Filing a sexual harassment complaint at work — section by section
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 — referred to in practice as the POSH Act — is Parliament's statutory implementation of the Supreme Court's guidelines in Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241. The Act runs to thirty sections and a short schedule. Its operative spine sits in seven provisions — Section 2(n) defines sexual harassment, Section 2(o) defines "workplace", Section 3 prohibits the conduct, Section 4 mandates an Internal Committee in every workplace employing ten or more workers, Section 9 fixes the three-month complaint window (extendable on recorded reasons), Section 11 prescribes the inquiry, and Section 26 supplies the penalty against an employer who defaults. This guide walks each operative section in the order in which a complaint moves through the statute, reads the wording against the Supreme Court's seminal Sections 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution jurisprudence in Apparel Export Promotion Council v A K Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759, and notes the compliance directions the Court issued in Aureliano Fernandes v State of Goa, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 627 after finding the Act was being routinely under-implemented across States and Union Territories. The criminal-law overlap with Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] is dealt with at the close.
Sexual harassment at the Indian workplace was a tortious wrong and an offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 long before it was a statutory civil cause of action. Until the POSH Act, 2013, the only operating framework was the set of guidelines the Supreme Court laid down in Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 — guidelines drawn by Verma C J from Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979 (CEDAW) and read into Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. The 2013 Act is a deliberate statutory codification of those guidelines; the Supreme Court has since treated the Act and the Vishaka guidelines as a continuous regime, with the Act now supplying the operative procedure and Vishaka supplying the constitutional purpose. The Court's directions in Medha Kotwal Lele v Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297, immediately before the Act came into force, and in Aureliano Fernandes v State of Goa, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 627, a decade after, frame the compliance reality that the statute alone does not yet produce.
The law in plain English — what the POSH Act does
The POSH Act does five things in sequence. It defines what counts as sexual harassment at a workplace; it prohibits it; it requires every workplace of ten or more workers to constitute an Internal Committee; it supplies a three-month complaint window with an in-house inquiry procedure that runs on civil-court powers; and it penalises an employer who fails to constitute the committee, fails to act on a committee report, or fails to file the prescribed annual return. The Act applies to women working in any capacity — regular, temporary, ad hoc, daily-wage, on contract through a contractor, on probation, on apprenticeship, on a co-working or platform engagement, on a domestic-work engagement at a household. The definition of "employee" in Section 2(f) is deliberately wide.
The Act does not displace the criminal-law route. A woman aggrieved by an act of sexual harassment may simultaneously file a first-information report under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] alleging an offence under Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] — sexual harassment as a cognisable offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment up to three years (in the case of physical contact and advances, demand for sexual favours, or showing pornography), or with imprisonment up to one year and/or fine (for sexually coloured remarks). The two regimes run in parallel; the Internal Committee inquiry is a statutory civil/quasi-judicial proceeding, the FIR is a criminal proceeding.
Section 2(n) — what counts as sexual harassment
Section 2(n) of the POSH Act defines "sexual harassment" to include any one or more of the following unwelcome acts or behaviour, whether directly or by implication: physical contact and advances; a demand or request for sexual favours; making sexually coloured remarks; showing pornography; and any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature. The textual hinge is the word "unwelcome" — what is unwelcome turns on the perception of the woman to whom the conduct is addressed, not on the intent of the man addressing it. The Supreme Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v A K Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 — the first post-Vishaka reading of the test — held that an attempt to molest a junior employee in a lift was sexual harassment within the Vishaka guidelines even where the physical contact was not consummated; the Court restored the dismissal order that the Delhi High Court had set aside.
Section 2(n) is supplemented by Section 3(2), which lists five "circumstances" that, if they occur in relation to or are connected with any act or behaviour of sexual harassment, may amount to sexual harassment: implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in employment; implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment; implied or explicit threat about present or future employment status; interference with the woman's work or creation of an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment; and humiliating treatment likely to affect the woman's health or safety. Section 3(2) imports into Indian law the United States doctrinal distinction between quid pro quo harassment (the first three sub-clauses) and hostile environment harassment (the fourth and fifth) — but the Act treats both as actionable on the same footing.
Section 2(o) — what counts as a "workplace"
The Act adopts a wide definition of "workplace" in Section 2(o), and the width matters because the Internal Committee's jurisdiction and the employer's Section 19 duties attach only where the conduct occurs at a workplace. Section 2(o) includes: any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment, enterprise, institution, office, branch or unit established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially financed by the appropriate Government; any private sector organisation or private venture, undertaking, enterprise, institution, establishment, society, trust, non-governmental organisation, unit or service provider carrying on commercial, professional, vocational, educational, entertainment, industrial, health services or financial activities; hospitals or nursing homes; any sports institute, stadium, sports complex or competition or games venue; any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment, including transportation provided by the employer; and a dwelling place or a house — to bring domestic workers under the Local Committee route in Section 6.
The "any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment" clause is the operative bridge. Conduct on an official tour, at a client site, at a conference or training, at an off-site team event, in transport provided by the employer, and at virtual workplaces (a development the courts have read into the Section 2(o) language during and after the COVID-19 period) attaches to the workplace and therefore to the Internal Committee's jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court in Anita Suresh v Union of India, (2019) SCC OnLine Del 7508 read the workplace definition to cover work-related off-site interactions and held the employer's Internal Committee competent to inquire.
Section 3 — the prohibition
Section 3(1) prohibits sexual harassment at the workplace in absolute terms — "no woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace". Section 3(2) catalogues the five "circumstances" that connect to the prohibition (set out above). The prohibition is the foundation of the employer's Section 19 duties — a workplace that does not actively prevent and redress sexual harassment is in continuing breach of Section 3 and Section 19 even before any individual complaint is filed.
Sections 4 and 6 — the two committees: ICC and LCC
Section 4 requires every employer of a workplace employing ten or more workers to constitute, by an order in writing, an Internal Committee. The Internal Committee is to consist of: a Presiding Officer who is a woman employed at a senior level at the workplace (or, where no such senior-level woman is employed, a woman employed at a senior level from any other office or administrative unit, or from another workplace of the same employer); not less than two members from amongst employees, preferably committed to the cause of women or who have had experience in social work or have legal knowledge; and one member from amongst non-governmental organisations or associations committed to the cause of women or familiar with issues relating to sexual harassment. At least one-half of the total members so nominated must be women. The members of the Internal Committee, other than the external member, hold office for a tenure of three years and are remunerated as the appropriate government may prescribe.
Section 6 supplies the parallel arrangement for workplaces with fewer than ten workers and for complaints against the employer itself — the appropriate Government constitutes, for every district, a Local Committee under the District Officer notified under Section 5. The District Officer is the District Magistrate, Additional District Magistrate, Collector, or Deputy Collector. The Local Committee's composition (Section 7) mirrors that of the Internal Committee — a chairperson from amongst eminent women in the field of social work and committed to the cause of women; one member from amongst the women working in block, taluka or tehsil or ward or municipality in the district; two members from non-governmental organisations or associations committed to the cause of women, of whom at least one is a woman; an ex officio member from a department dealing with social welfare or women and child development; and where the complainant is from a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, a member from such community. The composition rules — particularly the external-member requirement and the woman-Presiding-Officer requirement — are the points on which Internal Committee constitution most often fails on judicial review. The Delhi High Court in Ruchika Singh Chhabra v Air France India, (2018) SCC OnLine Del 9340 set aside an Internal Committee report on the ground that the external member was not from an NGO familiar with sexual harassment issues — a structural defect that vitiates the inquiry.
Section 9 — the three-month complaint window
Section 9(1) of the POSH Act prescribes that any aggrieved woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace to the Internal Committee — or, where no Internal Committee is constituted, to the Local Committee — within a period of three months from the date of the incident, and in case of a series of incidents, within a period of three months from the date of the last incident. The proviso to Section 9(1) permits the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to extend the time limit not exceeding three months if the committee is satisfied that the circumstances were such which prevented the woman from filing a complaint within the said period.
Section 9(2) provides for assistance — where the aggrieved woman is unable to make a complaint in writing, the Presiding Officer or any Member of the Internal Committee, or the chairperson or any member of the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall render all reasonable assistance to the woman for making the complaint in writing. Rule 6 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 requires the complaint to be submitted in six copies along with supporting documents and the names and addresses of the witnesses. Where the aggrieved woman is unable to make the complaint on account of her physical or mental incapacity or death or otherwise, Section 9 read with Rule 6(ii)–(v) permits her legal heir or any other person prescribed (relative or friend, co-worker, special educator, qualified psychiatrist or psychologist, guardian or authority under whose care she is receiving treatment or care) to make the complaint with her written consent.
Section 10 — conciliation
Section 10(1) provides that the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, before initiating an inquiry under Section 11, may at the request of the aggrieved woman take steps to settle the matter between her and the respondent through conciliation. The proviso is the critical safeguard — no monetary settlement shall be made as the basis of conciliation. Conciliation is initiated only on the woman's request; the respondent cannot demand it. Where a settlement is arrived at, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee shall record the settlement and forward it to the employer (or District Officer) to take action as specified in the recommendation, and no further inquiry shall be conducted. Where conciliation fails or the woman opts not to conciliate, the matter proceeds to inquiry under Section 11.
Section 11 — the inquiry, civil-court powers, and the 90-day timeline
Section 11(1) requires the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, where the respondent is an employee, to proceed to make inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent. Where no such service rules exist, the inquiry shall be conducted in such manner as may be prescribed under the Rules. The Internal Committee shall complete the inquiry within a period of ninety days. Section 11(3) confers on the Internal Committee and the Local Committee, for the purposes of making an inquiry under sub-section (1), the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit, in respect of three matters — summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; requiring the discovery and production of documents; and any other matter which may be prescribed.
The civil-court powers under Section 11(3) elevate the Internal Committee from an internal departmental body to a quasi-judicial committee. The inquiry is to be conducted following the principles of natural justice — notice, opportunity to be heard, opportunity to test evidence, opportunity to lead defence evidence, and a reasoned finding by an impartial committee. Rules 7 and 8 of the POSH Rules, 2013 prescribe the procedure — the Internal Committee shall send one copy of the complaint received under Rule 6 to the respondent within seven working days; the respondent shall file his reply along with his list of documents and names and addresses of witnesses within ten working days; the inquiry shall be made by giving an opportunity of being heard to both parties; the committee shall make the inquiry on the basis of preponderance of probabilities (the civil standard) and not on the criminal-trial standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 12 — interim relief during inquiry
Section 12 confers a power of recommendation for interim relief on the Internal Committee and the Local Committee. During the pendency of an inquiry, on a written request made by the aggrieved woman, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee may recommend to the employer to — transfer the aggrieved woman or the respondent to any other workplace; grant leave to the aggrieved woman up to a period of three months (in addition to the leave she would otherwise be entitled to); grant such other relief as may be prescribed. The leave granted to the aggrieved woman under Section 12(1)(b) shall not affect her existing leave balance. Rule 8(d) of the POSH Rules, 2013 supplies the additional reliefs — restraint of the respondent from reporting on the work performance of the aggrieved woman or writing her confidential report, and any other relief that may be prescribed by the appropriate government. The recommendation is binding on the employer; the employer is to implement the recommendation and send a report of such implementation to the Internal Committee.
Section 13 — the inquiry report and the employer's 60-day action duty
Section 13(1) requires the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, on completion of the inquiry, to provide a report of its findings to the employer (or the District Officer) within a period of ten days from the date of completion of the inquiry, and such report shall be made available to the concerned parties. Section 13(2) provides that where the Internal Committee arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall recommend to the employer (or the District Officer) that no action is required to be taken in the matter.
Section 13(3) provides that where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been proved, it shall recommend to the employer (or the District Officer) to — take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent (or where no such service rules have been made, in such manner as may be prescribed); and deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service rules applicable to the respondent, from the salary or wages of the respondent such sum as it may consider appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman or to her legal heirs, as it may determine, in accordance with the provisions of Section 15.
Section 13(4) requires the employer or the District Officer, as the case may be, to act upon the recommendation within sixty days of its receipt. Where the recommendation is for disciplinary action, the employer must initiate action for misconduct; where the recommendation is for compensation under Section 15, the employer must implement the deduction from the salary or wages of the respondent. Section 15 catalogues the factors the committee must consider in determining the compensation — the mental trauma, pain, suffering, and emotional distress caused to the aggrieved woman; the loss in career opportunity due to the incident; the medical expenses incurred by the victim for physical or psychiatric treatment; the income and financial status of the respondent; and the feasibility of such payment in lump sum or in instalments.
Section 14 — false or malicious complaints
Section 14 carries a deliberate safeguard against misuse — and a deliberate safeguard for the genuine complainant. Section 14(1) provides that where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, at the conclusion of the inquiry, comes to the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent is malicious or that the aggrieved woman or any other person making the complaint has made the complaint knowing it to be false, or has produced any forged or misleading document, it may recommend to the employer (or the District Officer) to take action against the woman or the person making the complaint in accordance with the service rules. The Supreme Court has read Section 14 narrowly — in Anita Suresh v Union of India, (2019) SCC OnLine Del 7508 and in subsequent High Court decisions, the courts have emphasised that a complaint that is not proved is not the same as a malicious complaint; the inability of the aggrieved woman to prove or substantiate the complaint or provide adequate proof need not attract action against the complainant under Section 14, and a mere conclusion that the allegation has not been proved is no ground for action against the complainant. Section 14(2) extends the safeguard to a witness whom the committee finds to have given false evidence or produced a forged or misleading document.
Sections 16 and 17 — confidentiality and the penalty for breach
Section 16 imposes a duty of confidentiality. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Right to Information Act, 2005, the contents of the complaint made under Section 9, the identity and addresses of the aggrieved woman, respondent and witnesses, any information relating to conciliation and inquiry proceedings, recommendations of the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, and the action taken by the employer or the District Officer, shall not be published, communicated or made known to the public, press and media in any manner. Section 16 is a non-obstante override of the Right to Information Act, 2005 — RTI applications seeking the contents of a POSH inquiry have been routinely rejected on the strength of Section 16, and the Central Information Commission has affirmed the exemption.
Section 17 penalises a breach of the Section 16 confidentiality duty. Where any person entrusted with the duty to handle or deal with the complaint, inquiry or any recommendations or action to be taken under the provisions of the Act, contravenes the provisions of Section 16, he shall be liable for penalty in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person — or where no such rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed. The Act does not itself fix a monetary penalty; the disciplinary route under the applicable service rules is the operative remedy.
Section 19 — the employer's positive duties
Section 19 is the employer's standing checklist. Every employer shall — provide a safe working environment at the workplace which shall include safety from the persons coming into contact at the workplace; display at any conspicuous place in the workplace the penal consequences of sexual harassment and the order constituting the Internal Committee under Section 4; organise workshops and awareness programmes at regular intervals for sensitising the employees with the provisions of the Act and orientation programmes for the members of the Internal Committee in the manner as may be prescribed; provide necessary facilities to the Internal Committee or the Local Committee for dealing with the complaint and conducting an inquiry; assist in securing the attendance of respondent and witnesses before the Internal Committee or the Local Committee; make available such information to the Internal Committee or the Local Committee as it may require having regard to the complaint made under Section 9(1); provide assistance to the woman if she so chooses to file a complaint in relation to the offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or any other law for the time being in force; cause to initiate action, under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [now the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023] or any other law for the time being in force, against the perpetrator, or if the aggrieved woman so desires, where the perpetrator is not an employee, in the workplace at which the incident of sexual harassment took place; treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the service rules and initiate action for such misconduct; and monitor the timely submission of reports by the Internal Committee.
Sections 22 and 23 — annual return and District Officer monitoring
Section 22 requires the employer to include in its report prepared under any law for the time being in force, the number of cases filed, if any, and their disposal under the Act, in the annual report of his organisation, or where no such report is required to be prepared, intimate such number of cases, if any, to the District Officer. The District Officer is to maintain the data submitted by employers. Section 23 obliges the appropriate Government to monitor the implementation of the Act and to maintain data on the number of cases filed and disposed of in respect of all cases of sexual harassment at workplace.
The Supreme Court in Aureliano Fernandes v State of Goa, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 627 found, on a writ petition arising out of an inquiry against an academic at Goa University, that the implementation of the Act across the country was uneven and in several States and Union Territories outright deficient — Internal Committees were not constituted, Local Committees did not exist in several districts, the District Officer had not been notified, and the annual return mechanism under Sections 21 and 22 was not operating. The Court issued a set of directions to the Union of India, all State Governments and Union Territories, to undertake a time-bound exercise to verify the constitution of Internal Committees at all workplaces, the existence of Local Committees in every district, the notification of District Officers, the conduct of orientation and skill-building programmes for committee members, and the operationalisation of the SHe-Box portal of the Ministry of Women and Child Development for tracking complaints. Aureliano Fernandes remains the most current compliance audit of the Act and the operative reading of Sections 22 and 23 today.
Section 26 — penalty on the employer
Section 26 is the enforcement teeth of the Act. Where the employer fails to constitute an Internal Committee under Section 4(1), or fails to take action under Sections 13, 14, and 22, or contravenes or attempts to contravene or abets contravention of other provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder, he shall be punishable with a fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees. Where the employer, after having been previously convicted of an offence punishable under the Act, is again convicted of the same offence, he shall be liable to twice the punishment which might have been imposed on a first conviction, subject to the punishment being maximum provided for the same offence — and the cancellation of his licence or withdrawal, or non-renewal, or approval, or cancellation of the registration, as the case may be, by the Government or local authority required for carrying on of his business or activity. Section 26 is the bridge between the in-house regime and the State's external enforcement — the offence is cognisable, although in practice prosecutions under Section 26 remain rare.
Watch for — distinguishing POSH from the criminal-law route
The POSH Act, 2013 and the criminal-law route under Section 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Section 354A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860] run in parallel; they are not alternatives. Section 75 of the BNS punishes a man who commits any of the acts referred to in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (1) — physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; a demand or request for sexual favours; showing pornography against the will of a woman; or making sexually coloured remarks — with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, for clauses (i), (ii) and (iii), and with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both, for clause (iv).
The differences are these. The POSH route is statutory civil-cum-quasi-judicial — the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities, the remedy is action under service rules and compensation under Section 15, the proceeding is confidential under Section 16, and the limitation is three months extendable to six. The Section 75 BNS route is criminal — the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, the remedy is conviction and sentence under the Sanhita, the proceeding is public, and the limitation is the period prescribed under Section 514 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Section 468 CrPC] (which depends on the maximum sentence). The same incident can sustain both proceedings; an acquittal in the criminal trial does not bar an adverse finding by the Internal Committee on the civil standard, and a finding of misconduct by the Internal Committee does not bar a criminal trial. The Supreme Court has expressly upheld the parallel-track architecture.
Where things go wrong — the four most common compliance failures
The four failures that produce the bulk of POSH litigation are these. First, the Internal Committee is not constituted at all, or is constituted defectively — the Presiding Officer is not a senior woman, the external member is not from an NGO familiar with sexual harassment issues, the gender balance falls below half, or the three-year tenure is not respected. Ruchika Singh Chhabra v Air France India, (2018) SCC OnLine Del 9340 and a line of High Court decisions hold that a defectively constituted Internal Committee renders the entire inquiry void; the employer cannot cure the defect by adding the missing member after the inquiry is complete.
Second, the inquiry is conducted in breach of natural justice — the respondent is not given a copy of the complaint within seven working days under Rule 7, the witnesses are examined without giving the parties the opportunity to cross-examine, or the inquiry report does not record reasons for the findings. The civil-court powers under Section 11(3) come with the civil-court duty to follow the principles of natural justice; a report that is shown to be in breach of natural justice will be set aside in a writ petition.
Third, the conciliation under Section 10 is misused to settle the matter through a monetary payment — the proviso to Section 10(1) expressly forbids monetary settlement as the basis of conciliation, and a settlement so reached is void.
Fourth, the confidentiality duty under Section 16 is breached — the names of the parties or the contents of the complaint are circulated through internal email lists, leaked to the press, or disclosed in response to an RTI application. The Section 17 penalty does not by itself supply a remedy to the woman aggrieved by the breach; her remedy is to sue in tort for the breach of confidentiality (or to invoke the Section 21 of the Constitution informational-privacy doctrine after Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1) in addition to the disciplinary action against the person who breached the duty.
Resources — sections, rules, and judgments to keep at hand
The operating manual is the Act itself — Sections 2(n), 2(o), 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23 and 26 are the working spine. The procedural detail sits in the POSH Rules, 2013 — Rules 6 (complaint), 7 (inquiry), 8 (interim and disciplinary action), 9 (action on report) and 14 (annual report) supply the day-to-day procedure. The Supreme Court's Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 supplies the constitutional ground; Apparel Export Promotion Council v A K Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 supplies the operative reading of "sexual harassment"; Medha Kotwal Lele v Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297 supplies the enforcement directions immediately before the Act came into force; and Aureliano Fernandes v State of Goa, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 627 supplies the current compliance audit. The Ministry of Women and Child Development's SHe-Box portal supplies a parallel online complaint route for government employees and a tracker for complaints filed across workplaces.
Outcome — what the statute produces and where it falls short
What the POSH Act, 2013 produces is a closed-loop statutory regime — a definition (Section 2(n)) tied to a workplace definition (Section 2(o)), tied to a prohibition (Section 3), tied to a committee (Sections 4 and 6), tied to a complaint window (Section 9), tied to an inquiry on civil-court powers (Section 11), tied to interim relief (Section 12), tied to a report and a sixty-day action duty (Section 13), tied to a compensation formula (Section 15), tied to confidentiality (Section 16), tied to employer duties (Section 19), tied to an annual return (Section 22), and tied to an employer penalty (Section 26). Each step references the next; the Act is one of the more tightly drafted procedural statutes on the Indian books.
Where the Act falls short is the implementation gap that the Supreme Court catalogued in Aureliano Fernandes — Internal Committees not constituted, Local Committees not in place, District Officers not notified, annual returns not filed, orientation programmes not conducted. The statute supplies the architecture; the State's implementation supplies the reality. The companion article on the Internal Committee — composition, powers, and procedure — works through the Section 4 and Section 11 machinery in detail.