Refused Remand Cannot Bar Cognizance: Allahabad HC Dismisses Challenge to SC/ST Act Summoning Order
The Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench held that a prior refusal of judicial remand does not fetter the Investigating Officer's authority or the trial court's power to take cognizance independently.
Justice Zafeer Ahmad, sitting singly at the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dismissed at the admission stage a criminal appeal filed by Adeem Ali challenging a summoning order passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Lakhimpur Kheri on 25 March 2026. The Special Judge had taken cognizance of offences under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, arising from Case Crime No. 833 of 2025 registered at Police Station Kotwali Sadar, District Lakhimpur Kheri. The central question was whether an earlier refusal of judicial remand under those very provisions could strip the Investigating Officer of authority to press charges and curtail the trial court's jurisdiction to take cognizance.
The Dispute Before the High Court
Adeem Ali's appeal arose from Special Trial No. 28 of 2026. His counsel, Ajeet Kumar Singh, urged three interconnected grounds against the impugned order dated 25 March 2026.
First, the cognizance order was described as cryptic and non-speaking, passed without due application of judicial mind and without proper consideration of the evidence gathered during investigation. Second, and more centrally, the trial court had on 29 October 2025 refused judicial remand of the appellant specifically in respect of the offences under Section 69 of the BNS, 2023 and the SC/ST Act provisions. Counsel argued that the Investigating Officer had no authority to subsequently invoke those same provisions by recording the statements of two witnesses, which amounted to an attempt to circumvent and frustrate that earlier judicial order. Third, a bare reading of the First Information Report and the statements recorded under Sections 180 and 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 did not, the appellant submitted, disclose that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste — a necessary ingredient of the SC/ST Act offences.
In support, the appellant relied on three Supreme Court judgments: Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517; Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608; and Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710.
The State, represented by the Government Advocate, opposed the appeal. The Investigating Officer had recorded the statements of two witnesses during investigation and had submitted a charge-sheet on the basis of that material. The trial court, it was submitted, duly considered the material on record and followed settled principles before taking cognizance. The State placed reliance on Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 5 SCC 424.
The Legal Issues
Two distinct legal questions required resolution. The first concerned the standard applicable when a High Court is asked to interfere with an order taking cognizance and issuing process: how much reasoning must the trial court record, and at what threshold does judicial scrutiny of the evidence become impermissible? The second was structural — whether a refusal of judicial remand at an anterior stage of the criminal proceedings operates as a binding determination that the offences in question are not made out, and consequently forecloses both the Investigating Officer's authority to investigate those offences and the trial court's jurisdiction to take cognizance upon a subsequently filed charge-sheet.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Ahmad began by setting out the conceptual framework. Under Section 210 of the BNSS, 2023, “cognizance” refers to the Magistrate's application of judicial mind to the material so as to take judicial notice of an offence. Summoning under Section 227 of the BNSS, 2023 is a subsequent and distinct step compelling the accused's appearance in consequence of that cognizance. Although the two are frequently recorded in a single order, they are conceptually separate stages.
At the stage of taking cognizance, the court is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence or adjudicate upon the probable defence of the accused. The jurisdiction is confined to examining whether the material, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence and furnishes sufficient ground for proceeding. Equally, while the cognizance order need not be elaborate, it must disclose application of judicial mind to the material collected during investigation. The summoning order, being a consequence of cognizance validly taken, requires no separate explicit reasons. This position, the court observed, is settled in Bhushan Kumar (supra).
Applying those principles, Justice Ahmad examined the impugned order of 25 March 2026. The Special Judge had considered the police report and the statements recorded during investigation and had specifically recorded that the material prima facie disclosed the commission of the offences alleged, and that the issues raised by the defence required appreciation of evidence at trial. The court held that a concise order not containing an elaborate discussion of each piece of evidence cannot, by itself, support an inference that it was passed without application of judicial mind. A detailed evaluation of evidence at the cognizance stage is neither contemplated nor permissible.
On the remand question, Justice Ahmad was unequivocal. An order refusing judicial remand is passed at a distinct stage of criminal proceedings and serves a purpose entirely different from an order taking cognizance. Such an order does not amount to an adjudication upon the legality of the investigation. It does not operate as a judicial determination that the offences in question are not made out. It certainly does not curtail the statutory authority of the Investigating Officer to continue the investigation, collect further material, and submit an appropriate police report under the BNSS, 2023. Accordingly, the refusal of judicial remand on 29 October 2025 could not preclude the Investigating Officer from conducting further investigation or prevent the trial court from independently considering the charge-sheet at the cognizance stage.
The three Supreme Court judgments relied upon by the appellant were addressed and distinguished on the same basis. Hitesh Verma (supra) lays down that an offence under the SC/ST Act requires proof that the insult or intimidation occurred specifically because of the victim's caste and within public view — both being matters turning on appreciation of evidence, to be tested at trial and not foreclosed at cognizance where the material, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients alleged. The test in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) — that a promise of marriage must be shown to have been false at its inception and made in bad faith to attract the relevant offence — goes to a factual determination that the cognizance order was not required to resolve at the threshold; it remains a matter for trial. Sonu (supra) was held to stand on the same footing for the same reason.
The submission that the FIR and statements under Sections 180 and 183 BNSS did not disclose the victim's caste status was treated as going to the sufficiency of evidence — a matter for trial. It could not be adjudicated by the High Court at the stage of examining the correctness of a cognizance order without weighing material in a manner impermissible at that stage.
Outcome
The criminal appeal was dismissed at the admission stage on 15 July 2026. The court found no infirmity in the order dated 25 March 2026 warranting interference. All submissions — including those touching upon the effect of the earlier remand refusal and the sufficiency of material regarding the victim's caste — were left open to be urged before the trial court in the course of trial. Justice Ahmad directed that no observation made in the order should be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits, and that the trial court shall proceed uninfluenced by anything stated therein. A copy of the order was directed to be sent to the concerned court for information and compliance.