MP High Court Quashes Attachment Order Used as Punishment, Cites GAD Circular and Transfer Policy

The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior quashed an attachment order dated 8 May 2026, holding it violated the State's GAD Circular, transfer policy, and the settled rule against punitive transfers.

On 22 May 2026, Justice Anand Singh Bahrawat of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench, quashed an order dated 8 May 2026 that had attached a government employee, Ashok Singh, to Janpad Panchayat, Porsa, District Morena. The court found the order prima facie contrary to the State Government's General Administration Department (GAD) Circular dated 4 May 2024 and to the transfer policy, both of which prohibit attachments. The court also held that the order was passed by way of punishment — a ground that makes any transfer or attachment order liable to be set aside. The petition was allowed and the employee was directed to continue at his present place of posting.

The Attachment Order and the Challenge Before the Court

Ashok Singh filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash the attachment order dated 8 May 2026 passed by Respondent No. 2. His counsel, Shri Pratip Visoriya, argued that the order was directly contrary to the GAD Circular dated 4 May 2024, which the State Government had issued specifically to regulate attachments. The transfer policy, too, did not permit attachments.

Counsel pointed out that the GAD had issued circulars on multiple occasions making clear that attachments are not permissible. Despite this, the impugned order was issued. What made the order additionally vulnerable, counsel submitted, was the language of the order itself: the respondents had stated in the order that the attachment was being passed as a punishment. An attachment or transfer order, counsel argued, cannot be passed by way of punishment.

The State, represented by Government Advocate Shri G.K. Agarwal, opposed the petition and supported the impugned order.

The Legal Bar Against Punitive Transfers

The court noted that the transfer policy contains Clause 52, which specifically prohibits all types of attachments. This was a concrete textual basis for the challenge, beyond the GAD Circular.

On the question of whether a transfer or attachment can be used as punishment, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India, (2009) 2 SCC 592. The Supreme Court had held in that case that while an employer is entitled to pass a transfer order in administrative exigencies, it is an entirely different matter when the order is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. The court quoted the relevant passage:

“When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.”

The Supreme Court in Somesh Tiwari had also explained that such an order attracts the principle of malice in law — not malice in fact, but malice arising from the order being based on an irrelevant ground, such as allegations in an anonymous complaint, rather than on any factor germane to a transfer.

The Gwalior Bench applied this reasoning directly to the facts before it. The impugned order had itself disclosed that the attachment was being passed as a punishment. That admission, combined with the bar in the GAD Circular and Clause 52 of the transfer policy, made the order unsustainable.

Preliminary Inquiry Did Not Establish Allegations

The court also addressed the complaint that appeared to have prompted the attachment. A preliminary inquiry had been conducted by the respondent authorities into the allegations against Ashok Singh. However, the court noted that the enquiry report did not disclose that the allegations levelled against the petitioner had been found proved.

In those circumstances, the court held that an employee or officer cannot be victimised by way of attachment or transfer. The court drew a clear distinction: if the Government wishes to transfer an employee on administrative grounds, that option remains available under the transfer policy. What is not available is using an attachment or transfer as a substitute for disciplinary action, particularly when the preliminary inquiry has not returned findings against the employee.

Order

The court allowed and disposed of the writ petition in the following terms:

The impugned order dated 8 May 2026 was quashed. The respondents were directed to permit Ashok Singh to continue discharging his duties and services at his present place of posting.

The court clarified that the respondents remain at liberty to take disciplinary action against the petitioner in accordance with law, if they so desire.