Allahabad HC Quashes FIR Against Advocate Who Filed GST Appeal on Client's Instructions
A Division Bench held that nominating an advocate in an FIR for a professional act of filing a statutory appeal strikes at the roots of Articles 14 and 21 and the right to legal assistance.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Tarun Saxena, on 21 May 2026 quashed an FIR, a charge-sheet, and a cognizance order that had been initiated against an advocate for filing a statutory GST appeal on behalf of his client. The Bench held that the FIR “violate[s] all known principles of criminal liability” and that holding an advocate in criminal conspiracy with his client for a professional act would strike at the existence of the Bar and deprive citizens of their right to legal assistance. The petition was filed by Samarpan Jain, an advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, who had been named alongside his client in an FIR registered by a Deputy Commissioner of GST.
The Dispute Before the Court
Samarpan Jain has been enrolled with the Bar Council of U.P. since 20 December 2021 and specialises in indirect taxes, direct taxes, and corporate laws. He is also an Advocate on Record before the Allahabad High Court, holding AOR No. A/S0088/25.
One Mohd. Haris, proprietor of M/s M H Enterprises (GSTIN-09AJDPH7962C3Z5), Rampur, engaged Jain to file statutory appeals under Section 107 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The appeals challenged orders dated 16 April 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, GST, Sector-1, Rampur under Section 74 of the State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Those orders assessed tax, interest, and penalty of Rs. 81,46,291 for the financial year 2021-2022, Rs. 4,90,78,118 for 2022-2023, and Rs. 4,80,16,615 for 2023-2024 against the firm.
On 15 August 2025, Jain filed two online statutory appeals before Appellate Authority-3 in respect of two orders dated 18 April 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, GST, Sector-1, Rampur. In doing so, he made the mandatory pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed tax by utilising the Input Tax Credit and Electronic Credit Ledger of the assessee. He relied on a circular, CBIC-20001/2/2022-GST dated 06.07.2022, and on the Gujarat High Court's decision in M/s Yasho Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and another, which had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Yasho Industries Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1526.
On 22 September 2025, the appellate authority served Mohd. Haris with an intimation dated 23 September 2025 stating that the pre-deposit made from the Electronic Credit Ledger by utilising Input Tax Credit could not be accepted as a valid statutory pre-deposit. He was directed to appear on 24 September 2025 on the question of maintainability. Jain was informed of this communication late in the night of 23 September 2025. He was required to attend an urgent meeting at Ghaziabad and expressed his inability to appear at Moradabad. The client could not arrange an adjournment, and the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on the ground that the pre-deposit was not a valid tender.
Instead of proceeding to recover the assessed tax, interest, and penalty from Mohd. Haris, the Deputy Commissioner of GST lodged FIR No. 175 of 2025 on 04 October 2025 at Police Station Kotwali, District Rampur under Sections 61(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338, and 340(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The FIR named not only Mohd. Haris but also Samarpan Jain, alleging that the pre-deposit from the Electronic Credit Ledger was an illegal course and that there was evasion of GST committed by the client in conspiracy with the advocate, causing financial loss to the State Exchequer.
The Legal Issue
The central question was whether an advocate who files a statutory appeal and makes a pre-deposit in the manner he advises, relying on a view of the law endorsed by the Gujarat High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, can be named as a co-conspirator in a criminal case arising from that professional act.
Senior Advocate Sushil Shukla, appearing for Jain, submitted that the petitioner acted in his “professional capacity” and did so to the best of his knowledge, going by the law as declared by the superior courts. He argued that even if the petitioner acted in error, a professional act of filing an appeal cannot make an advocate a partner in his client's business or a conspirator. He pressed that it would be a “very perilous proposition” to accept that an advocate who takes a particular course of action for his client would face criminal prosecution for conspiracy.
The Additional Advocate General, Anoop Trivedi, appearing for respondent no. 3, had little to offer in response. The GST officer who had lodged the FIR was summoned in person and asked why he had nominated the advocate for a professional act of filing an appeal. He had no answer.
The Bench also took note of a sequence of events that followed the issuance of notice in the writ petition. After notice was issued, the police filed a charge-sheet and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Rampur passed a cognizance order, both on the same day, 14 May 2026. This prompted an amendment of the writ petition to bring the charge-sheet and the cognizance order within its scope.
How the Bench Reasoned
The Division Bench held that the FIR, the charge-sheet, and the cognizance order violated all known principles of criminal liability.
The Bench reasoned that an advocate is, by profession, authorised to represent clients in any kind of case, including defending persons charged with murder, rape, or terror offences. If filing an appeal for a client could make an advocate a conspirator, it would, in the Bench's words, be “the end of the very existence of the Bar.” It would also deprive citizens of their right to legal assistance, because an advocate would be thinking about his own defence before filing a vakalatnama. The Bench held that such a situation “hits at the roots of the principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.”
On the specific act of making the pre-deposit from the Electronic Credit Ledger, the Bench was clear. Even if the Deputy Commissioner of GST believed that the pre-deposit could not be debited to the Electronic Ledger out of Input Tax Credit, the advocate's professional decision to do so did not make him a conspirator with the assessee. The act was done in the course of filing an appeal, based on a particular view of the law, whether right, wrong, or utterly wrong, and had nothing to do with the client's business.
The Bench also drew attention to the manner in which the charge-sheet was filed and cognizance was taken on the very same day, 14 May 2026, after notice had been issued in the writ petition. This sequence was treated as a matter requiring specific notice in the judgment.
Order
The writ petition was allowed. The Bench quashed the FIR dated 04 October 2025 giving rise to Case Crime No. 175 of 2025 under Sections 61(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338, and 340(2) of the BNS, Police Station Kotwali, District Rampur, in so far as it relates to Samarpan Jain. Charge-sheet No. 30 of 2026 dated 04 April 2026 and the cognizance order dated 14 May 2026 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Rampur were also quashed in so far as they relate to the petitioner.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur was directed to cause an entry to be made in red ink in the General Diary of Police Station Kotwali, District Rampur recording that the proceedings of Case Crime No. 175 of 2025 under Sections 61(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338, and 340(2) of the BNS have been quashed in relation to the petitioner under orders of this Court.
The Registrar (Compliance) was directed to communicate the order to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur, and through him to the Superintendent of Police, Rampur, the Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, District Rampur, and the Deputy Commissioner, GST, Sector-I, Rampur.