Juvenile Conviction Cannot Bar Passport: Allahabad HC Quashes Refusal Order, Directs Fresh Processing
The Allahabad High Court held that a conviction recorded by a Juvenile Justice Board carries no disqualification under Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, and cannot be used to refuse a passport. The bench quashed the Regional Passport Officer's order and directed fresh processing of the application.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Indrajeet Shukla, allowed a writ petition challenging the refusal of a passport to a man who had been convicted as a juvenile in 2013. The bench held that Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 operates as a non-obstante clause that removes any disqualification flowing from a juvenile conviction, regardless of what any other law may say. The Regional Passport Officer, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow had refused the passport on 19 March 2021, citing an adverse police report and alleged non-response to a notice. The court found the refusal order arbitrary, unsupported by any pending criminal case, and wholly contrary to the statutory protection available to juvenile convicts. The impugned order was quashed and the passport authority directed to process the application afresh.
The Passport Refusal and Its Procedural History
Mohd Yunus Ansari applied for a passport on 29 January 2020. When no decision was taken on his application, he filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12922 of 2020 before the Allahabad High Court. That petition was decided on 31 August 2020 with a direction that the Regional Passport Officer communicate his decision at the earliest.
The passport authority still did not act. Ansari then filed Contempt Application No. 684 of 2021 for non-compliance of the 31 August 2020 order. It was during the pendency of that contempt application that the Regional Passport Officer passed the impugned order dated 19 March 2021, refusing the passport. The stated reasons were that Ansari had failed to respond to a notice dated 31 December 2020 disclosing the final outcome of criminal cases against him, and that an adverse police report made issuance impossible.
The petitioner's counsel, Shailendra Singh, argued that the refusal order was cryptic, passed without cogent reasons, and was in fact a product of the respondent's resentment at the contempt proceedings. He submitted that no criminal case was pending against the petitioner at all.
The Juvenile Conviction at the Root of the Dispute
The counter-affidavit filed by the Union of India revealed the real basis for refusal: Ansari had been convicted by the Juvenile Justice Board, Gorakhpur in Case Crime No. 219 of 2010 under Sections 363, 366, and 376 IPC, by judgment dated 13 August 2013. His High School Certificate placed his date of birth as 18 May 1993, making him approximately 16 years and 10 months old at the time of the alleged offence on 1 March 2010. He was therefore tried as a juvenile.
The Juvenile Justice Board, while recording the conviction, admitted Ansari to probation for six months on condition that he furnish surety and bonds for good conduct. He complied. The District Probation Officer, Gorakhpur issued him a Character Certificate on 20 March 2014 confirming that he had maintained good conduct throughout the probation period. The genuineness of that certificate was not disputed by the respondents.
The Union of India's counsel, Arun Kumar Pal, defended the refusal on the ground that Ansari was a previous convict and that Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act, 1967 — which permits refusal where criminal proceedings are pending before a court — justified the authority's action.
The Statutory Framework: Passports Act and Juvenile Justice Law
The bench set out the relevant provisions in detail. Section 5(3) of the Passports Act, 1967 requires the passport authority, when refusing an application, to record in writing a brief statement of its reasons and furnish a copy to the applicant on demand. Section 6(2) lists the exhaustive grounds on which a passport may be refused. Section 6(2)(e) covers conviction within the preceding five years for an offence involving moral turpitude with a sentence of not less than two years. Section 6(2)(f) covers pendency of criminal proceedings before a court.
Against these provisions, the bench placed Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. That section opens with a non-obstante clause and provides that a juvenile who has committed an offence and been dealt with under the Act “shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.” It further mandates that the Board direct removal of the relevant conviction records after the expiry of the appeal period or a reasonable prescribed period.
The bench also referred to Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which came into force on 15 January 2016 and preserved the applicability of the 2000 Act to proceedings pending before that date. Since the conviction in Ansari's case was recorded in 2013 under the 2000 Act, the protections of that statute continued to govern its consequences.
Section 3(xiv) of the 2015 Act, which embodies the “principle of fresh start” — requiring that all past records of any child under the juvenile justice system be erased except in special circumstances — was also placed on record by the bench.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Indrajeet Shukla, writing for the bench, identified the core question as whether a conviction recorded by a Juvenile Justice Board could constitute a legal impediment to the issuance of a passport. The answer, the bench held, was an unequivocal no.
The non-obstante clause in Section 19(1) of the 2000 Act excludes the operation of any other law in matters of juvenile convictions. The bench held that any disqualification entailing from such a conviction must be ignored and cannot act to the detriment of the child in conflict with law in any manner. The conviction recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board, Gorakhpur therefore could not be read as a disqualification for any future purpose, including the issuance of a passport.
On the question of pending criminal proceedings, the bench found that the respondents had failed to demonstrate the pendency of any criminal case against Ansari. The ground under Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act was therefore wholly unavailable. The bench described the reference to a pending criminal case in the impugned order as “a monument of non-application of mind” and a reflection of the respondent-authorities' non-serious attitude.
The bench drew on the Supreme Court's decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, which held that the right to travel abroad is encompassed within the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, and that any administrative action impairing that right must satisfy the tests of fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness. It also referred to Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, AIR 1967 SC 1836, which first established that the right to travel abroad falls within personal liberty under Article 21.
The bench cited the Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2887, for the proposition that denial of a passport does not operate in a vacuum and that any restriction on the right to travel must bear a rational nexus with a legitimate purpose. That judgment had also distinguished between possession of a passport and the act of travelling abroad, observing that whether a person may actually leave the country is a matter for the criminal court, not the passport authority.
On the question of the right to be forgotten, the bench referred to the Supreme Court's order dated 12 April 2021 in Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India (WP(C) 3981/2011), which had observed that allowing criminal antecedent records of a juvenile to remain accessible could bring humiliation and adversely impact the juvenile's future prospects. The bench held that the right to be forgotten for a juvenile, in the context of Section 24 of the 2015 Act, is an absolute right directed at safeguarding future prospects.
The bench also relied on Union of India v. Ramesh Bishnoi, (2019) 19 SCC 710, where the Supreme Court held that a juvenile convict's conviction cannot be read against him, particularly when the law mandates the principle of fresh start.
On the requirement of reasons, the bench applied the principle drawn from State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Prasad Jain, (2008) 15 SCC 711, and reiterated in Chandana Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, 2011 (269) ELT 433 (SC), that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion and that its absence renders an order lifeless. The bench held that the impugned order, which was cryptic and unsupported by any material, failed this basic requirement.
Directions Issued
The bench issued the following directions:
The conviction recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board, Gorakhpur cannot be treated as a legal impediment for issuance of a passport, by operation of Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. The non-obstante clause in that provision removes any disqualification attaching to such conviction notwithstanding anything in any other law, including the Passports Act, 1967.
Since no criminal proceedings are pending against the petitioner, the ground under Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act is not attracted and is wholly unavailable to the respondents.
The right to be forgotten for a juvenile, by removing and destroying the record of juvenile delinquency, is an absolute right conferring a fresh start. The Regional Passport Officer, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow is mandated to process Ansari's passport application afresh, notwithstanding the conviction recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board, and to issue the passport if there is no other legal impediment.
Order
The Division Bench allowed Writ-C No. 21876 of 2021. A writ of certiorari was issued quashing the impugned order dated 19 March 2021 passed by the Regional Passport Officer, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow. The Regional Passport Officer was directed to process the petitioner's passport application afresh in accordance with law. Costs were made easy. The judgment was delivered on 7 May 2026.