WhatsApp threats — saving the evidence the right way
A WhatsApp threat is an electronic record admissible against the sender — but only when it is preserved in compliance with the certificate regime under Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. The doctrinal arc from Anvar P V v P K Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 through Tomaso Bruno v State of UP, (2015) 7 SCC 178 and Shafhi Mohammad v State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801 to Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 fixes the mandatory-certificate rule and its narrowly drawn exceptions. The operational discipline turns on the original device kept unaltered, a hash value computed at the moment of seizure, a chain-of-custody log, a server-side preservation request to the intermediary, and metadata-bearing screenshots.
A WhatsApp threat — a message threatening injury to the person, reputation, or property of the recipient, or to anyone in whom the recipient is interested — engages the substantive offence of criminal intimidation under Section 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [Sections 503, 506 and 507 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860], with Section 78 BNS [Section 354D IPC] covering the stalking variant and Sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 covering the privacy-violation and obscene-content variants where the threat is accompanied by intimate imagery. The evidentiary architecture under which the threat must be brought before the trial court is the regime under Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 [Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872] — the mandatory certificate framework that has been the subject of a six-year doctrinal arc from Anvar P V v P K Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 through Tomaso Bruno v State of UP, (2015) 7 SCC 178 and Shafhi Mohammad v State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801 to the present working rule in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1. The preservation discipline at the moment of seizure, the chain-of-custody log through the investigation, and the certificate-bearing production at the moment of trial together determine whether a WhatsApp threat reaches the verdict stage or is excluded for evidentiary deficiency.
The substantive offence — criminal intimidation, stalking and the IT Act overlay
Section 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 supplies the substantive offence. Section 351(1) defines criminal intimidation as threatening another with injury to person, reputation, or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which the person is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which the person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Section 351(2) prescribes imprisonment up to two years or fine or both as the punishment for the simple-intimidation form, with Section 351(3) prescribing up to seven years' imprisonment for the aggravated form — threat to cause death or grievous hurt, destruction by fire, an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment, or imputation of unchastity to a woman. Section 351(4) prescribes the same punishment as 351(2) for criminal intimidation by anonymous communication, with the further requirement that the act of taking precaution to conceal the name or abode of the sender attracts an additional penalty. The Section 351(4) anonymous-communication formulation maps directly onto WhatsApp threats sent from unknown numbers, throwaway accounts, or numbers registered in fictitious names.
Section 78 of the BNS [Section 354D IPC] supplies the parallel stalking offence — a man who follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact, such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman, or monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking. The "monitors the use" formulation expressly reaches digital stalking; the punishment is up to three years' imprisonment for the first conviction and up to five years for the second. Where the threat carries a sexual element or is accompanied by intimate imagery, Section 79 BNS [Section 509 IPC] (word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman) supplies the further substantive offence. Where the intimate imagery violates the recipient's reasonable expectation of privacy — typically in the threat-with-leaked-imagery class — Section 66E of the IT Act (punishment for violation of privacy) is the medium-specific offence. Where the content is obscene, Section 67 of the IT Act applies; where the content depicts sexually explicit acts, Section 67A applies.
The first-information procedure runs through Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Section 154 CrPC]. The criminal-intimidation offence under Section 351 BNS is cognizable in its aggravated forms; the simple-intimidation form is non-cognizable. The stalking offence under Section 78 BNS is cognizable. The IT Act offences under Sections 66E, 67 and 67A are cognizable. The composite first-information that arrays the BNS provisions alongside the IT Act provisions therefore proceeds on the cognizable footing and engages the mandatory-registration rule in Lalita Kumari v Govt of UP, (2014) 2 SCC 1.
The Section 63 BSA framework — what it requires
Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 [Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872] supplies the conditions of admissibility for electronic records produced in evidence. Section 63(1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the BSA, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof or production of the original, on satisfaction of the conditions in Section 63(2).
Section 63(2) lays down the four substantive conditions — the computer output containing the information must have been produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer or communication device was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on; the information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived must have been regularly fed into the computer or communication device in the ordinary course of those activities; throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device must have been operating properly, or if not, the non-operation must not have been such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and the information contained in the electronic record must reproduce or be derived from such information fed into the computer or communication device in the ordinary course of the said activities.
Section 63(4) supplies the certificate requirement. Where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of Section 63, a certificate doing any of the following must accompany the electronic record — identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced; giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device; and dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in Section 63(2) relate. The certificate must be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate). It is sufficient for the matters stated in the certificate to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating them. The Section 63(4) certificate is the operational chokepoint of the regime.
Section 39 of the BSA, with the consolidated presumptions architecture at Sections 85A to 85C of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 retained in modified form, supplies the presumption framework. The presumption as to electronic agreements attaches to any electronic record purporting to be an agreement containing the electronic signature of the parties; the presumption as to secure electronic records and signatures attaches to secure electronic records and signatures within the meaning of Sections 14 and 15 of the IT Act, 2000; the presumption as to Electronic Signature Certificates attaches to the information listed in a certificate accepted by the subscriber. Section 47A of the BSA preserves the opinion-of-the-Certifying-Authority framework for electronic-signature verification. Section 79A of the IT Act, 2000 supplies the framework for the notification of Examiners of Electronic Evidence — bodies operating under CERT-IN and the network of central and State Forensic Science Laboratories — whose opinions on the integrity of electronic records carry the statutory imprimatur.
The doctrinal arc — Navjot Sandhu, Anvar P V, Tomaso Bruno, Shafhi Mohammad and Arjun Panditrao
The first stage of the doctrine on the Section 65B certificate is State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 — the Parliament-attack-case appeal. The Supreme Court there held, in the context of telephone-call records, that secondary electronic evidence could be admitted under the general framework at Sections 63 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 even where the Section 65B certificate was not produced, on the footing that the strict-certificate reading would render Section 65B unworkable in cases where the original device was outside the prosecution's control. The reading was treated as the operative rule for nearly a decade.
The second stage is Anvar P V v P K Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 — a defamation matter arising out of an election speech that had been recorded and reproduced. The Supreme Court overruled Navjot Sandhu on the certificate point and held that Section 65B is a complete code on the admissibility of secondary electronic evidence. The Court was express that the general Sections 63 and 65 framework cannot be invoked to circumvent the Section 65B(4) certificate requirement, and that the certificate is mandatory at the stage of production. The Court left a narrow opening — where the electronic record is the original itself, produced before the court, the Section 65B framework is not engaged; the document is treated as primary evidence under the Section 62 framework.
The third stage is Tomaso Bruno v State of UP, (2015) 7 SCC 178 — a homicide case in which the Court briefly suggested, in passing observations, that the strict Anvar P V rule could be relaxed where the certificate was not available. The observations were not central to the ratio in Tomaso Bruno, but they sowed doctrinal confusion at the High Court level for the next three years. The position was further muddied by Shafhi Mohammad v State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801 — a two-judge bench ruling in a vehicular-homicide context, in which the Court held that the Section 65B(4) certificate requirement is procedural and could be dispensed with "in the interests of justice" where the party adducing the evidence does not have control over the device. Shafhi Mohammad created a carve-out for victims and parties not in possession of the device — the very party-class who would, in a WhatsApp threat matter, typically be the recipient producing the threat against the sender.
The fourth and present stage is Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, hearing an election-petition matter, was asked to resolve the conflict between Anvar P V and Shafhi Mohammad. The Court held that Anvar P V states the correct law; Shafhi Mohammad stands overruled to the extent it held otherwise; and the Tomaso Bruno observations are obiter and do not displace Anvar P V. The Court further clarified that the Section 65B(4) certificate must be produced along with the electronic record "wherever feasible" — the temporal direction in the judgment is "as soon as possible" — and that where the certificate is in the hands of a third party who is unwilling or unable to produce it, the court has the power under Sections 91 of the CrPC and the general inherent jurisdiction to direct production. The doctrinal effect for the WhatsApp threat fact-pattern is that the recipient who has received the threat may obtain a Section 63(4) BSA certificate by approaching the intermediary or the device manufacturer, and where the certificate is not voluntarily furnished, may move the trial court for a production direction.
The post-Arjun Panditrao position has been worked out through a series of High Court rulings in 2021 and 2022, with substantial uniformity emerging on three operational sub-rules. First, the recipient's own device — on which the threat was received — is treated as the original electronic record; a printout or screenshot taken from the recipient's own device is therefore secondary evidence requiring the Section 63(4) certificate, but the device itself, produced before the court, is primary evidence not requiring the certificate. Second, the WhatsApp server-side log — supplied by Meta in response to a Section 94 BNSS production order — is secondary evidence requiring the certificate from the intermediary's responsible-officer. Third, the forensic image of the recipient's device, taken by a notified Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the IT Act, is secondary evidence requiring the certificate from the Examiner.
The preservation workflow — five components
The preservation workflow that will withstand a Section 63 BSA challenge has five components. The first is the original device. The recipient's mobile phone, on which the threatening WhatsApp message was received, is the primary electronic record. The device must be preserved unaltered from the moment the threat is received until the device can be produced before the investigating officer or the court. Powering down the device without further use is the safest preservation step; continuing to use the device for ordinary communication risks the auto-deletion of disappearing messages, the overwriting of cache, and the loss of the unaltered-state defence at trial. Where the recipient cannot reasonably surrender the device — the device is the recipient's only communication device, the recipient is dependent on it for work or family — the practical compromise is to obtain a forensic image of the device at the earliest opportunity from a notified Examiner of Electronic Evidence, with the image accompanied by a Section 63(4) certificate.
The second is the hash value. A cryptographic hash — typically the SHA-256 algorithm output — computed against the relevant message file, the chat database (the msgstore.db file on the Android filesystem, or the equivalent ChatStorage.sqlite on the iOS filesystem), or the forensic image as a whole, fixes the integrity of the record at the moment of computation. Any subsequent alteration to the data produces a different hash. The hash value, recorded contemporaneously in the chain-of-custody log and incorporated in the Section 63(4) certificate, is the technical anchor of the integrity defence. The practice in the better-resourced State cyber-crime cells is to compute the hash in the presence of two independent witnesses and to record the hash in the seizure memo prepared under Section 105 of the BNSS [Section 100 CrPC].
The third is the chain-of-custody log. From the moment the device or the forensic image is seized, every subsequent transfer of custody — from the seizing officer to the Forensic Science Laboratory, from the FSL to the investigating officer, from the investigating officer to the trial court — must be documented in a continuous log that records the date, time, transferring person, receiving person, hash value at transfer, condition of the seal on the storage, and purpose of the transfer. The chain-of-custody log is itself a document admissible in evidence and is the principal defence against the cross-examination line that the record has been tampered with between seizure and production. The Indian Evidence Act framework treats the chain-of-custody log as part of the regular-course-of-business records under the legacy Section 90A IEA framework, retained in modified form in the BSA.
The fourth is the server-side preservation request. WhatsApp messages, in the end-to-end-encrypted default configuration, are not stored on the Meta server in plaintext form — the server holds only the metadata (sender, recipient, timestamp, message-ID, group identifier where applicable) and the encrypted ciphertext for delivery. The metadata is, however, available to the intermediary, and the production of the metadata is the principal route to the corroboration of the sender's identity where the sender denies authorship of the message. The mechanism is a Section 94 BNSS [Section 91 CrPC] production order from the investigating officer to the intermediary's nodal officer, with the order specifying the message-IDs or the date-range of the messages and the metadata fields sought. Rule 4(2) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 — the "traceability" provision — requires significant social media intermediaries (a category that includes WhatsApp) to identify the first originator of information in a chain, on the order of a court of competent jurisdiction or on a notification by the competent authority under Section 69 of the IT Act, where the information relates to specified categories of serious offences. The 2021 Rules also impose a 180-day preservation obligation on the intermediary for records relating to traced communications. The traceability mandate is under challenge before the Delhi High Court in WhatsApp LLC v Union of India, W.P. (C) 7284 of 2021 — the petitioner argues that the traceability requirement is incompatible with the end-to-end-encryption guarantee and that compliance would require the platform to be re-architected in a manner that compromises the encryption integrity of every message on the platform; the matter is pending at the time of writing.
The fifth is the metadata-bearing screenshot. Where the device cannot be surrendered and a forensic image is not immediately obtainable, the immediate preservation step is a screenshot of the threatening message with the metadata visible — the sender phone number, the WhatsApp display name as it appeared on the recipient's device, the timestamp of the message, the group identifier where the message was sent in a group context, and the recipient's device clock at the moment of screenshot. The screenshot is secondary evidence and requires the Section 63(4) BSA certificate; the certificate may be furnished by the recipient as the person in charge of the device that produced the screenshot. The screenshot is not a substitute for the original device but is the floor of admissibility — the minimum preservation step that supplies a record for the first-information report and for the initial investigation.
The intermediary obligations and the traceability tension
Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 supplies the safe-harbour framework for intermediaries. An intermediary — defined at Section 2(1)(w) of the IT Act to include any person who on behalf of another receives, stores or transmits an electronic record, with telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online auction sites, online market places and cyber cafes specifically named — is not liable for any third-party information, data or communication link made available or hosted by it, provided that the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging its duties under the Act and follows the Central Government's intermediary guidelines. The 2021 Intermediary Rules supply the operational due-diligence framework.
Rule 3 of the 2021 Intermediary Rules imposes the baseline due-diligence obligations — publication of rules and regulations, privacy policy and user agreement; periodic notification to users of the requirement not to host or display unlawful content; removal of content upon receipt of actual knowledge from a court order or notification by the appropriate government in accordance with the Shreya Singhal v Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 read-down of Section 79(3)(b); preservation of removed content for 180 days for investigation purposes; cooperation with law enforcement agencies in the matter of investigation; appointment of a Grievance Officer and publication of contact details. Rule 4 imposes the additional due-diligence obligations on significant social media intermediaries — appointment of a Chief Compliance Officer, a Nodal Contact Person and a Resident Grievance Officer, all residents in India; publication of a monthly compliance report; and, under Rule 4(2), the identification of the first originator of information in messaging services where the information relates to offences specified in the sub-rule.
The interaction between the traceability mandate under Rule 4(2) and the end-to-end-encryption architecture of WhatsApp is the active doctrinal contest. WhatsApp's position, in the WhatsApp LLC v Union of India challenge, is that the identification of the first originator of an encrypted message is technically impossible without the breaking of the encryption — the server does not hold the plaintext and cannot determine which user sent a particular message-content. The Government's position is that the platform can be architected to identify the first originator without breaking the encryption — through cryptographic-fingerprint techniques that match the encrypted hash of a message across multiple delivery instances. The doctrinal stakes are substantial; the present working position, pending judicial resolution, is that the intermediary cooperates with metadata production but resists plaintext-content production on the encryption-architecture ground.
The video-conference and digital-trial framework — Praful B Desai
The trial-stage admissibility framework for electronic evidence is reinforced by State of Maharashtra v Praful B Desai, (2003) 4 SCC 601. The Supreme Court there held that the recording of evidence by video conference is a valid mode of recording under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — the witness need not be physically present in the courtroom where the witness is available through an audio-visual link that satisfies the court of the witness's identity and the integrity of the testimony. The Praful B Desai ruling, decided before Anvar P V and well before the BSA, has been the doctrinal foundation for the post-2020 expansion of remote-evidence-taking in the High Courts and the District Courts during and after the pandemic. The carry-over into the WhatsApp threat fact-pattern is that the recipient witness, the intermediary's responsible officer who has supplied the Section 63(4) certificate, and the notified Examiner of Electronic Evidence may each testify by video conference where the trial court so permits, supplying the testimonial layer that authenticates the electronic record produced.
The Shreya Singhal v Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 framework supplies the constitutional anchor for the IT Act offences alongside which the BSA evidence is produced — Sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the IT Act survived the Shreya Singhal review (only Section 66A was struck down), with the Court drawing the express distinction between the open-ended formulation of Section 66A and the narrowly-drawn formulations of the rest of Chapter XI. The doctrinal stability of the BSA-IT Act preservation-and-prosecution framework in 2026 traces in part to the Shreya Singhal endorsement of the narrowly-drawn formulations.
Open questions and the 2026 working position
Three doctrinal questions remain unresolved in 2026. The first is the Rule 4(2) traceability mandate — the WhatsApp LLC v Union of India challenge before the Delhi High Court is pending at the time of writing, and the outcome will determine whether the intermediary can be compelled to identify the first originator of an encrypted message-chain. The doctrinal stakes engage Article 21 informational-privacy doctrine — the K S Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 nine-judge framework — alongside the operational reality of platform architecture. The second is the temporal latitude in the Arjun Panditrao Khotkar "as soon as possible" formulation — the High Courts have applied the rule with some variation, with the better-reasoned cases requiring the certificate at the stage of charge-sheet filing and the more permissive cases allowing production up to the stage of marking the document as exhibit. The third is the status of the Section 63(4) certificate furnished by the recipient herself — where the recipient is the person in charge of her own device and the screenshot is taken on that device, can the recipient sign the certificate, or must the certificate be furnished by an Examiner of Electronic Evidence or by the device manufacturer? The position favoured by the majority of post-Arjun Panditrao rulings is that the recipient can sign the certificate, with the credibility of the certificate going to weight rather than to admissibility.
For the recipient of a WhatsApp threat, the practising lawyer, the investigating officer, or the trial-court judge working a criminal-intimidation matter in 2026, the position is workable. Section 351 BNS [Sections 503, 506 and 507 IPC] supplies the substantive offence, with Section 78 BNS for stalking and Sections 66E, 67 and 67A of the IT Act for the medium-specific overlay. Section 173 BNSS [Section 154 CrPC] supplies the first-information route, with Lalita Kumari fixing the mandatory-registration rule. The preservation workflow has five components — original device unaltered, SHA-256 hash, chain-of-custody log, server-side preservation request through a Section 94 BNSS production order, and metadata-bearing screenshot. The evidentiary framework is Section 63 BSA [Section 65B IEA], with the mandatory-certificate rule fixed by Anvar P V and restored by Arjun Panditrao Khotkar after the Tomaso Bruno and Shafhi Mohammad interlude. The intermediary framework runs through Section 79 IT Act and the 2021 Rules, with Rule 4(2) traceability the principal area of contest. Producing the record with the certificate at the earliest reasonable point — at charge-sheet filing where the certificate-holder cooperates, and at trial-court direction where she does not — decides whether the threat reaches the verdict stage as admissible evidence.