Justice S.B. Saraf Justice A.K. Chaudhary Allahabad HC SERVICE Lok Adalat cannot dissolve amarriage, Allahabad HC rules
[ High Court of Judicature at Allahabad — Lucknow Bench ]

Allahabad HC: DLSA Unnao Usurped Family Court's Power by Treating Mediation Record as Divorce Decree

The Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench found that a District Legal Services Authority cannot grant divorce, declared no valid divorce existed, and ordered the ruling circulated to all DLSA offices in Uttar Pradesh.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, comprising Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, has held that the District Legal Services Authority, Unnao acted entirely outside its legal competence when a mediation record from 2018 was used to project a divorce between a married couple. Disposing of Writ – C No. 12174 of 2025 on 30 April 2026, the bench declared that no formal divorce decree exists between the petitioner, Smt. Sushma Devi, and her husband, respondent No. 3, and directed that a copy of the order be placed before the Registrar General for circulation to all Lok Adalats and DLSA offices across Uttar Pradesh. The judgment is a detailed examination of the limits of Lok Adalat jurisdiction under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 and the National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009.

How a Pre-Litigation Mediation Became a Disputed “Divorce”

The husband, respondent No. 3, filed pre-litigation suit No. 92/2018 before the District Legal Services Authority, Unnao. The Authority issued notice on 1 June 2018. On 12 June 2018 — the very first date of hearing — the matter was referred to mediation, and a settlement document was prepared the same day. The settlement included a term at point 6(cha) stating that “each party are free to re-marry.” The Authority disposed of the matter on 14 July 2018 in terms of that settlement.

The wife's case is that the husband fraudulently obtained her signatures on the settlement form. She contends that even after the settlement, the parties continued to live together as husband and wife, and that a daughter, Gunjan, was born from the marriage on 22 November 2019. The husband's position is that the settlement and the disposal order of 14 July 2018 constituted a mutual consent divorce, entitling him to remarry. He has since remarried and is sustaining a second family.

When the husband began relying on the DLSA order to justify his second marriage, the wife approached the DLSA by way of a review application. The Authority dismissed the review on 30 June 2025 but clarified that its earlier order had not declared the marriage a nullity. It is the dismissal of that review, along with the original settlement order, that the wife challenged in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Mediator's Own Affidavit Contradicts the “Ratification” Narrative

An earlier order passed by a co-ordinate bench on 3 February 2026 had noted that Mohd. Rashid, then ADJ/FTC-I, Unnao, appeared to have “ratified” a divorce on the basis of the mediator's report of 12 June 2018. The bench directed Mohd. Rashid — by then working as Registrar, State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Lucknow — to file an affidavit explaining his order.

In his personal affidavit dated 18 February 2026, Mohd. Rashid stated categorically that he had not passed any order of divorce. He clarified that he had acted only as the mediator, that a mediator at the pre-litigation stage has no adjudicatory jurisdiction, and that his role was confined to facilitating discussions and recording terms of settlement. He denied having “ratified” the report in any judicial capacity.

The co-ordinate bench had also referred the matter to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of the High Court, directing the mediator to work on the quantum of money and jewellery to be paid to the wife and to explore a mutual consent divorce application under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That mediation produced no settlement, leaving the controversy entirely unresolved.

What the Regulations Actually Permit — and Prohibit

The bench worked through the statutory and regulatory framework in detail. The Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 constitutes District Legal Services Authorities under Section 9 and defines their functions under Section 10. The concept of pre-litigation settlement was introduced by amendment in 2022 through Sections 22A to 22E of the Act.

The National Legal Services Authority (Lok Adalats) Regulations, 2009 govern how Lok Adalats are composed and what they may do. Regulation 6(c) prescribes the composition of a Lok Adalat bench at the district level, requiring a sitting or retired judicial officer alongside other members. Regulation 9 is unambiguous: a Lok Adalat has power only to help parties arrive at a compromise or settlement and shall not issue any direction or order in respect of the dispute.

The proviso to Regulation 10(2) is equally clear. It states that matters relating to divorce shall not be referred to a Lok Adalat. The bench found it difficult to comprehend how, when a divorce matter cannot even be referred to a Lok Adalat, a decree of divorce could be expected to emerge from a pre-litigation proceeding before one.

Regulation 17 describes the drawing up of a Lok Adalat award as a purely administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement agreed by the parties. Regulation 17(5) requires members to ensure that parties sign only after fully understanding the settlement terms, and to satisfy themselves that the terms are not unreasonable, illegal, or one-sided, and that consent is free from threat, coercion, or undue influence. Regulation 17(6) directs members to affix signatures only to settlements reached before them, not to settlements reached outside the Lok Adalat with the assistance of third parties. Regulation 17(7) specifically proscribes the grant of divorce by mutual consent.

The Bench's Findings on the DLSA's Conduct

The bench identified several failures in the way the DLSA, Unnao handled the matter. The notice, the first hearing, the referral to mediation, and the preparation of the settlement all took place on 12 June 2018 — the same day. The bench described this as a “tearing hurry” that ought to be avoided in all circumstances, particularly in matrimonial cases.

The settlement term permitting each party to remarry was found to be “absolutely illegal and forbidden by law.” The bench observed that such a term, if it was to appear at all, could only have been valid after a divorce was granted by a competent court. The settlement, as drawn, failed even a basic test of reasonableness and provided scope for misuse by an unscrupulous party.

The orders dated 12 July 2018 and 14 July 2018 passed by the Lok Adalat/Authority were described as cryptic, mechanical, and passed without application of mind. The bench held that the DLSA had usurped the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court to grant a decree of divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Far from resolving the dispute, the orders gave rise to a multiplicity of proceedings affecting the status and rights of several people, including the husband's second wife and the child born of the first marriage.

The bench also noted the allegation that respondent No. 3 had some connection with the Lok Adalat Authority and may have orchestrated the settlement. It cited Regulation 17(6) as the precise safeguard designed to prevent Lok Adalats from being used to commit fraud or forgery, and found that safeguard had not been applied.

On the husband's argument that he genuinely believed the DLSA order amounted to a divorce, the bench applied the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat — ignorance of law excuses no one — and rejected the contention as without any basis or force of law.

The Broader Concern About Lok Adalat Overreach

The bench was careful to acknowledge the value of Lok Adalats in unclogging judicial backlog and making justice accessible and affordable. It accepted that Lok Adalats and DLSA offices play a pivotal role in cost-effective and expeditious disposal of disputes. However, it drew a firm line between that legitimate function and the usurpation of powers reserved for regular courts.

The bench observed that in matrimonial cases, no party truly wins — any breakdown of a marriage is a defeat for the individuals and for the institution. It called on Lok Adalats to be empathetically sensitive to matrimonial disputes and to exercise their powers strictly within the four corners of the Act and the Regulations. Expedition and disposal cannot justify diluting or tweaking the Rules and Regulations of the Legal Services Authority Act.

The secretary of a District Legal Services Authority belongs to a cadre of senior judicial officers expected to be well versed with law and judicial process. The bench expressed that it felt “rather disturbed” at the manner in which the DLSA, Unnao had conducted itself, and identified several shortcomings in the handling of the matter.

The court also noted that in pre-litigation matters, where no case is pending before any court and there is no referral by a court, the responsibility of the Lok Adalat and the Authority is higher, and a higher standard of scrutiny and quality of administration of justice is obligated on them.

Order

The Division Bench disposed of Writ – C No. 12174 of 2025 on 30 April 2026 with the following directions:

  • It declared categorically that till date there has been no formal divorce decree between the petitioner, Smt. Sushma Devi, and respondent No. 3.
  • The petitioner is at liberty to proceed in accordance with law against respondent No. 3, as legally advised.
  • A copy of the order is to be placed before the Registrar General of the High Court with a direction to circulate it to all Lok Adalats and DLSA offices in the State of Uttar Pradesh for necessary compliance and future reference.

The petitioner was represented by Ashutosh Misra and Ziya Ahmad. The respondents were represented by the Government Counsel, O.P. Tiwari, Shishir Jain, and Vijay Dixit.

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