Order to Explain Why Contempt Charges Should Not Be Framed Is Not Appealable Under Section 19, Rules Allahabad High Court
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed a contempt appeal, holding that a direction to appear and explain why charges should not be framed carries no element of punishment and is not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
The Allahabad High Court has dismissed a contempt appeal filed by Dhanendra Kumar Jain, Secretary of the Committee of Management of Digambar Jain College, Baraut, Baghpat, against an order of a Single Judge that directed him to appear and explain why contempt charges should not be framed against him. The Division Bench, comprising Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay, held that such a direction does not amount to an order imposing punishment for contempt and therefore does not attract the right of appeal under Section 19(1)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The bench made clear that the appellant is not without remedy and may pursue a Letters Patent Appeal instead.
The Dispute Over Assistant Professor Appointments at Digambar Jain College
The proceedings trace back to a selection process for 13 posts of Assistant Professor at Digambar Jain College, Baraut, Baghpat. The Committee of Management had conducted interviews and forwarded documents to the university for approval. On 22 November 2023, the State Government stayed further proceedings of the selection. The Committee of Management, headed by the appellant, challenged that stay in Writ-A No. 20415 of 2023. The High Court disposed of that petition on 20 December 2023, setting aside the State Government's order and remanding the matter to the Joint Secretary, State of Uttar Pradesh, for fresh orders.
Acting on the remand, the State Government on 6 May 2024 restrained the Committee of Management from making further appointments, citing the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Selection Commission Act, 2023, which had come into force on 21 August 2023. The Committee of Management challenged this order in Writ-A No. 7979 of 2024. Five selected candidates separately filed Writ-A No. 7792 of 2024.
Before those writ petitions could be decided, the State Government on 20 November 2024 recalled its own order dated 6 May 2024. Respondent No. 1, Sunil Kumar Jain, challenged the recall order in Writ-A No. 19843 of 2024. Since no stay was granted on the recall order, the Committee of Management proceeded to select candidates for the remaining 8 posts and submitted the selection to the university on 9 December 2024. When the university neither approved nor disapproved the appointments, the Committee of Management invoked Clause 17 of the State University Act, treating the appointments as deemed approved, and issued appointment letters to 17 candidates on 9 January 2025. The Vice Chancellor accorded approval to the joining on 15 January 2025.
On 21 January 2025, the High Court decided the batch of writ petitions. It set aside the order dated 6 May 2024 and directed the State Government to pass fresh orders within four weeks, without taking note of the recall order dated 20 November 2024. Pursuant to the order dated 21 January 2025, the State Government on 21 April 2025 allowed the Committee of Management to complete the selection process. On 26 July 2025, the Vice Chancellor formally communicated approval of the appointments.
In the meantime, respondent No. 1 filed Writ-A No. 10333 of 2025 challenging the State Government's order dated 21 April 2025. On 25 July 2025, the High Court kept that order in abeyance. The appellant, unaware of the order dated 25 July 2025, issued further appointment letters on 26 July 2025. The order dated 25 July 2025 was served on the appellant on 5 August 2025.
Respondent No. 1 then filed Contempt Application No. 6614 of 2025 on 18 November 2025, alleging contempt of the order dated 25 July 2025 in Writ-A No. 10333 of 2025 and of the order dated 21 January 2025 in Writ-A No. 19843 of 2024. On 18 February 2026, the Single Judge directed the Principal Secretary Higher Education, Uttar Pradesh; the Director of Higher Education, U.P., Prayagraj; and the Secretary of the Committee of Management, Digambar Jain College, to remain present in court on 30 March 2026 and to explain why charges should not be framed against them. It was against this direction that the present Contempt Appeal No. 4 of 2026 was filed.
The Legal Question: When Does an Intermediate Contempt Order Attract an Appeal Under Section 19?
The sole question before the Division Bench was whether the appeal was maintainable under Section 19(1)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 19(1) provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court “in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.” Where the order is of a Single Judge, the appeal lies to a bench of not less than two judges.
Senior Counsel for the appellant argued that an order passed at an intermediate stage in contempt proceedings can be appealed under Section 19(1), relying on the Allahabad High Court's decision in Suhas L.Y., District Magistrate v. Taulan Singh, 2018 SCC OnLine All 6741, and on the Supreme Court's decision in R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400. He submitted that the direction requiring the appellant to appear and explain why charges should not be framed was itself an order passed in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
Senior Counsel for respondent No. 1 countered that a direction merely calling upon a person to explain why charges should not be framed does not affect any substantive right of the alleged contemnor. He argued that Section 19(1) must be read in conjunction with the requirement that the order carry an element of punishment. He relied on the Supreme Court's five-point summary in Midnapore Peoples' Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399, and on the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sadhna Upadhyay Advocate v. State of U.P., 2009 (65) ACC 64 (FB).
How the Division Bench Reasoned
The bench worked through the line of Supreme Court authority on Section 19 with care. It reproduced the five principles from Midnapore Peoples' Co-operative Bank, which the Supreme Court had itself reaffirmed in Ajay Kumar Bhalla v. Prakash Kumar Dixit, 2024 (12) SCC 159. Those principles establish that an appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment for contempt. An order initiating proceedings, an order declining to initiate proceedings, an order dropping proceedings, and an order acquitting or exonerating a contemnor are all outside the scope of Section 19.
The bench then examined the appellant's reliance on R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik. In that case, the contemnors had tendered an unconditional apology which the High Court accepted, yet the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the rule issued for contempt. The Supreme Court held that once the court decides not to discharge the rule after accepting an apology, it has exercised its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and an appeal lies. The Division Bench distinguished that position: R.N. Dey was confined to its own facts because there the court had already decided a substantive contention raised by the alleged contemnors asking for discharge. The judgment of Midnapore, the bench held, is the definitive guideline for determining when a Section 19 appeal lies and when a Letters Patent Appeal is the correct route.
The bench also considered the Supreme Court's decision in ECL Finance Limited v. Harikishan Shankerji Gudipati, (2018) 13 SCC 142, which held that observations made while issuing notice in a contempt petition are only for prima facie satisfaction and that the right to appeal under Section 19(1)(a) arises only after the court takes a definitive decision to proceed to punish. Similarly, the bench noted the Allahabad High Court's own decision in Pradeep Kumar Dubey v. Ram Chandra Asthana, 2025 SCC OnLine All 5390, which drew a distinction between an order that is tantamount to entailing punishment and a routine interlocutory direction.
Applying these principles to the facts, the bench found that the Single Judge's order of 18 February 2026 did no more than direct the appellant to appear and explain why charges should not be framed. No punishment had been imposed. No finding of contempt had been recorded. No substantive contention of the alleged contemnor had been decided against him. The direction was, in the bench's assessment, a procedural step in the contempt proceedings, not an exercise of the jurisdiction to punish.
The bench drew an analogy with criminal proceedings: even in a criminal trial, an appeal lies only after a final order of conviction, not at the stage of charge framing. Allowing appeals at the charge-framing stage would bring every contempt proceeding to a halt before it could be heard on merits.
Outcome
The Division Bench dismissed Contempt Appeal No. 4 of 2026. It held that the appeal under Section 19(1)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 did not lie against the Single Judge's direction of 18 February 2026. The bench clarified that the appellant is not without remedy and may file an appeal under the Letters Patent Act. The order was pronounced on 30 March 2026.