Allahabad HC Upholds Refusal to Discharge PA Accused of Disproportionate Assets Under PC Act
The Lucknow Bench held that a prima facie discrepancy in known sources of income is enough to frame charges, and the accused must account for assets during trial, not at the discharge stage.
The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, on 20 April 2026, dismissed a criminal revision filed by Anup Kumar Shrivastava, a former Personal Assistant in the Revenue and Special Intelligence department, Lucknow, who sought to quash a Special Court's refusal to discharge him in a disproportionate assets case. Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra, sitting singly in Court No. 27, found no illegality or perversity in the order of the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Court No. 1, Lucknow, which had dismissed his discharge application. The court held that at the stage of framing of charge, the question is only whether a prima facie case exists — detailed computation and proof of every income source belong to the trial, not to the discharge proceeding.
The Prosecution Case and the Route to the High Court
The case has its origins in an investigation stretching back well over a decade. On 15 November 2010, the State Government issued Government Order No. 108/1/84/2010, directing an open investigation against Shrivastava on a communication from the Anti-Corruption Department. The inquiry identified a discrepancy between his known sources of income and assets found during the check period running from 1 April 2004 to 31 December 2004.
On 20 January 2012, an FIR was registered against him at Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, as Case Crime No. 24 of 2012, under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A subsequent report dated 28 March 2017, prepared by the Anti-Corruption Department for the same check period, assessed the discrepancy at Rs. 1,69,815/— arrived at by comparing known income of Rs. 10,89,199/- against total income assessed at Rs. 12,59,014/-. Sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Act was granted by letter dated 9 August 2018.
Shrivastava filed a discharge application before the Special Court. By order dated 19 March 2026, the Special Judge dismissed it. He then filed Criminal Revision No. 437 of 2026 before the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking to quash the Special Court's order and secure his discharge from the criminal proceedings.
What the Revisionist Argued
Counsel for Shrivastava advanced several arguments before the High Court. The first was delay: the check period ended in December 2004, the Government Order came only in 2010, and the FIR was registered in 2012 — a gap of roughly eight years, for which the prosecution offered no justification. This delay, it was argued, prejudiced the accused and violated the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The second argument concerned the computation of known sources of income. Counsel contended that the department had incorrectly inflated the discrepancy figure by including loan assets and amounts spent on maintaining family members, and that the prosecution had never properly identified or specified the known income sources. In the FIR, the discrepancy was stated as Rs. 3,16,341/-, but after investigation it was reduced to Rs. 1,69,815/- — a variation the revisionist said exposed a fundamental infirmity in the prosecution's case.
The revisionist also placed his personal financial transactions before the court: a sale deed dated 30 July 2005 for land at Dalibagh, Butler Road, Lucknow, measuring 142.66 square metres, executed jointly with his wife for a consideration of Rs. 6,00,000/-; a house loan from IDBI Bank; and loans of approximately Rs. 45,00,000/- taken from friends and relatives for constructing flats on the purchased land. He argued that all of this had been disclosed in writing to the competent officer and the Investigating Officer, and that assets attributable to his Hindu Undivided Family had been wrongly treated as his exclusive income.
On the sanction order, counsel submitted that it was a non-speaking order passed without recording reasons and without considering the representation made by the accused, and was therefore contrary to the ratio in C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 81. Finally, it was argued that the Special Judge, while dismissing the discharge application, had not addressed the contentions raised and had simply gone into the general powers of discharge without recording any finding on the specific arguments — making the order itself an exercise without application of mind.
The State's Position
The Additional Government Advocate, appearing for the State, countered that at the stage of considering a discharge application or framing charges, the trial court is not expected to carry out a mathematical calculation of the discrepant amount. The court is required only to assess whether sufficient material exists to proceed against the accused for the charges levelled. The small quantum of the discrepancy cannot by itself be a ground for discharge. The trial court had considered the grounds raised and the evidence collected during investigation before dismissing the application.
How the High Court Reasoned
Justice Mishra began with the statutory framework. Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — in its form prior to the 2018 amendment, which is the provision applicable here — makes it an offence of criminal misconduct for a public servant to be in possession of, or to have at any time during the period of office been in possession of, pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. The Explanation to the section defines “known sources of income” as income received from any lawful source duly intimated in accordance with applicable law, rules or orders.
The court drew on the Supreme Court's decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundiraraju, (2023) 6 SCC 768, which restated the standard at the discharge stage in disproportionate assets cases. Under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is to consider only whether a prima facie case exists and whether the charge is groundless — it is not to conduct a mini-trial or weigh the accused's explanations as established facts. The burden question under Section 13(1)(e) was also addressed: while the prosecution must establish possession of disproportionate assets, the term “known sources of income” refers to sources known to the prosecution; it is then for the accused to satisfactorily account for the assets in his hands. That obligation to account, the court held, cannot be discharged at the Section 239 stage.
The court also referred to the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and Others, (2012) 9 SCC 460, which confirmed that even a strong suspicion is sufficient to frame a charge, that the court at this stage does not assess whether the case would end in conviction, and that quashing of a charge is an exception reserved for cases where the allegations are patently absurd or where basic ingredients of the offence are entirely absent.
Applying these principles to the facts, Justice Mishra found that the inquiry report preceding the FIR, together with the material collected during investigation, raised serious doubt and grave suspicion about the revisionist's complicity in the offence. The reduction in the discrepancy figure from Rs. 3,16,341/- to Rs. 1,69,815/- after investigation was described as significant but not a sole ground to discharge the revisionist. Equally, the small size of the discrepancy relative to income was not a standalone ground for discharge.
On the sanction, the court examined the order and found that it could not be said to have been passed by the competent authority without application of mind. The sanctioning officer had stated that he examined all material collected during investigation and recorded his satisfaction regarding the charges before granting sanction. The court also noted that there was no dispute that the sanction was granted by the competent officer.
On the argument that the accused had borrowed money from friends and relatives within prescribed limits and had intimated the government, the court observed that during trial the revisionist would have the opportunity to prove each such receipt through witness testimony and contemporaneous documents. Whether any borrowing was within the limits prescribed under relevant service rules and was duly intimated in the prescribed form are matters to be established before the trial court. At the charge-framing stage, there is no scope for such calculation and proof.
Outcome
Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra found no illegality, irregularity, or perversity in the impugned order of the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Court No. 1, Lucknow, dated 19 March 2026. Criminal Revision No. 437 of 2026 was dismissed. The criminal proceedings against Anup Kumar Shrivastava under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, registered as Case Crime No. 24 of 2012, will proceed before the Special Court.