Allahabad HC Upholds AMU's Two-Thirds Majority Rule for Teacher Termination, Rejects Article 14 Challenge

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has declined to strike down Statute 40(3)(b) of the Aligarh Muslim University Act, holding the provision is not manifestly arbitrary under Article 14.

On 14 July 2026, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court comprising Justice Arindam Sinha and Justice Satya Veer Singh disposed of a writ petition filed by Dr Tanzeem Fatima, a former member of the teaching faculty at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). Dr Fatima had challenged both her termination on facts and the constitutional validity of Statute 40(3)(b) of the Aligarh Muslim University Act (Act XL of 1920), which requires a two-thirds majority of the Executive Council (EC) members present and voting for the determination of a teacher's employment. The Division Bench confined itself to the vires challenge and, after reading Statute 40 in full, declined to declare the provision unconstitutional, holding that the statute as a whole contains adequate procedural safeguards and does not meet the threshold of manifest arbitrariness required to attract invalidation under Article 14.

The Termination and the Journey to the Division Bench

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Dr Fatima. A show cause notice was issued, followed by a memorandum of charges and an inquiry. Multiple inquiry reports were submitted; the EC accepted them. A second show cause notice was issued and, on a majority vote of the EC, a decision to terminate was initially taken.

The writ court intervened at an earlier stage, setting aside that first EC decision and restoring the matter to the EC. On restoration, the EC by a resolution dated 19 May 2014 reiterated its decision to terminate Dr Fatima.

The writ petition challenging that resolution had been pending since 2014. On an earlier occasion in 2026, the Division Bench asked Dr Fatima's counsel, Arvind Srivastava, to elect between pursuing the factual challenge before a single judge under the roster or pressing the constitutional vires challenge before the Division Bench. Mr Srivastava chose to keep both alive, but the Bench's order of 1 April 2026 noted its prima facie view that a decision taken by vote “necessarily will not carry reasons” and “will carry the result of whether the motion is carried or rejected.”

Mr Srivastava relied on an amendment application dated 21 May 2018, already allowed and disposed of, by which grounds 91(H) and 91(I) were added to the petition. Those grounds formed the core of the vires challenge before the Bench on 14 July 2026.

The Grounds of Challenge to Statute 40(3)(b)

Ground 91(H) argued that Statute 40(b), framed under the AMU Act, is silent on affording the delinquent employee an opportunity of hearing before the EC passes a resolution of punishment with civil consequences, rendering it arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Ground 91(I) argued that Statute 40(b) does not direct the EC to give reasons when passing a resolution determining a teacher's employment, which is an order with civil consequences. The absence of a reasons requirement was said to make the provision manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational, and violative of Article 14.

Mr Srivastava argued that the EC members had earlier issued a show cause notice and then “went through the motions to effectively deny petitioner opportunity of hearing,” before securing her dismissal through a two-thirds majority vote without agenda or discussion. This, he submitted, was the result of the provision itself being arbitrarily framed.

AMU's Defence: Parliamentary Statute, Full Opportunity, McDowell

Senior Advocate C. B. Yadav appeared for AMU. He submitted that Statute 40 was created by an Act of Parliament and that Dr Fatima was given every opportunity to defend her position. Only after the disciplinary exercise was duly completed was the matter placed before the EC for a vote, as required by Statute 40(3)(a).

Mr Yadav relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., reported in (1996) 3 SCC 709. Paragraph 43 of that judgment declares that no enactment can be struck down by simply saying it is arbitrary or unreasonable; some constitutional infirmity must be identified. The passage the Bench reproduced reads: “No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable.” The judgment held that a vires challenge can succeed on only two grounds — lack of legislative competence or violation of a fundamental right or other constitutional provision — and that there is no third ground.

Petitioner's Reliance on Anurag Krishna Sinha

In reply, Mr Srivastava placed before the Bench a judgment of the Supreme Court dated 10 March 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 13581 of 2025 — Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar and Ors. Paragraph 31 of that judgment refers to A.P. Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy, MANU/SC/1020/2011, and reproduces an observation from paragraph 29 of that decision: that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness because an arbitrary action necessarily involves a negation of equality, that this doctrine is not restricted to executive actions but also applies to the legislature, and that for a statute to be struck down under Article 14 “the action of the legislature, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary.”

Mr Srivastava argued that this proposition, taken from a Supreme Court judgment of March 2026, confirmed that a statute could be challenged for manifest arbitrariness under Article 14, and that Statute 40(3)(b) met that threshold.

How the Bench Read Statute 40 in Full

The Division Bench set out the entirety of Statute 40 in the judgment. The provision runs across six sub-clauses dealing with removal of members and employees of the University.

Statute 40(3)(a) entitles the EC to dismiss a teacher on grounds of misconduct, but only after following the procedure specified in clause (c). It also provides that, save in cases of misconduct-based dismissal, the EC shall not determine a teacher's employment except for good cause and after giving three months' notice or payment of three months' salary in lieu.

Statute 40(3)(c) spells out the procedure: the Vice-Chancellor may suspend a teacher against whom misconduct is alleged; before any dismissal order is passed, the teacher must be informed of the allegations and given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the EC or a committee appointed for the purpose; and the teacher is entitled to the benefit of due inquiry, with full opportunity to inspect evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and offer own evidence and witnesses.

Statute 40(3)(e) adds a further safeguard: before notice is given or payment made under sub-clause (a), the teacher must be informed by the EC of the cause of the action proposed and given a reasonable opportunity to make representations.

The Bench noted that sub-clause (a) prevails over sub-clause (b). The saving in sub-clause (a) — allowing determination on notice with severance — did not apply to Dr Fatima's case because she was not dismissed on notice served with severance pay. Charges were levelled, found proved, and only then was the matter placed before the EC for vote.

Why the Bench Declined to Strike Down Statute 40(3)(b)

The Bench held that the contention of sub-clause (b) being unconstitutional as offending Article 14 could not be upheld. Its reasoning proceeded on two lines.

First, applying McDowell, the Bench observed that merely alleging unconstitutionality on the ground of arbitrariness cannot be the basis for challenging a legislative act. Statute 40 came into being through section 28 of the AMU Act, an Act of Parliament.

Second, and more directly, the Bench found that when Statute 40 is read as a whole, a teacher is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend herself through the full disciplinary procedure prescribed in clause (c), and only after that procedure is duly completed can the matter of removal be placed before the EC for a two-thirds majority vote. The two-thirds threshold itself, the Bench observed, is a check: it prevents removal by a bare majority and requires a higher degree of consensus among EC members present and voting. Taken together, the Bench found these features constitute “sufficient check to prevent arbitrariness as opposed to the provision itself being arbitrary.”

On the argument drawn from Anurag Krishna Sinha, the Bench found the passage cited by Mr Srivastava actually supported AMU's position. The Supreme Court had said that for a legislative action to be struck down for violating Article 14, it should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary and there must be substantive unreasonableness in the statute itself. The Division Bench found no such manifest arbitrariness in Statute 40.

Outcome

At the close of arguments, Mr Srivastava submitted that Dr Fatima's challenge based on the facts of her termination remained to be adjudicated. The Bench accommodated this by directing that she may file a fresh writ petition, disclosing the present petition and all subsequent pleadings filed therein, with the prayer confined to the fact-based challenge. If the fresh petition is filed by 27 August 2026, Dr Fatima may plead exclusion of the time taken in adjudicating the present writ petition to account for any delay and seek early adjudication.

The Division Bench disposed of Writ-A No. 31741 of 2014 accordingly on 14 July 2026.