Shariat Law Cannot Override PCMA or POCSO Act, Holds Allahabad HC in Child Marriage FIR Case

A Division Bench declined to quash an FIR against nineteen persons who obstructed police and a Child Line Team attempting to prevent the marriage of a 16-year-old Muslim girl in Bulandshahr, holding that personal law cannot displace the statutory prohibition on child marriage.

The Allahabad High Court has dismissed a writ petition seeking to quash an FIR registered on 15 February 2026 against nineteen persons who allegedly assaulted and obstructed police officers and members of a Child Line Team in Bulandshahr as they moved to prevent the child marriage of Sonam, daughter of Taufiq, aged about 16 years. Justice J.J. Munir, writing for the Division Bench he shared with Justice Achal Sachdev, held without equivocation that the Shariat Law permitting marriage upon puberty “runs clearly in the teeth of the PCMA as well as the POCSO Act.” The judgment is one of the clearest recent articulations by any High Court that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 apply to every citizen irrespective of religion, and that an FIR disclosing obstruction of officials enforcing those statutes is not liable to be quashed at an incipient stage.

The Incident at Village Sunpeda Baksuwa

On 15 February 2026, Sub-Inspector Vinay Kumar of Police Station Kakor, District Bulandshahr, along with the in-charge of the Child Line Team Bulandshahr, Abhishek Kumar, two case workers — Neeraj Kumar Sharma and Km. Gulista — and Sub-Inspector Dhani Ram, proceeded to Village Sunpeda Baksuwa. They had received information about an impending child marriage of Sonam. They left P.S. Kakor vide G.D. Entry No. 18 dated 15 February 2026 at 11.29 a.m.

Upon reaching Sonam's house, members of the Child Line Team spoke to her parents and to Sonam herself. After inquiries, they announced their intention to produce her before the Child Welfare Committee, Bulandshahr, and asked the family to accompany them. At that point, a large group — nineteen of whom are named in the FIR and are the writ petitioners, plus fifty others whose identity could not be ascertained — allegedly abused and threatened the police and Child Line Team personnel, and forcibly removed Sonam from the custody of Km. Gulista.

The police party and the Child Line Team were forced to retreat to save their lives. They ultimately managed to rescue Sonam and bring her away in the care of Km. Gulista. The FIR states that the entire occurrence was video-graphed by the informant. Crime No. 54 of 2026 was registered under Sections 191(2), 132, 121(1), 352, and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The Argument Pressed Before the Bench

Ms. Pooja, appearing for the petitioners, argued that under Shariat Law applicable to Muslims, a girl who attains puberty — generally regarded as 15 years — is competent to marry. She submitted that the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 should not affect the personal law of the petitioners on the question of marriage.

To support this, counsel pointed to Section 2 of the Majority Act, 1875, which carries a non obstante clause excluding matters of marriage, dower, divorce, and adoption from the stipulated age of majority of 18 years. She also cited Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, which directs that for Muslims, the rule of decision in questions relating to marriage, dissolution of marriage, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts, and wakfs shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).

The Additional Government Advocates opposed admission of the petition.

How the Bench Reasoned on Personal Law and Statutory Prohibition

The Division Bench acknowledged that there is a division of opinion among High Courts on whether a minor married under Muslim law is governed by personal law or by the POCSO Act and the PCMA. The Bench then stated its own position directly.

The court expressed agreement with the reasoning of P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J. of the Kerala High Court in Moidutty Musliyar and others v. Sub Inspector Vadakkencherry Police Station and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 4188, that no personal law can wipe out the prohibition of child marriage under the PCMA, or the effect of the POCSO Act, which renders sexual intercourse with a person below 18 years a crime. In the Bench's view, the age of marriage for every citizen of the country, irrespective of religion, is that which is prescribed by the PCMA.

The Bench added that permitting the marriage of a person below 18 years would, given that carnal relations are inseparable from the institution of marriage, amount to an acknowledged violation of the POCSO Act. The PCMA and POCSO Act were described as statutes based on public health and national policy, with a scientific understanding translated into prohibitory law, from which there can be no escape for anyone.

On the argument drawn from the Majority Act, the court noted that Section 2(a) of that Act does make the stipulated age inapplicable to capacity to act in the matter of marriage, but held this to be beside the point: the PCMA is a much later statute, extends to the whole of India, and applies to all citizens of India. A later, all-encompassing statute prevails over an exception in the Majority Act, 1875. The court also noted that while a marriage performed in violation of the PCMA may be voidable rather than void, the act of performing such a marriage is punishable, and the offences under the PCMA are cognizable and non-bailable by virtue of Section 15 of that Act.

The Unsettled Question Before the Supreme Court

The Bench reviewed the current state of the law at the national level with care. It noted the Supreme Court's decision in Independent Thought v. Union of India and another, (2017) 10 SCC 800, and observed that despite the exposition of law there, the controversy had continued, with some High Courts still holding that age of majority and capacity to marry for Muslims is governed by the Shariat Law.

The question arose again before the Supreme Court in Society For Enlightenment & Voluntary Action v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2922. The Bench quoted the remarks of the Supreme Court in that case, where their Lordships noted gaps in the PCMA, observed that the interface of personal laws with the prohibition of child marriage under the PCMA had been a subject of confusion, and recorded that the Union had submitted that the Supreme Court may direct that the PCMA prevails over personal law. The Supreme Court in that case kept the legal question open, noting that the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amending) Bill 2021 had been introduced in Parliament on 21 December 2021 and was pending consideration.

The Allahabad Bench was informed during the hearing that this Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the 17th Lok Sabha, and nothing was shown to indicate the Bill was still pending before Parliament.

The Bench also noted that the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Javed v. State of Haryana and others, CRWP No. 7426-2022, decided 30 September 2022, had held that a Muslim female aged 15 years could marry a person of her choice and the marriage would not be affected by Section 12 of the PCMA. That judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court, which, by order dated 13 January 2023 in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No. 35376 of 2022, issued notice and directed that the impugned judgment “shall not be relied on as a precedent in any other case.”

The Delhi High Court in Mohd. Amaan Malik v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3870, had also taken note of this flux and the pending question before the Supreme Court, observing the split of opinion across High Courts on whether the POCSO Act or personal law governed such cases.

By an order dated 19 August 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed several connected special leave petitions on the ground of locus standi, including those arising from the Punjab and Haryana High Court's order in Javed v. State of Haryana. The Bench noted that the only matter where the substantive question still appeared to be alive was W.P. (C) No. 814/2023, which by that order was adjourned to 26 August 2025. The Allahabad Bench concluded that there was no authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court settling the issue.

The Bench held that this absence of a binding Supreme Court ruling did not prevent it from expressing a view. It reiterated that the Shariat Law providing for puberty as the permissible age for a girl to marry runs clearly contrary to both the PCMA and the POCSO Act.

Applying the Law to the Facts

The court then examined what the facts of the case disclosed. It found a determined attempt by the victim's parents and the community to marry a girl below 18 years of age, contrary to the PCMA, and one that would in all likelihood have led to a transgression of the POCSO Act once the marriage was consummated.

The police and the Child Line Team, in this context, were found to have acted within the law and in bona fide discharge of their duties under the PCMA and in furtherance of preventing a violation of the POCSO Act. The court described their action as commendable.

What the FIR captured, the Bench held, was an assault on those officials. They were abused, threatened, and had to flee for their lives. The victim was forcibly taken from the care of Km. Gulista. The court held that this constituted, prima facie, obstruction in the performance of duties of a government servant, and that the other offences alleged also required thorough investigation.

The argument that there was no medical report to justify the invocation of Sections 121(1) and 132 of the BNS, that no overt acts had been assigned, that the ingredients of Section 351(2) BNS were not disclosed, and that there were no independent witnesses, was rejected. The court held that the offences were clearly disclosed. It added that it might not ultimately be one offence more or one less, and that some petitioners might not be found involved — but those were matters for the charge-sheet and the Trial Court. Interdicting investigation at an incipient stage by quashing the FIR was not warranted.

Order

The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition. The interim stay order dated 6 April 2026 was vacated. The court directed that its order be communicated to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bulandshahr, and the Station House Officer, P.S. Kakor, District Bulandshahr, both through the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahr, by the Registrar (Compliance).