Allahabad HC Overturns Salary Denial to Primary Teacher, Holds Executive Circular Cannot Override Section 10 of UP Salaries Act
A Division Bench applied the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench ruling in Pawan Kumar Divedi to hold that an assistant teacher in a primary section is entitled to State salary, setting aside a contrary circular-based rejection that had stood for over three decades.
The Allahabad High Court, in a judgment delivered on 17 July 2026, set aside both the order of the District Basic Education Officer (DBEO), Azamgarh, dated 11 April 2013 and the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition on 29 April 2013, holding that Clause 10 of a Director of Education circular dated 3 May 1982 could not deprive a primary-section teacher of salary rights created by Section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1978 (UP Act No. 6 of 1979). Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, writing for a Division Bench that also comprised Justice Kunal Ravi Singh, applied the Constitution Bench decision in State of U.P. v. Pawan Kumar Divedi, (2014) 9 SCC 692, and remitted the matter to the DBEO, Azamgarh, for fresh consideration within three months.
Decades of Salary Deprivation at a Single School
Surendra Sharma was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Primary Section of Smt. Ram Daiyee Balika Junior High School, Dariya Dayalpur, Azamgarh, on 1 July 1977. The institution had received primary-school recognition on 30 March 1974 and Junior High School recognition, effective 1 July 1977, by order dated 14 March 1978. By 1980 it was brought under the grant-in-aid scheme, and the DBEO approved the appellant's appointment and included him in the approved salary list by order dated 3 November 1980.
Salary from the State Exchequer was paid until October 1981 and then stopped. Two similarly placed teachers at the same institution had better fortune through litigation. Smt. Jagdamba Srivastava secured a writ order on 15 October 1993 directing salary payment; the State's Special Leave Petition was dismissed. Smt. Gayatri Rai, who had also been appointed on 1 July 1977, succeeded in Writ Petition No. 22154 of 1988, with the court directing salary on 8 March 1996. She has been drawing salary from the State Exchequer since.
Sharma's own efforts proved far more protracted. Writ Petition No. 33545 of 1997, filed with another teacher, was disposed of on 22 July 1998 with a direction to the DBEO to decide representations. The Accounts Officer granted financial approval on 31 October 1998, but payment was not released. The DBEO rejected the claim by order dated 12 April 1999. A further writ petition, No. 21720 of 1999, yielded an interim order for current salary on 31 October 2001, but the petition itself was dismissed on 28 August 2003. A Division Bench, in Special Appeal No. 1978 of 2009, allowed the appeal on 23 November 2012 and remitted the matter to the DBEO for fresh, reasoned consideration. The DBEO again rejected the claim on 11 April 2013, this time relying on Clause 10 of the Circular dated 3 May 1982. The ensuing writ petition, Writ-A No. 23422 of 2013, was dismissed by the Single Judge on 29 April 2013, prompting Special Appeal No. 903 of 2013.
The Clause 10 Barrier and the Statutory Claim
Section 10(1) of the 1978 Act casts a liability on the State Government to pay salaries of teachers and employees of every “institution” for any period after the appointed day. The word “institution” is defined in Section 2(e) as a recognised Junior High School receiving maintenance grant. The expression “Junior High School” was, at the relevant time, undefined in the Act — a gap that generated the dispute resolved by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar Divedi.
Clause 10 of the 1982 Circular, issued by the Director of Education (Basic), directed that salary under the 1978 Act be paid only to teachers working in Classes VI to VIII and that the benefit would not extend to teachers of the attached primary section (Classes I to V). The Single Judge had upheld this clause and further held that, after more than 31 years, the appellant could not be permitted to challenge it. The State's Standing Counsel before the Division Bench supported this position and additionally relied on the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017, subsequently enacted as U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018, which inserted a narrower statutory definition restricting “Junior High School” to Classes VI to VIII.
Counsel for the appellant, Shri J.P. Singh, pressed a different frame entirely. He argued that the Circular post-dated the approval of the appellant's appointment and had no retrospective operation. He pointed to Clause 14 of the same Circular as protecting teachers appointed before the 1978 Rules came into force. Most critically, he contended that the question of entitlement was governed by Section 10 of the Act, conclusively interpreted by the Constitution Bench in Pawan Kumar Divedi in favour of primary-section teachers, and that an executive circular could not restrict a statutory right as authoritatively declared by the Supreme Court.
How the Division Bench Reasoned
The Division Bench took the Constitution Bench's three-category classification of Junior High Schools as its analytical starting point. In paragraph 42 of Pawan Kumar Divedi, the Supreme Court distinguished: schools running Classes I to VIII as a single unit; such schools subsequently upgraded; and schools initially running only Classes VI to VIII to which a primary section was later added. The Court held that Section 10 applied without difficulty to the first two categories, and that even the third category was covered.
Smt. Ram Daiyee Balika Junior High School was recognised as a Primary School in 1974 and as a Junior High School from 1977, and has functioned as a single institution running Classes I to VIII ever since. The Division Bench held this placed it squarely within the first category, where the Constitution Bench found no difficulty in applying Section 10.
The bench also noted that the same point had already been decided in relation to the very same institution. The judgment dated 15 October 1993 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10389 of 1991 (Smt. Jagdamba Srivastava & Another) had rejected the State's argument that only Class VI to VIII teachers were entitled to salary, holding:
Against this backdrop, the Division Bench held that Clause 10 of the 1982 Circular is merely an executive instruction implementing the grant-in-aid scheme. An executive circular cannot limit or take away a right created by Section 10 of a statute, nor can it narrow a statutory term after the Supreme Court has given it an authoritative meaning. The DBEO and the Single Judge erred in proceeding solely on Clause 10 without considering Section 10 read in the light of Pawan Kumar Divedi.
The bench rejected the Single Judge's reasoning on limitation with precision. The appellant was not challenging the validity of Clause 10; he was claiming the benefit of the correct statutory interpretation of Section 10. That being a question of law settled by the Constitution Bench in 2014, no question of delay in raising it arose.
On the 2018 amendment, the bench acknowledged that U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 inserted clause (ee) into Section 2 of the 1978 Act, defining “Junior High School” to mean an institution imparting education from Class VI to Class VIII. This effectively gave statutory force to the narrower meaning that the Constitution Bench had rejected. However, the bench held that this was a substantive change in the law that operates only from the date of its commencement. It does not affect the appellant's claim for salary for the period before the amendment, which remains governed by Pawan Kumar Divedi.
To support retrospective application of the Constitution Bench's interpretation, the bench drew on the Supreme Court's decision in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora and Others, 2025 INSC 498: (2026) 2 SCC 401. That decision holds that a Supreme Court judgment interpreting a statute declares what the law has always meant, not a new rule from the date of judgment, and therefore applies to cases still pending when it was delivered — unless the Court expressly limits its decision to prospective operation. Pawan Kumar Divedi contained no such limiting direction.
The bench was careful to note the limits of this principle. Cases that had already attained finality before 2014 remain undisturbed, consistent with the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and decisions in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer, (2024) 2 SCC 362, and State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315. The appellant's claim, however, never attained finality. The Division Bench's remand order of 23 November 2012, the DBEO's fresh rejection on 11 April 2013, the Single Judge's dismissal on 29 April 2013, and the present special appeal formed a continuous chain of live proceedings. The Constitution Bench ruling therefore squarely applies.
Regarding Singasan Sharma v. State of U.P. and 3 Others, Special Appeal No. 530 of 2025, decided on 17 December 2025, reported in 2026 (2) ESC 583 (All)(DB), the bench acknowledged its limited relevance. That decision dealt with denial of retirement benefits on the basis of a later administrative inquiry despite earlier court orders on a duly approved appointment, following the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav v. State of U.P., (2024) 11 SCC 770. While the principle that a teacher not at fault cannot be denied salary for management or official lapses supports the appellant's position to the extent that his 1980 approval was never cancelled, the bench noted the absence of specific pleading or material showing the appellant actually continued to teach throughout the entire period for which salary is claimed. That factual exercise was left to the remand.
Factual Qualifications Imposed on the Entitlement
The Division Bench was explicit that the legal entitlement established in this judgment does not automatically translate into a fixed amount payable. Salary under Section 10 will be payable only for the period during which the appellant actually worked and taught in the institution. The record before the court did not disclose his employment status after the dismissal of the writ petition on 29 April 2013 — whether he continued in service, retired, or whether service ended for any other reason. The bench expressed no opinion on any post-2013 service dispute, leaving the appellant free to pursue whatever remedy is available in law if he claims his service was discontinued illegally.
The arrears, if found payable, will run from November 1981 up to the earlier of: the commencement of U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018, or the date on which the appellant's service came to an end.
Order
The judgment and order dated 29 April 2013 passed by the Single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition-A No. 23422 of 2013 and the order dated 11 April 2013 passed by the DBEO, Azamgarh, are set aside. Special Appeal No. 903 of 2013 is disposed of with the following directions:
The matter is remitted to the District Basic Education Officer, Azamgarh, for fresh consideration in the light of the law in Pawan Kumar Divedi. The DBEO is directed to verify, from service records, attendance registers, and any other relevant material, the period during which the appellant actually taught in the institution and whether, and from what date, his service ended. If it is found that the appellant worked in the institution, he shall be paid arrears of salary for the verified period, from November 1981 up to the earlier of the commencement of U.P. Act No. 3 of 2018 or the date his service ended.
The exercise is to be completed within three months from the date a certified copy of the order is produced before the DBEO, after affording the appellant an opportunity of hearing. There is no order as to costs.