An inquiry cleared her, a second one did not reach her, and she was suspended. Allahabad High Court refers the hearing question to a larger Bench
Justice Siddharth Nandan finds two Division Bench rulings in conflict on whether a teacher must be heard before the Inspector approves a suspension, and keeps the orders in abeyance meanwhile.
A principal of an aided intermediate college in Farrukhabad was the subject of complaints by a local Kisan Union worker whose daughter she had disciplined. A three-member committee of district officials inspected the school and reported that every allegation was baseless. The complaints continued, a second committee was set up, and on the strength of its report — which the principal says was never given to her — she was suspended and the Inspector of Schools approved the suspension. Justice Siddharth Nandan has kept both orders in abeyance and referred to a larger Bench the question whether she was entitled to be heard before that approval was given.
Two inquiries
The petitioner was appointed Principal of a recognised and aided intermediate college through the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board, on an advertisement of 2011. The institution is governed by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971.
The sequence set out in the judgment begins with a student. A complaint was made against a girl whose father is described as a Kisan Union worker; he submitted a written apology on her behalf and no further action was taken against her. He then began making complaints against the principal at various levels of the education department and the district administration. The education department took no action, but the District Magistrate constituted a three-member committee — the District Inspector of Schools, the Circle Officer (Police) and the Deputy District Magistrate — to inquire and report.
That committee inspected the institution in November 2025 and reported in December 2025. Its conclusion, extracted in the judgment, records that the complainant was telephoned and invited to attend the school to state his case and did not come; that the principal explained the girl had been bringing a phone into school and that her father had apologised in writing when this was reported, a copy of the apology being produced; and that it was clear from the inquiry that all the allegations were baseless. The committee added a general direction that the principal and manager should hold periodic meetings with parent-teacher bodies and address the suggestions raised.
The girl subsequently failed her Class 11 examination, her father withdrew her from the school and a transfer certificate was issued — and he continued to complain. On a further complaint, the Additional District Magistrate constituted another committee. The principal filed a representation saying the allegations were baseless and that a fact-finding inquiry had already found them so.
The second committee reported, the District Magistrate forwarded the report to the Inspector of Schools, the college's Committee of Management resolved to place the principal under suspension, and a suspension order followed in July 2026. The Inspector approved it in August 2026. On the petitioner's case, neither the resolution nor the inquiry report that led to it was ever supplied to her, despite a written request.
The question the judge could not answer alone
Under Section 16-G(5) of the 1921 Act a management may suspend a teacher or principal, and under Section 16-G(6) read with sub-section (7) the order must be forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools, together with the particulars and documents required by Regulation 39 of Chapter III, for approval or disapproval. The question is whether anyone is entitled to be heard at that stage.
The judgment records a conflict in the authorities. On one view no opportunity of hearing is required at the approval stage. On the other, in Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, the Court held that although a hearing is not required at that stage as a general matter, where the employee has submitted a representation or objection against the suspension the Inspector must hear both the management and the employee before approving or disapproving, and must give brief reasons.
That difference matters on these facts, because the petitioner had made exactly such a representation.
Why it went upstairs rather than being decided
Justice Nandan's reason for not resolving the conflict himself is a careful statement of judicial discipline, and it is the part of this judgment with the widest application.
Where a Single Judge is inclined to differ from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench or Single Judge, he should refer the matter to a larger Bench or place the papers before the Chief Justice so that one may be constituted — a healthy principle of judicial decorum and propriety. But the situation here is different again: the Court found, prima facie, a conflict between the ratios of two Division Benches. In that position it would not be appropriate for a Single Judge to express agreement or disagreement with either.
The authority is Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, extracted at length, in which the Supreme Court said that considerations of judicial propriety require a Single Judge who thinks earlier decisions of his High Court need reconsideration not to embark on that inquiry himself, but to refer the matter or place the papers before the Chief Justice — and recorded regret that the judge in that case had departed from the traditional way. The judgment also cites Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community, Raghubir Singh and Mahadeolal Kanodia.
The question referred is therefore framed in terms: while exercising powers under Section 16-G(6) read with sub-section (7) at the stage of approval or disapproval of a suspension order passed under Section 16-G(5), and forwarded to the Inspector with the particulars and documents under Regulation 39, whether any opportunity of hearing ought to be extended to the management, teacher or principal as the case may be.
Interim relief, and a line about who may start such proceedings
The Court did not leave the petitioner suspended while the reference is heard, and the reason it gave for intervening is independent of the question referred.
It observed that, prima facie, the entire proceeding initiated against the petitioner and the resulting suspension appear to have emanated from the inquiry set up by the District Authorities — whereas it is no longer res integra that the initiation of such proceedings lies outside the realm of the district administration and within the sole domain of the educational authorities. On that footing the approval order of August 2026 and the suspension order of July 2026 were both directed to be kept in abeyance in the meantime.
That observation is as consequential as the reference itself. Complaints against teachers in aided institutions routinely reach District Magistrates, who constitute committees of revenue and police officers to inquire into what are service matters within a statutory education framework. The judgment flags that the machinery for acting on such complaints belongs to the education department, and that a suspension traced to a district administration's inquiry is vulnerable for that reason alone.
Order
The papers were directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for consideration, to constitute an appropriate Bench to hear the matter, with the impugned orders kept in abeyance in the meantime. The judgment is marked AFR — approved for reporting.
For teachers and principals in U.P.'s aided schools the stakes in the reference are practical. Approval by the Inspector of Schools is the only external check on a management's power to suspend, and a suspension can continue for years while an inquiry proceeds. If approval is a purely administrative step at which nobody is heard, that check amounts to a file movement; if a represented employee must be heard and brief reasons given, it becomes a real one. The larger Bench will decide which.
The facts of this case are a reminder of why the question is not academic. On the record before the Court, an official committee including the Inspector himself had already found the allegations baseless, the complainant declined an invitation to substantiate them, and the principal was nonetheless suspended on a later report she says she never saw.