Allahabad HC Upholds Conviction for Stabbing Woman Ten Times in Her Own Home, Flags Trial Court's Failure to Impose Fine Under Section 307 IPC
Justice Santosh Rai dismissed a four-decade-old criminal appeal, affirming five years' rigorous imprisonment for a man who entered a woman's home and inflicted ten knife wounds, while pointing out that the trial court had omitted the mandatory fine under Section 307 IPC — an infirmity the High Court could not cure in the absence of a State cross-appeal.
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has dismissed a criminal appeal filed in 1982, upholding the conviction of Gajendra under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) and Section 452 IPC (house-trespass after preparation for causing hurt). Justice Santosh Rai, sitting singly, affirmed the concurrent sentences of five years and two years rigorous imprisonment respectively, directed to run concurrently, as awarded by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor, in its judgment of 27 November 1982. The appeal had been reserved on 14 May 2026 and decided on 16 July 2026. A notable aspect of the judgment is the court's observation that the trial court failed to impose a fine under Section 307 IPC — a mandatory concomitant of imprisonment under that provision — yet the High Court held it could not enhance the sentence to the appellant's prejudice in an appeal filed solely by the convict, with no cross-appeal or revision by the State seeking enhancement.
The Attack on 19 May 1982
The prosecution case, as recorded by the High Court, traces to the morning of 19 May 1982. At around 9.30 a.m., Km. Rekha was alone in her house in village Bharera, within the circle of Police Station Kotwali City, District Bijnor. She was washing pulses at the handpump in the courtyard with the main door of the house open. Gajendra, armed with a knife, entered the house, caught hold of her from behind and inflicted ten incised wounds on different parts of her body.
Her alarm brought two neighbours — Mahender Singh and Moola Singh — to the spot; they reprimanded the appellant, who then fled. Her parents, who had been in the fields, returned on being informed and took her to the District Hospital, Bijnor. Dr. V.K. Goel (P.W.4) examined her at 11.20 a.m. the same day. He found ten clean-cut, bleeding and clotted incised wounds on her lip, chest, both forearms, left hand, left palm, left index finger, right thigh, left thigh and left leg. He opined that the injuries were caused by a sharp-edged weapon, were consistent with having been inflicted at about 9.30 a.m. on 19 May 1982, and that their cumulative effect was sufficient, in the ordinary course, to cause death.
A written report was lodged by the victim at the police station, and Case Crime No. 231 of 1982 was registered under Sections 452 and 324 IPC. On completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer concluded the case fell under Section 307 IPC. A charge-sheet was submitted on 6 July 1982, the matter was committed to Sessions, and the trial court framed charges under Sections 452, 307 and 324 IPC. Gajendra pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
Evidence at Trial and the Hostile Witnesses
The prosecution examined five witnesses: P.W.1 Km. Rekha (injured complainant), P.W.2 Mahender Singh and P.W.3 Moola Singh (occurrence witnesses, both declared hostile), P.W.4 Dr. V.K. Goel (medical examiner), and P.W.5 Banwari Lal (Investigating Officer).
Although P.W.2 and P.W.3 were declared hostile, cross-examination by defence counsel drew from them an admission that the victim had sustained knife injuries on the date and at the time alleged. P.W.3 further admitted to having seen the appellant standing outside the complainant's house. The prosecution also exhibited documentary evidence including the written report, recovery memos of blood-stained material, the injury report, site plan, chik report and charge-sheet.
The trial court convicted Gajendra under Sections 452 and 307 IPC and sentenced him to five years and two years rigorous imprisonment respectively, directed to run concurrently. He appealed to the High Court under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Grounds Pressed Before the High Court
Appearing for the appellant, learned counsel Gaurav Kakkar raised four grounds. First, that the conviction rested on the uncorroborated testimony of P.W.1 alone, the two independent occurrence witnesses having turned hostile. Second, that the motive set up by the prosecution — a long-standing dispute over a right of way — was disproved on the prosecution's own showing, the alleged dispute being two years old, minor and never the subject of any complaint or report. Third, that P.W.1 admitted she did not reduce her account to writing when the Investigating Officer visited her house on the very day of the occurrence, which cast doubt on her subsequent version. Fourth, that the nature and spread of injuries on the hands, fingers, legs and chest were consistent with a struggle of a different origin, and it had not been ruled out that some other person was the actual assailant.
The learned Additional Government Advocate Shyam Narain Rai supported the impugned judgment. He argued that P.W.1, being the injured victim herself, carried an inherent guarantee of truthfulness; her testimony was fully corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W.4 as to the number, nature, location and timing of injuries, and by the hostile witness P.W.3's admission that he had seen the appellant outside the complainant's house. The omission to record her statement in writing on the day of occurrence was, he submitted, a peripheral matter. Ten incised wounds — including on the face, chest and both thighs, with defensive wounds on the fingers and palms — pointed unambiguously to an intention to cause death, satisfying Section 307 IPC.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Santosh Rai identified four points for determination: whether P.W.1's testimony was reliable despite the absence of independent corroboration in the strict sense; whether the ingredients of Section 307 IPC were established; whether the conviction under Section 452 IPC was sustainable; and whether the sentence called for interference, including on the question of fine not having been imposed.
Reliability of the injured witness. The court reiterated that the law does not insist on plurality of witnesses, and that a conviction can be founded on the testimony of a single witness if wholly reliable. Where the witness is the injured victim herself, her testimony carries a built-in guarantee of truthfulness and ordinarily requires no further corroboration. On a careful perusal of P.W.1's deposition, the court found nothing in her account or in the cross-examination directed at her that detracted from its inherent probability. Her consistent narrative was corroborated in material particulars by P.W.4's medical findings as to number, location, nature and timing of the injuries, and to the extent of the appellant's presence at the spot, by the admission extracted from hostile witness P.W.3.
The court held that evidence of a witness declared hostile is not to be rejected in its entirety; the portion finding support from other reliable material may be relied upon. As for the omission to reduce her account to writing before the Investigating Officer on the day of occurrence, the court described this as “a discrepancy touching a wholly collateral matter” that did not go to the root of the prosecution case. Trivial variations of this kind, particularly in the testimony of unlettered witnesses recalling a traumatic event, do not warrant rejection of otherwise trustworthy evidence.
Motive. The court agreed with the trial court that the alleged dispute over a right of way had not been shown to have been serious or of recent origin, no report having been lodged for nearly two years before the incident. It affirmed, however, that failure to prove motive is not fatal to the prosecution case where the occurrence is established by cogent direct evidence. Motive assumes significance principally in cases resting on circumstantial evidence; its absence cannot outweigh clear, direct and corroborated testimony.
Section 307 IPC — intention to cause death. The court set out the legal position that Section 307 IPC does not require the injury actually inflicted to be sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. What is essential is that the act be done with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances, that if death had resulted, the offence would have amounted to murder. The intention or knowledge of the accused is to be gathered from the nature of the weapon used, the manner and severity of the assault, the part of the body targeted, and the surrounding circumstances including the number of blows.
Applying this to the facts: the appellant entered the house armed with a knife after satisfying himself that the victim was alone, and inflicted ten incised wounds including wounds close to the mouth, on the chest, on both thighs and the leg. The wounds on the palms and fingers of the victim were, the court held, consistent with defensive injuries sustained while warding off blows, indicative of a sustained and determined assault. The medical evidence placed the cumulative effect of the injuries as sufficient to cause death. The court held that “the premeditated manner of entry timed to when the victim was alone” combined with the choice of weapon, number and location of wounds, and the life-threatening chest injury, admitted of no inference other than that the appellant acted with the intention of causing the victim's death.
Section 452 IPC. On house-trespass, the court found that the appellant had entered the dwelling house of the victim without lawful authority, at a time when she was alone, for the purpose of committing an offence upon her person. The ingredients of house-trespass having been committed after preparation for causing hurt, within the meaning of Section 452 IPC, were made out, and the conviction was upheld.
Probation Refused
The appellant's counsel made a submission that, having regard to the appellant's age and absence of any prior conviction, the sentence be reduced or that the benefit of probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 be extended to him. The court declined.
The offence involved the repeated stabbing of a lone, defenceless young woman in her own home, resulting in ten incised wounds spread across virtually every part of her body, inflicted with a degree of determination and violence sufficient, on the medical evidence, to have caused her death. The court noted the calculated manner in which the appellant waited for an opportunity to find her alone before entering the house. Having regard to the gravity, brutality and premeditated character of the offence, the court held this was manifestly not a case in which it would be appropriate, or in the interest of society, to extend the benefit of release on probation in lieu of sentence.
The Fine Infirmity — And Why It Could Not Be Corrected
The court raised one aspect on its own. The trial court, while sentencing Gajendra, had not imposed any fine. The court observed that Section 307 IPC renders an offender liable to fine in addition to imprisonment, and that where the IPC provision prescribes punishment in the form of imprisonment along with liability to fine, the trial court is expected to impose fine as well. Failure to impose fine amounts to an error in sentencing, and the absence of fine under Section 307 IPC constitutes an infirmity in the sentence as recorded.
However, the court observed that neither the State nor the complainant had preferred any appeal or revision under Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking enhancement of the sentence by imposition of a fine. In an appeal preferred solely by the convict under Section 374 of the Code, the court exercising jurisdiction under Section 386 of the Code cannot enhance the sentence to the appellant's prejudice in the absence of a cross-appeal or notice for enhancement. No order was therefore made on this count, and the sentence as awarded by the trial court was maintained in its entirety.
Order
Criminal Appeal No. 3037 of 1982 was dismissed. The conviction of Gajendra under Sections 452 and 307 IPC and the concurrent sentences of two years and five years rigorous imprisonment respectively, as recorded by the IV Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor in Sessions Trial No. 203 of 1982, were upheld in their entirety. The findings of the trial court on the reliability of the injured witness's testimony, the corroborative value of the medical evidence and the establishment of the ingredients of Section 307 IPC were affirmed.
The bail bonds of the accused-appellant were cancelled with immediate effect. If the appellant was on bail at the time, he was directed to surrender before the trial court within two weeks to serve the remainder of his substantive sentence. Should he fail to surrender within the stipulated period, the trial court was directed to take immediate steps including issuance of a non-bailable warrant to take him into custody. The appellant was held entitled to the benefit under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for set-off of the period of detention already undergone.
The trial court record along with a copy of the judgment was directed to be transmitted forthwith to the concerned court. The trial court was directed to submit a compliance report within two months of receipt of the order, and the Registrar (Compliance) was directed to serve a copy of the order within one week by fax or e-mail to the concerned court through the District & Sessions Judge, Bijnor.