Allahabad HC Upholds Murder Conviction 40 Years On, Sends 82-Year-Old Back to Jail
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed a 1985 criminal appeal, confirming a life sentence under Section 302 IPC for a man who killed his brother with an agricultural tool in 1984.
Forty years after filing his appeal, Babu Lal, now 82 years of age, has had his murder conviction confirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 236 of 1985 on 17 July 2026, holding that the trial court's judgment convicting him under Section 302 and Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code was neither infirm nor perverse. The appellant had struck his brother Ganga on the head multiple times with a sabri—an iron agricultural digging tool roughly one and a half feet in length—on the morning of 25 March 1984. He was convicted by the Court of Session in S.T. No. 607 of 1984 on 11 October 1984 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. His bail was cancelled and he was directed to surrender forthwith.
The Incident and the Trial Court Record
On 25 March 1984, at around 11:30 am, an oral report was lodged with the police by PW-1, the wife of the deceased. She stated that Babu Lal, armed with the sabri, came from behind and struck her husband Ganga on the head three to four times. When she intervened, she was also attacked. Rani, the sister of the deceased, then came and disarmed Babu Lal, handing the weapon to the police. Ganga died on the spot.
At trial, two prosecution witnesses were examined: PW-1, the wife of the deceased, and PW-2, the daughter of the deceased. Both were eyewitnesses and corroborated each other on material particulars. Rani, though named in the charge sheet, was not examined as a prosecution witness. The post mortem report, admitted as Exhibit Ka-13, documented five injuries on the deceased's body, including a lacerated wound on the right parietal and frontal bone causing a comminuted fracture. The doctor who prepared the report was not called to give oral evidence; instead, the defence had admitted the genuineness of the report under Section 294 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, which the bench held dispensed with the need for formal proof.
The trial court convicted Babu Lal under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment, and separately under Section 323 IPC with one year's rigorous imprisonment. Babu Lal appealed, and was enlarged on bail during the pendency of the appeal after serving approximately five years.
Four Challenges Raised Before the Division Bench
Sri D.P. Singh, Senior Counsel for the appellant, pressed four distinct arguments before the Division Bench.
First, that the non-examination of Rani—the person who snatched the sabri and handed it to the police—amounted to withholding the best evidence, thereby vitiating the trial. Second, that the prosecution had failed to establish any adequate motive. The only motive placed on record was a dispute the day before the incident, during which the deceased asked Babu Lal to leave some moveable articles for him, and Babu Lal refused. Senior Counsel argued this was too trivial a quarrel to motivate a man to kill his own brother.
Third, and most substantively, that the weapon used—an agricultural tool, not a dedicated weapon, and used from its blunt side—showed an absence of intention to kill. He argued that even accepting the prosecution's case in full, the maximum offence made out was one under Section 325 IPC for causing grievous hurt. Fourth, and related, that the prosecution had failed to prove the requisite intention beyond reasonable doubt, and that the appellant should not have been convicted under Section 302 IPC.
The State, represented by Ms. Divya Ojha, AGA-I, countered each argument. On the best evidence point, she submitted that the rule does not apply in criminal law and the prosecution is not obliged to examine every witness named in the charge sheet. On motive, she pointed to the undisturbed deposition of PW-1. On intention, she argued that the repeated targeting of the head established that Babu Lal sought to cause death, not mere pain.
The Bench's Reasoning on Best Evidence and Motive
The Division Bench rejected the best evidence argument without hesitation. It restated the settled position in criminal jurisprudence: the prosecution is always assessed on the evidence it places before the court, not on evidence it chose not to produce. The prosecution's prerogative to decide which witnesses to examine from those named in the charge sheet is well recognised. Critically, the bench pointed out that the defence was equally at liberty to summon Rani as a defence witness and did not do so. Where the best evidence is a document, the court may exercise its power under Section 91 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure to call for it; no similar exercise was sought here.
On motive, the bench found the altercation over the apportionment of moveable property between the brothers a day before the killing to be sufficient. PW-1's account of this dispute was not disturbed in cross-examination. The bench, however, went on to observe that in a case resting on direct eyewitness testimony, motive loses its significance in any event. Motive becomes critical where a case is built entirely on circumstantial evidence; where ocular evidence is available and proved, its absence or weakness is not fatal to the prosecution.
Intention, the Nature of the Weapon, and Mens Rea
The core legal question was whether the use of a blunt agricultural tool could sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC, or whether it reduced the offence to one under Section 325 IPC or Section 304 IPC.
The bench held that intention cannot be assessed by the nature of the instrument alone. What matters is which part of the human body was targeted and how that targeting was carried out. In this case, Babu Lal struck the deceased on the head repeatedly—a vital part of the body. He approached from behind, concealing the sabri with his forearms so that the deceased had no chance to react or exercise his right of private defence. The post mortem report confirmed injuries consistent with an attack from the rear: on the parietal and frontal bone, the cervical area of the neck, and the right shoulder.
The bench set out its reasoning through illustration. A brick thrown at a person's head, even if it misses or causes only minor injury, may sustain a charge under Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder, because the article and the targeted anatomy are such that a full blow would, in all probability, cause death. A pebble thrown at the head cannot attract Section 307 IPC, because it could never cause grievous hurt or death in the ordinary course of nature. The bench further illustrated with two labourer scenarios: a stab to the inner thigh severing the femoral artery by a labourer who does not know anatomy might attract only Section 326 IPC, whereas the same act by a doctor who knows exactly where the femoral artery runs could attract Section 302 IPC, because the doctor's knowledge — itself part of mens rea — establishes the intention.
Applying this framework, the bench concluded that Babu Lal's conduct admitted only one inference. He arrived surreptitiously, concealed the weapon, and targeted the head not once but four times. The deceased died on the spot. The ferocity of the assault and the surreptitious approach together established that Senior Counsel for the appellant objected to the reliance placed on the post mortem report, arguing it was not a scientific report covered by Section 293 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure (which covers FSL reports, ballistic reports and the like), and that the doctor ought to have been called and subjected to cross-examination. The bench dealt with this by reference to the trial court record itself. At the stage of admission or denial of documents under Section 294 of the erstwhile Code, the defence had admitted the genuineness of the post mortem report, on account of which it was marked as Exhibit Ka-13. The bench held that once the defence admits the genuineness of a document under Section 294, no formal proof is required. The objection was therefore not maintainable at the appellate stage. Senior Counsel urged the bench to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, noting that the appellant is now 82 years of age and had already served approximately five years before being enlarged on bail. The bench acknowledged the difficulty plainly: “The fact that the appellant would have to go back to jail after 40 years, no doubt, disturbs this Court.” However, the bench held that it had no legal basis to do so. For the court to interfere with a conviction under Section 302 IPC and substitute it with one under Section 304 Part-II IPC, there must be mitigating facts such as sudden and grave provocation or a sudden fight. No such facts were on record. The bench also expressly noted that it does not possess the extraordinary powers vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, which allow that court to do complete justice regardless of procedural constraints. Absent both a legal basis for reduction and the constitutional power to grant equitable relief beyond the law, the bench had no option but to confirm the sentence. The Division Bench dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 236 of 1985. The bail bonds of the appellant were cancelled. He was directed to surrender forthwith before the trial court concerned, which was directed to send him back to jail to complete the remaining part of his life sentence. If Babu Lal does not surrender, the court directed that non-bailable warrants be issued to secure his presence and he be thereafter sent to jail. The record of the trial court was directed to be returned.On the Post Mortem Report and Its Admissibility
The Question of Age and the Court's Limitations
Order