Written Tenancy Agreement Not a Jurisdictional Prerequisite Under UP Rent Act 2021, Order VII Rule 11 CPC Inapplicable: Allahabad HC
The Allahabad High Court held that the Rent Authority's jurisdiction under the UP Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 flows from the statute, not from any written tenancy agreement between the parties, and that Order VII Rule 11 CPC cannot be imported into tenancy proceedings excluded from the Code's general operation.
The Allahabad High Court, in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, dismissed a tenant's challenge to concurrent orders of the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal arising from eviction proceedings under the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021. Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, sitting singly, held that the absence of a written tenancy agreement does not deprive the Rent Authority of its jurisdiction to entertain an eviction application under Section 21(2) of the Act. The Court also held that Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application in proceedings before the Rent Authority, the Code having been expressly excluded by Section 33 of the Act. Both limbs of the petitioner-tenant's jurisdictional challenge were rejected.
The Dispute Before the Court
The respondent-landlord, Manish Agrawal, instituted proceedings before the Rent Authority in Case No. 1120 of 2025 under Section 21(2) of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant, Jagdish Kumar Bansal.
The petitioner raised a preliminary objection on 29 October 2025 before the Rent Authority, contending that no written tenancy agreement existed between the parties and that, in its absence, no landlord-tenant relationship was established. On that basis, he argued that the eviction application under Section 21(2) was not maintainable. He also pressed a further objection under Section 38(2) of the Act, asserting that the proceedings themselves were barred.
The Rent Authority rejected the preliminary objection on 7 November 2025. It held that the statutory definition of “tenant” under the Act is wide enough to cover any person in occupation of the premises. It further held that Section 4(7) of the Act expressly enables the landlord to institute eviction proceedings even where the statement of information contemplated by that provision has not been furnished. On Section 38(2), the Rent Authority ruled that the provision merely excludes adjudication of title questions and does not go to jurisdiction over eviction applications. Remaining objections were found to raise disputed questions of fact and law requiring evidence and were therefore not amenable to preliminary determination.
The petitioner appealed. The Rent Tribunal, by order dated 17 December 2025, affirmed the rejection but partly allowed the appeal to the limited extent of protecting the petitioner's right to urge all objections afresh. The Tribunal directed that the objections raised shall form part of the petitioner's reply and shall be considered independently by the Rent Authority at the stage of final disposal, uninfluenced by any observations in the order dated 7 November 2025. The petitioner then moved the High Court under Article 227.
The Two Legal Issues
The petitioner pressed two distinct contentions before the High Court.
First, he argued that a written tenancy agreement is a jurisdictional precondition for proceedings under Section 21(2) of the Act. Without such an agreement, he contended, the Rent Authority lacked jurisdiction entirely and the proceedings were liable to be rejected as not maintainable.
Second, he contended that the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal were wrong to reject his preliminary objection, which effectively sought termination of the eviction proceedings at the threshold — a remedy analogous to one under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
How the Court Reasoned
On the first issue, the Court was categorical. Jurisdiction of the Rent Authority flows from the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 itself, not from any document that may or may not exist between the parties. A written tenancy agreement may be evidence of the terms of the tenancy or of the jural relationship, but it is not the source of the Authority's power to adjudicate.
The Court applied a plain principle: jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the existence or non-existence of a document unless the statute expressly so provides. Neither Section 21(2) nor any other provision of the Act conditions the landlord's statutory remedy upon the tenancy being reduced to writing. Had the legislature intended to impose such a condition, it would have done so in express terms. The Court declined to supply a jurisdictional condition which the legislature consciously omitted.
The Court also flagged the anomalous consequence of the petitioner's argument. If accepted, any tenant could defeat the Rent Authority's jurisdiction simply by disputing the documentary foundation of the tenancy. The existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, the terms of tenancy and allied questions are matters squarely within the adjudicatory domain of the Rent Authority, not matters affecting its inherent jurisdiction. The Court drew the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction, which derives from the statute, and jurisdictional facts, which the Authority is competent to enquire into and determine. A dispute about those facts does not strip the Authority of its power to resolve them.
This view, the Court noted, is consistent with the earlier judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Akhilesh Kumar v. Sanjay Sahgal, which, upon examination of the same statutory scheme, held that the absence of a written tenancy agreement neither renders proceedings under Section 21(2) non-maintainable nor divests the Rent Authority of jurisdiction.
On the second issue, the Court examined the procedural architecture of the Act. Section 33 of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 expressly provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to proceedings before the Rent Authority or the Rent Tribunal. The exclusion is broad and unambiguous. In place of the Code's elaborate framework, the Act prescribes a distinct procedure: institution by application, issuance of notice, filing of a reply, a rejoinder where necessary, and a summary enquiry. The statutory emphasis is on substantive adjudication after exchange of pleadings.
Section 34 of the Act carves out specified procedural powers that the Authority and the Tribunal do retain — summoning witnesses, discovery of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, setting aside ex parte orders, and such matters as may be prescribed. These are enumerated and confined. Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, which enables rejection of the plaint at the threshold before trial commences, is not among them and cannot be impliedly inferred.
The Court applied the settled interpretive principle that where a special statute expressly excludes general procedural law and selectively incorporates only specified provisions, courts cannot import additional excluded provisions merely because they appear convenient. To do so would amount to judicial legislation and would defeat the legislative scheme.
Introducing a preliminary rejection stage into tenancy proceedings would require the Rent Authority to undertake a separate preliminary adjudication before reaching the merits — a procedural stage the legislature consciously omitted and one that would inevitably delay disposal.
The Court, however, drew a sharp distinction between the availability of a defence and the procedural vehicle for raising it. Excluding Order VII Rule 11 does not deprive the petitioner of any substantive right. Every objection — on maintainability, jurisdiction, limitation, the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship or any other legal or factual ground — remains fully available. Such objections must be incorporated in the reply contemplated by the Act and fall for adjudication by the Rent Authority when it finally disposes of the proceedings. What stands excluded is not the defence, but only a distinct procedural mechanism borrowed from the Code.
In the present case, the Tribunal had correctly characterised the petitioner's preliminary objection as one seeking threshold termination of the proceedings on grounds analogous to Order VII Rule 11. The Court found no infirmity in that characterisation. The Tribunal's further direction — that every objection be treated as part of the reply and be independently considered without influence from the Rent Authority's earlier observations — was consistent with the statutory scheme and ensured that no defence stood foreclosed.
Outcome
The High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227, finding that the impugned orders of the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal suffered from no jurisdictional infirmity, patent illegality, perversity, or material irregularity warranting supervisory interference.
The Court clarified that the dismissal does not prejudice the petitioner's right to raise all factual and legal pleas in the pending proceedings before the Rent Authority. The objections already raised by the petitioner shall be treated as forming part of his reply and shall be considered and adjudicated by the Rent Authority independently, on their own merits, strictly in accordance with law, and uninfluenced by any observations in the order dated 7 November 2025 or in the High Court's judgment — except to the extent of the legal principles enunciated therein.