Rival Petrol Pump Operator Has No Locus to Challenge Competitor's NOC, Rules Allahabad HC Lucknow Bench

The Allahabad High Court dismissed a writ petition by an existing petrol pump owner who sought to block a new outlet nearby, holding that competing business interest confers no locus standi under Article 226.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at its Lucknow Bench, comprising Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, dismissed Writ-C No. 5894 of 2026 on 11 August 2026. The petitioners, running a petrol pump under the name D.K. Automobiles on State Highway No. 30 at Village Govindapur, District Bahraich, had asked the Court to quash an approval order dated 09 February 2026 passed by the District Magistrate and a No Objection Certificate dated 13 February 2026 issued by the City Magistrate in favour of respondents 7 and 8, who were setting up a new petrol outlet at the adjoining plot. The bench held, as a preliminary objection, that the writ petition was not maintainable because an existing retailer has no locus standi under Article 226 to prevent a rival from entering the market. The petition was additionally found to be an abuse of process.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioners operate an Indian Oil Corporation petrol pump at Khasra/Gata No. 68, Village Govindapur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bahraich, on State Highway No. 30. Respondent No. 6, Reliance BP Mobility Limited, allotted a new petrol pump dealership to respondents 7 and 8 at what the petitioners described as the same or adjoining Khasra number.

The District Magistrate issued an approval on 09 February 2026 and the City Magistrate issued an NOC on 13 February 2026 in favour of respondents 7 and 8. The petitioners sought to quash both through the present writ petition in certiorari.

The petitioners' counsel pointed to Clause 3.1 and 3.2 of the State of Uttar Pradesh Guidelines of 2022 on norms of location, layout and access to fuel stations along state roads. Those clauses, he argued, prescribe a minimum distance of 300 metres for undivided carriageways and 1,000 metres for divided carriageways between fuel stations. The exception allowing a closer fuel station is available only where access is through a service lane of at least 7 metres in width. According to counsel, no such 7-metre service lane existed at the proposed site, making the approval and NOC impermissible.

An additional submission was that two adjoining petrol pumps would adversely affect the financial health of the existing outlet and that public policy should not permit it.

Preliminary Objection on Maintainability

Counsel for respondents 7 and 8, supported by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel and counsel for Reliance BP Mobility, raised the maintainability of the writ petition at the outset. The bench treated this as a preliminary objection going to the root of the case and decided it first.

The bench found the answer in a settled line of authority. It noted that a coordinate bench of this Court at Allahabad had, by order dated 08 February 2025 in Mili Rai v. Union of India & 5 Others (Writ-C No. 34873 of 2024), dismissed a similar petition and in doing so had quoted at length from an earlier coordinate bench decision in Writ-C No. 14091 of 2020. Paragraphs 6 to 10 of that earlier judgment were reproduced and found to apply squarely.

That earlier judgment had stated plainly that a petitioner running a petrol pump who opposes the establishment of another pump nearby is “essentially aimed at eliminating healthy competition and for perpetuating his monopoly.” Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda, (1970) 1 SCC 575, the earlier bench had observed that a rice mill owner has no locus standi under Article 226 to challenge the setting up of a rival mill because no vested right is infringed. The same principle was applied to petrol pump operators.

The bench also drew on a coordinate bench order dated 10 February 2021 in Writ-C No. 4608 of 2021 (M/s Tushar Filing Stations and Another v. Union of India), which had extensively quoted from Prince Filing Station v. Union of India (Writ-C No. 22409 of 2020, order dated 17 December 2020). That judgment had examined the requirement of being “an aggrieved person” to maintain a certiorari writ, drawing on the Supreme Court's ruling in Jas Bhai Moti Bhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671.

The Jas Bhai Moti Bhai Desai line holds that the mere fact that a rival commercial establishment would cause pecuniary harm through competition does not affect a legally protected interest sufficient to ground certiorari jurisdiction. In that case, the stand that a rival cinema house would harm commercial interest was held not to constitute an infringement of a justiciable right. The bench in the present case found that position equally applicable to petrol pump operators.

The bench further cited Mithilesh Garg and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1992) 1 SCC 168, in which the Supreme Court had rejected a challenge by existing permit holders to the grant of new permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. That decision had clarified that the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) does not extend to shutting out competition, and that more operators produce healthy competition and an efficient system.

Applying these precedents, the bench held: “the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the present petition in its present form.” It also invoked the Constitutional Bench decision in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12, which lays down that the existence of a right is the very foundation of Article 226 jurisdiction and that a writ issues only where a right under Part III is infringed. The bench found that the petitioners' fundamental right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) was not infringed by respondents 7 and 8 operating pursuant to a lawfully granted permission.

The Proxy PIL and Abuse of Process Finding

Beyond locus, the bench identified a separate ground for dismissal. Counsel for the respondents drew attention to an order dated 9 April 2026 passed by a coordinate bench in PIL No. 293 of 2026 (Sayeed Ahmad v. Union of India). The respondents contended that the PIL had been initiated as proxy litigation at the petitioners' behest, since it raised the same grievance about the distance between the two petrol pumps under Clause 3.1 and 3.2 of the 2022 Guidelines.

In that PIL, counsel for Opposite Party No. 5 (the oil company) had placed before the court the amended norms adopted by the Public Works Department along with a State Government order dated 16 February 2023 by way of corrigendum. According to those amended norms, the distance restriction does not apply where access and egress for fuel stations are provided through a common service road of minimum 7 metres in width and not directly to state roads. The site map produced before the PIL bench “clearly mentions a width of 7.00 meters service road.” The PIL bench had noted that only a preliminary NOC had been granted, and that final permission would not follow if the 7-metre road was not actually constructed.

In the present writ petition, the Additional Chief Standing Counsel reiterated before the Division Bench that the 7-metre service road had since been constructed, so the mischief alleged under Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 no longer existed even on facts.

The Division Bench found that the petitioners had simply modulated their prayer in the present writ to challenge the approval order and NOC, while the underlying grounds remained identical to those ventilated in the PIL. The bench concluded the present petition was “nothing but an abuse of the process of law.”

On the Merits: Competition Cannot Be Restrained by Article 226

Though the dismissal on locus was decisive, the bench also addressed the merits briefly. It rejected the argument that anticipated harm to the petitioners' business from a competing outlet was a legally cognisable injury. The bench observed that the Court cannot act as an insurance company for the financial health of an existing business operator. The petition was characterised as monopolistic in nature and as aimed at eliminating competition rather than vindicating a legal right.

On the fundamental rights question, the bench reiterated the principle from Madan Gopal Rungta: the petitioners' right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on their own business was untouched by respondents 7 and 8 operating in accordance with their permissions. Apprehension of reduced earnings from competition does not rise to an infringement of a fundamental right that would engage Article 226 jurisdiction.

The bench also noted that respondents 7 and 8 themselves possess an equal fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to install and operate a petrol pump at the location in question — the same right that the petitioners had earlier exercised. So long as respondents 7 and 8 exercised that right without impairing the like right of the petitioners, no legally cognisable injury arose.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed Writ-C No. 5894 of 2026 on 11 August 2026. The dismissal rests on two concurrent grounds: first, the petitioners lack locus standi under Article 226 because opposition to a business competitor does not constitute an infringement of a legally protected or fundamental right; and second, the petition constitutes an abuse of process given that the same grievance had already been the subject of the proxy PIL No. 293 of 2026 before a coordinate bench. The approval order of the District Magistrate dated 09 February 2026 and the NOC issued by the City Magistrate dated 13 February 2026 in favour of respondents 7 and 8 therefore stand undisturbed.