Allahabad HC Dismisses Section 319 CrPC Appeal, Deprecates Counsel Absences in Fresh Matters
The Lucknow Bench dismissed a complainant's appeal against rejection of her Section 319 CrPC application, finding the trial court's refusal to summon an additional accused legally sound, and deprecated the conduct of three counsel who failed to appear without adequate reason.
Justice Subhash Vidyarthi, sitting singly at the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dismissed at the admission stage a criminal appeal filed by Smt. Chhotka under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The appeal challenged an order dated 8 May 2026 by the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Shravasti, which had rejected the appellant's application under Section 319 CrPC to summon Ankit Yadav — son of the charge-sheeted accused Ram Suresh Yadav — as an additional accused. The bench found the trial court's reasoning free from any error or illegality warranting appellate interference. Before concluding, the court placed on record its strong deprecation of the growing practice of counsel seeking adjournments in fresh High Court matters on the ground of engagements before subordinate courts.
The Dispute Before the Lucknow Bench
The case arose from an FIR lodged on 22 August 2022 by the appellant against Ram Suresh Yadav and his son Ankit Yadav, alleging that both had assaulted and abused her and her son, causing injuries to both. The offences alleged were under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC/ST Act, registered at Police Station Naveen Modern, District Shravasti, as Case Crime No. 77 of 2022.
After investigation, the Investigating Officer filed a charge-sheet dated 16 September 2022 only against Ram Suresh Yadav, concluding that the evidence did not establish the involvement of Ankit Yadav. Trial proceeded against Ram Suresh alone as Session Case No. 10 of 2023. After three prosecution witnesses were examined, the appellant moved an application under Section 319 CrPC seeking to array Ankit Yadav as a co-accused. The Special Judge rejected that application, and the appellant carried the matter to the High Court under Section 14-A(1) of the SC/ST Act.
What the Trial Court Found in the Evidence
The trial court examined the statements of all three prosecution witnesses before passing the impugned order. The complainant herself (PW-1) stated that both Ram Suresh and Ankit Yadav were involved in the incident, but she did not assign any specific role to Ankit Yadav. PW-2, Taravati, reached the spot half an hour after the incident and was therefore not an eyewitness; she did not support the allegation of Ankit Yadav's involvement. PW-3, the injured son of the complainant, stated that only he and Ram Suresh were present on the spot at the time of the incident, and that both were taken to the hospital in separate ambulances. Medical examination of both was conducted at Ikauna, Shravasti.
On this evidence, the trial court found no good ground to summon Ankit Yadav. The court noted that the complainant had not assigned him any specific role and that the injured eyewitness, PW-3, had clearly denied the presence of any person other than the opposite party no. 2 at the time of the incident.
The Legal Standard for Summoning an Additional Accused
The trial court drew on a line of binding precedent on Section 319 CrPC, which the High Court examined and accepted. The Special Judge referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka : (2004) 7 SCC 792, which reiterated that the power to summon an additional accused is extraordinary and must be used sparingly, and only when compelling reasons exist. The same judgment recalled the ruling in Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation : (2000) 3 SCC 262, that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice, keeping in view the stage of trial and the quantum of evidence collected, and that there is no compelling duty on a court to proceed against other persons.
The trial court also relied on a coordinate bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ramakant Tripathi v. State of U.P. : 2009 Cr.L.J. 459, which synthesised several Supreme Court decisions and held that mere suspicion of involvement is not enough; there must be a prospect of conviction. If there is no remote possibility or likelihood of conviction, the court must refuse to exercise the power.
The highest authority on the point — Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab : (2014) 3 SCC 92, decided by a Constitution Bench of five judges — was also placed before the trial court. The Constitution Bench held that the power under Section 319 CrPC requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of complicity: “the test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction.”
The trial court further noted Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi : (1983) 1 SCC 1, which described Section 319 CrPC as conferring a truly extraordinary power to be used with compelling reasons, a position reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Jamin v. State of U.P. : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 506.
How the High Court Reasoned
Justice Vidyarthi, proceeding without the assistance of any counsel for the appellant, perused the record. The court found that the trial court had applied the correct legal standard drawn from the Constitution Bench decision in Hardeep Singh and the earlier line of authority. The evidence on record — particularly the categorical denial by PW-3 of any presence at the spot other than the charge-sheeted accused — did not meet the threshold required to exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC.
The High Court held that the reasoning assigned by the trial court after due consideration of the facts and circumstances and the relevant law did not suffer from any error or illegality warranting interference in appellate power. The court did not identify any perversity in the trial court's evaluation of the three prosecution witnesses, nor any failure to apply the Hardeep Singh test.
The Court's Deprecation of Counsel Conduct
The court was constrained to proceed without any advocate for the appellant. All three enrolled counsel — Shri Suresh Kumar Mishra, Shri Dharmendra Kumar Bhatt and Shri Manjul Kumar Pathak — were absent. A proxy advocate, Shri Rudra Pratap Pal, sought an adjournment on the ground that Shri Mishra and Shri Bhatt were engaged in a District Court. He was unable to account for the whereabouts of Shri Pathak at all. On the previous listing on 15 July 2026, again no one had appeared for the appellant.
The court deprecated the conduct of Shri Mishra and Shri Bhatt for giving precedence to a trial court engagement over a fresh matter before the High Court. It also deprecated the conduct of Shri Pathak for absenting himself without assigning any reason and without any intimation. The bench observed that assistance of advocates is not a condition precedent for adjudication; a court must perform its duty of dispensing justice even without such assistance.
Beyond the immediate case, Justice Vidyarthi placed on record a broader concern. He observed that the court had come across several requests for adjournment on the ground of counsel being engaged before District Courts or Tribunals, and that at times counsel deliberately avoid fresh High Court matters to keep them pending without any order being passed, even where the matter does not deserve admission. This practice, the court said, generates artificial and unwarranted pendency. It also causes a secondary problem: trials before subordinate courts are repetitively adjourned on the pretext of High Court pendency, even where the High Court has passed no interim order, causing unwarranted delay in the conclusion of those trials.
The court requested members of the bar to realise their role as officers of the court, raise standards of assistance, and refrain from seeking adjournments on unreasonable and frivolous grounds.
Order
Criminal Appeal No. 1895 of 2026 was dismissed at the admission stage on 17 July 2026. The order was marked as speaking and reportable.