unmarried daughter — see Chandra Kishore v Nanak Chand, AIR 1975 Del 175, reading Section 20(3) with Section 3(b). The obligation is on the parent personally; brothers are not under the obligation unless they have inherited the joint family property from the father.
Section 20(1) extends the obligation to aged or infirm parents. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in S Chellaiyan v Sathiakrishna, AIR 1982 AP 79 held that "aged or infirm" is determined functionally — whether the parent is able to make a living. Both son and daughter are liable equally; the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 supplies a parallel, faster Tribunal route, but Section 20 HAMA continues to be available for a civil-suit determination.
Sections 21 and 22 — dependants of a deceased Hindu
Section 21 HAMA enumerates the "dependants" of a deceased Hindu — father, mother, widow, son or son's son or son's son's son (so long as unable to obtain maintenance from the estate of his father), unmarried daughter (so long as unable to obtain maintenance from the estate of her father), widowed daughter, widow of a predeceased son, widow of a predeceased grandson, illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter (so long as a minor), and others as enumerated.
Section 22 HAMA imposes the liability — the heirs of the deceased Hindu (including a donee, devisee, or gratuitous transferee with notice of the right) are bound to maintain the dependants out of the estate inherited. The liability is not personal — it is in rem against the inherited estate. The Madras High Court in T S Mahalaxmamma v M Daiva Prasad, AIR 1984 NOC 265 read "heir" widely to include donees, devisees and gratuitous transferees with notice of the dependant's right.
Section 22(2) HAMA permits the dependant who has not inherited any property from the deceased to claim maintenance from the heirs. The liability of each heir is pro rata to the share of the estate inherited; Section 22(3) supplies the proportional rule. The right of the dependants arises only after the death of the person on whom they were dependent; Sections 21 and 22 apply only to estates of Hindus who die after the commencement of the Act — see Ramamoorthy v Sitharamma, AIR 1961 SC 1346.
Section 23 — factors for fixing quantum
Section 23 HAMA codifies the factors the court is to consider in fixing the quantum of maintenance. Sub-section (2), dealing with the wife, children and aged parents, directs the court to consider: (a) the position and status of the parties; (b) the reasonable wants of the claimant; (c) whether the claimant is justified in living separately; (d) the value of the claimant's property and any income derived from it or from the claimant's own earnings or from any other source; (e) the number of persons entitled to maintenance under the Act. Sub-section (3), dealing with dependants under Section 21, directs consideration of the net value of the estate of the deceased after satisfaction of debts, the past relations between the dependant and the deceased, the reasonable wants of the dependant, and the dependant's other resources.
The Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dutt v Kamla Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386 held that the earning capacity of the wife is a relevant — but not the sole — consideration in fixing quantum under any maintenance statute; the standard is whether she can maintain herself in the same manner as she had been maintained during the marriage. The same approach has been applied across statutes — Chaturbhuj v Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC 316 (Section 125 CrPC) and Manish Jain v Akanksha Jain, (2017) 15 SCC 801 (Section 24 HMA) — and there is no reason for a different standard under Section 23(2) HAMA.
Komalam Amma v Kumara Pillai Raghavan Pillai, (2008) 14 SCC 345 confirmed that maintenance under HAMA is a statutory right rooted in the matrimonial or familial relationship, not a contractual entitlement that the parties can vary or extinguish by private arrangement. The pleading of an out-of-court "settlement" by the husband does not defeat the statutory claim; at most, sums paid under such arrangements are credited against the decretal amount.
Sections 25 and 27 — variation and charge on property
Section 25 HAMA empowers the court to alter the amount of maintenance, whether fixed by agreement or by decree, on a material change in the circumstances justifying the alteration. The provision parallels Section 146 BNSS [Section 127 CrPC] and Section 25(2) HMA, but is broader in textual scope — the change of circumstances need not be of any particular character, and the court may include or exclude any specific item of maintenance as the circumstances justify.
Section 27 HAMA is the provision that distinguishes the HAMA route most clearly from the BNSS Section 144 route. Where the court so directs, the maintenance ordered may be declared a charge on the immovable property of the obligor. The charge runs with the property; Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 protects the dependant against transferees of the property who have notice of the right, or against transferees taking gratuitously. Section 28 HAMA reinforces the position — the dependant's right under the Act may be enforced against a transferee of the property with notice of the right or against a gratuitous transferee. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in A B Satya Krishna v A Varalakshmi, AIR 1976 AP 43 confirmed that Sections 27 and 28 of HAMA and Section 39 of the TPA operate together to secure the dependant against alienation. Section 144 BNSS [Section 125 CrPC] has no equivalent charge-on-property mechanism — recovery is by warrant in the manner of a fine, with a one-year limitation. The HAMA charge is therefore the principal reason a wife with a husband owning immovable assets may prefer the slower civil-suit route.
HAMA Section 18 versus HMA Section 25 — the Chand Dhawan position
The interaction between Section 18 HAMA and Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been a recurring problem. Section 18 HAMA operates during the subsistence of the marriage; Section 25 HMA operates at the time of, or after, a decree under the HMA. The two are sequential rather than concurrent — once a divorce decree is passed, the wife ceases to be a "wife" within Section 18 HAMA and her claim shifts to Section 25 HMA.
The Supreme Court in Chand Dhawan v Jawaharlal Dhawan, (1993) 3 SCC 406 considered the position where the husband's petition for divorce was dismissed. Section 25 HMA, by its terms, permits an order at the time of passing any decree under the HMA or at any time subsequent thereto; a dismissal of a divorce petition is not a "decree" within the meaning of Section 25, and therefore Section 25 HMA cannot be invoked. The wife in such circumstances must claim under Section 18 HAMA (during marriage subsistence) or Section 144 BNSS [Section 125 CrPC]. The position has been read consistently since.
The Supreme Court in Padmaja Sharma v Ratan Lal Sharma, (2000) 4 SCC 266 considered the converse — whether a wife who has obtained an order under Section 18 HAMA is barred from claiming under Section 25 HMA after a subsequent divorce. The Court held that the two remedies operate sequentially and not exclusively; the wife is not barred from claiming permanent alimony under Section 25 HMA after the divorce decree merely because she had earlier obtained maintenance under Section 18 HAMA during the subsistence of the marriage. Sums already received under the HAMA order are to be credited against the HMA order.
Cross-statute cumulation — the Rajnesh rule
The interaction between HAMA Section 18, BNSS Section 144 [Section 125 CrPC], HMA Sections 24 and 25, Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and Sections 36 and 37 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 has produced a layered maintenance jurisprudence. Rajnesh v Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 confronted the problem squarely and laid down a binding cumulation rule. The two-judge Bench held that a wife may proceed under more than one statute — the remedies are not mutually exclusive — but the court hearing the later application is required to take into account any award already passed under a parallel statute, and to avoid double recovery for the same head of relief.
The disclosure regime Rajnesh introduced — the affidavit of assets and liabilities filed by both parties — applies equally to a HAMA Section 18 civil suit. The Family Court hearing a HAMA suit will insist on the affidavit and will take judicial notice of any maintenance already ordered under Section 144 BNSS, Section 24 HMA, or Section 20 PWDVA. The principle is one of credit, not of bar — the wife's right under HAMA is preserved, but the quantum is adjusted to prevent duplication on overlapping heads.
The practical consequence is that a HAMA suit is rarely the first port of call. The summary criminal route under Section 144 BNSS is faster, and the PWDVA route is faster still where the wife has been subjected to domestic violence. The HAMA suit is invoked where the wife seeks a charge on immovable property under Section 27, fuller quantification through discovery and trial, or maintenance for an unmarried adult daughter (whom Section 144 BNSS does not protect) or for aged parents through Section 20.
Procedure — civil suit before the District Court
A HAMA suit is filed before the District Court (or Family Court where notified) of competent territorial jurisdiction. The Bombay High Court in Sucheta Dilip v D Shantaram, AIR 2003 Bom 390 (DB) held that the wife may file where she resides, on the principle that the "infraction of right" continues to occur where the wife is forced to live in the absence of maintenance.
Court fee is payable under the State Court Fees Act on the value of the relief claimed — typically the present value of a year's maintenance plus arrears. Where the suit is filed in forma pauperis, the wife is liable to pay court fee on the portion of the claim ultimately disallowed (see Meera v Sukumar, AIR 1994 Mad 168 (DB)). Interim maintenance pending suit may be granted under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — the Andhra Pradesh High Court in P Srinivasa Rao v P Indira, AIR 2002 AP 130 (FB) held that the implicit power to do justice supports an interim order even though the Act does not expressly provide for it.
Limitation is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — three years from the date the right to sue accrues, which is the date maintenance falls due. A claim for arrears beyond three years is barred. The fresh accrual of monthly maintenance means a wife who delays her suit retains her claim for the three years preceding the suit. The position differs from the one-year limitation in the first proviso to Section 144(3) BNSS, which is a limitation on the recovery application, not on the substantive claim — but the HAMA limitation is on the substantive claim itself.
The decree is enforced as a civil decree under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Where the decree creates a charge on immovable property under Section 27 HAMA, execution may proceed by attachment and sale of the charged property under Order 21 Rule 64. Order 21 Rule 32 (specific performance of decrees against the person) does not directly apply to a money decree of maintenance; the imprisonment-in-default mechanism under Section 144(3) BNSS is therefore not available under the civil decree, though arrest and detention under Order 21 Rule 37 may be invoked in extreme cases.
Tax treatment and ancillary points
Periodic maintenance received by a wife under a HAMA decree is taxable in her hands as income under the Income-tax Act, 1961 — the position has been worked out in a series of High Court decisions and is settled. A one-time lump-sum payment in lieu of monthly maintenance, made before the divorce decree, is treated as a transfer between spouses and is not taxable; a payment after the divorce, between former spouses who are no longer "relatives" within Section 56(2)(x), may attract different treatment depending on the structure.
Stamp duty on the settlement deed or compromise decree varies by State; Maharashtra and Karnataka have specific concessional provisions for matrimonial settlement deeds.
A property given to a wife in lieu of maintenance becomes her absolute property under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Prakash v Pushpa Rani, AIR 2004 NOC 463 (AP) so held, on the foundation that pre-existing maintenance right under the personal law converts limited estate into absolute estate under Section 14. The position has implications for the wife's inheritance and her capacity to dispose of the property.
When HAMA is the right route
Section 18 HAMA is the right route, rather than Section 144 BNSS or Section 24 HMA, in four situations.
The first is where the wife seeks a charge on the husband's immovable property under Section 27 HAMA. No parallel mechanism exists under BNSS or HMA; the charge is the principal long-term security against a defaulting husband.
The second is where the wife seeks fuller quantification through discovery and trial of the husband's income. The HAMA civil suit permits inspection of accounts, witnesses on commission, and a full evidentiary record. The summary Section 144 BNSS proceeding, even after Rajnesh, is structurally less suited to detailed forensic investigation of the husband's income — particularly relevant where the husband is in business, with off-the-books income, rather than in regular salaried employment.
The third is where the claimant is outside the categories protected by Section 144 BNSS. Unmarried adult daughters (Section 20(3) HAMA), aged or infirm parents, and dependants of a deceased Hindu under Sections 21 and 22 HAMA have no equivalent under BNSS Section 144 except for the limited category of parents under sub-clause (d) of Section 144(1) BNSS.
The fourth is where the divorce decree has been passed and a Section 25 HMA permanent-alimony order is being sought — Section 25 HMA is the appropriate route, but a parallel claim or a successive claim under Section 18 HAMA during marriage subsistence is preserved by Padmaja Sharma.
The HAMA route is slower and more expensive than the summary route. Family Courts hearing HAMA suits work at the pace of the Civil Court — pleadings, framing of issues, evidence, arguments, judgment — and the suit may take three to five years to disposal at the trial-court level. Interim maintenance under Section 151 CPC supplies a partial answer; for genuinely urgent cases, a parallel Section 144 BNSS application is filed alongside the HAMA suit, with Rajnesh's cumulation rule managing the overlap.
The open questions
Three questions remain genuinely open on the HAMA framework.
The first is the position of the second wife of a void bigamous marriage under Section 18(1) HAMA. The Bombay High Court in Mangla v Dhondiba, AIR 2010 Bom 122 (DB) denies the claim under Section 18; the Delhi High Court in Suresh Khullar v Vijay Kumar, AIR 2008 Del 1 (DB) and Narinder Pal Kaur v Manjeet Singh, AIR 2008 Del 7 (DB) reads the term widely to include the second wife in cases of suppressed first marriage. The Supreme Court has not directly settled the split.
The second is the relationship between Section 19 HAMA (widowed daughter-in-law) and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005, giving the daughter equal coparcener rights and consolidating the widow's share). The 2005 amendment has substantially reduced the practical relevance of Section 19 HAMA — most widows will now take a share under Section 6 HSA — but the residual application of Section 19 where the husband died before 2005 (and the share never crystallised) remains active in litigation.
The third is the interaction between Section 23 HAMA's quantum factors and the Rajnesh framework under Section 144 BNSS. The two are textually similar but not identical; Rajnesh's twenty-five-per-cent benchmark and asset-affidavit regime have not been formally incorporated into HAMA practice. Family Courts hearing HAMA suits have begun applying the affidavit framework by analogy, but the formal extension awaits a Supreme Court ruling.
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is the most thorough of the Indian maintenance statutes. It is also the slowest. The choice between HAMA, BNSS Section 144, HMA Sections 24 and 25, and the PWDVA is a question of forum strategy — which the modern Indian matrimonial bar makes on the facts of the case, with Rajnesh's cumulation rule managing the overlap. For a wife seeking a charge on the husband's immovable property, full discovery of business income, or maintenance for an unmarried adult daughter or aged parents, HAMA is the route. For everything else, the summary statutes typically come first.