Allahabad HC WRIT PETITION Electrohomeopathy holder cannotcross over to practise allopathy
[ High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ]

Electrohomeopathy Certificate Confers No Right to Practise Allopathy, Allahabad HC Dismisses Sealed-Clinic Writ

A Division Bench held that a Vocational Certificate in Community Health or electrohomeopathy cannot authorise a practitioner to treat patients under the modern allopathic system.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Indrajeet Shukla, dismissed a writ petition filed by Santosh Kumar Sharma, a practitioner whose clinic in District Etah, Uttar Pradesh, had been sealed by the Chief Medical Officer on 16 February 2026. The petitioner held a Vocational Certificate Code No. 802 (Community Health) obtained in 2005 from the National Institute of Open Schooling and claimed it entitled him to practise modern scientific medicine. The bench rejected that claim outright, ruling that an electrohomeopathy certificate cannot, by any stretch of imagination, authorise the holder to practise allopathy. The judgment draws on Supreme Court precedent and State Government Orders to hold that the sealing was lawful and that the petitioner's right under Article 19(1)(g) was not infringed by the State's regulatory action.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Santosh Kumar Sharma had been running a clinic and, apparently, a hospital in Etah. The trouble began as far back as 26 June 2019, when the Chief Medical Officer issued a notice asking him to produce his degrees and educational records. He replied on 3 July 2019 and again submitted a detailed response on 27 December 2024 along with his academic testimonials.

A show cause notice for the closure of the clinic was served on 1 May 2025. This prompted Sharma to file an earlier writ petition, Writ-C No. 41953 of 2024, which the Court disposed of on 8 January 2026. That order directed him to file a detailed objection before the Chief Medical Officer, Etah within two weeks, and required the Chief Medical Officer to decide the objection within one month after giving the petitioner due notice, an opportunity of hearing, and access to all materials the authority intended to rely upon.

Sharma complied and submitted an exhaustive representation with documents. The Chief Medical Officer rejected the representation on 16 February 2026, maintained the seal, and set criminal law in motion. The current writ petition challenged that rejection order.

What the Sealing Order Found

The order dated 16 February 2026 recorded several grounds for refusing to remove the seal. The Chief Medical Officer found that Sharma was treating patients with allopathic medicines without being registered with the CMO's office, a prerequisite under Government Order No. 2374/5-2001 dated 16 September 2021. It was also recorded that holders of electrohomeopathy certificates are prohibited from practising allopathic medicine under Government Orders dated 3 August 2016 and 13 April 2023.

Beyond qualification, the clinic itself failed on infrastructure requirements. It lacked a biomedical waste management system. No fire NOC had been obtained. Infection prevention and control systems were absent. The premises did not meet the standards set under the Manak Dainik Sthapan (Registrikaran aur Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 2010, and the connected State Government Orders. Unqualified persons were found practising modern medicine on the hospital's premises.

Registration with the Chief Medical Officer's office, the sealing authority noted, was a sine qua non for practising modern medicine. Sharma had none.

Arguments Raised by the Petitioner

Counsel for Sharma pressed three points. First, he argued that an adequate opportunity of hearing was not afforded before the impugned order was passed. Second, he contended that the complaint by the sixth respondent was motivated by personal vengeance, and that a practitioner with long experience in the field ought not to have been shut down. Third, he invoked Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, asserting that the right to practise a profession, including medicine, is constitutionally protected and that the impugned order was ex facie bad.

The Standing Counsel for the State respondents refuted each submission. His central position was that a certificate in electrohomeopathy cannot, under any reading, confer authority to practise modern medicine.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Indrajeet Shukla, who delivered the judgment, anchored the reasoning in two settled propositions. First, a practitioner registered under one system of medicine cannot transgress into another system, particularly allopathy, without the requisite qualification and registration. The bench cited Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel (1996) 4 SCC 332, where the Supreme Court held that doing so amounts to negligence per se, exposing both the practitioner and the public to grave risk.

Second, the bench relied on Dr. Mukhtar Chand v. State of Punjab (1998) 7 SCC 579, where the Supreme Court held that a practitioner enrolled on the State Register of Indian Medicine or the Central Register of Indian Medicine has no scope to practise modern scientific medicine unless also enrolled on a State Medical Register under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. The bench quoted the Supreme Court's finding directly: “prescribing a drug is a concomitant of the right to practise a system of medicine.” It followed that the right to prescribe allopathic drugs cannot be divorced from the claim to practise allopathic medicine.

On Article 19(1)(g), the bench was equally clear. The right to practise a profession is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public under Article 19(6). Regulatory measures ensuring that only qualified and registered persons practise medicine, and that clinical establishments meet prescribed standards, are legitimate and proportionate restrictions on public health grounds. The bench cited Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118 and State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534 for this proposition.

On the procedural fairness argument, the record showed that the prior writ petition itself had secured Sharma a full opportunity: a directed hearing, the requirement to supply all relied-upon materials, and a month-long decision timeline. The Chief Medical Officer had followed that process. The bench was not persuaded that there had been any denial of natural justice.

The bench also addressed the broader public interest dimension. The health of the general public is a primary State responsibility. The practice of medicine is regulated by statutes and Government Orders that occupy the field and prescribe standards. A person who does not possess knowledge of a particular system of medicine but practises in it is, in the bench's words, “a quack and a mere pretender of medical knowledge or skill” — or, at best, a charlatan. Permitting such practice would directly conflict with the governing statutes.

The bench also noted that the clinic's failures were not merely about Sharma's qualifications. The absence of biomedical waste management, a fire NOC, and infection control systems were independent grounds for the seal. Non-compliance with the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine (NCISM) Act, 2020, and the relevant State Government Orders on clinical establishment standards added to the picture.

On the Scope of Article 226 Review

The bench observed that this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot substitute its own wisdom and findings for those of competent expert authorities. The Chief Medical Officer, acting on the findings from an inspection and on the basis of the petitioner's own documentary record, was the competent authority. The High Court found no ground to interfere with that expert determination.

Outcome

The writ petition was dismissed. The sealing of Santosh Kumar Sharma's clinic and hospital in Etah was upheld. The order of 16 February 2026 passed by the Chief Medical Officer, Etah, rejecting his representation and maintaining the seal, was found valid in law. The criminal proceedings that had been set in motion against him were not stayed. No order as to costs was made.