Food Safety Registration Is No Substitute for a Slaughterhouse Licence, Rules Allahabad HC

A Division Bench dismissed a Kanpur slaughterhouse operator's writ after finding that a Food Safety registration certificate cannot authorise operations exceeding the petty food business threshold under the FSS Act, 2006.

The Allahabad High Court on 2 September 2026 dismissed a writ petition filed by Junaid Alam, a Kanpur Nagar slaughterhouse operator, who had challenged the District Magistrate's order dated 22 May 2025 rejecting his application to reopen a two-unit slaughter house. A Division Bench of Justice Ajit Kumar and Justice Garima Prashad held that the petitioner's Food Safety registration certificate under Section 31(2) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 did not authorise slaughtering at the proposed scale of twenty large animals per day — a capacity that squarely required a regular licence under Section 31(1). In the absence of that licence, neither a direction to reopen nor time to modernise the facility could be granted.

The Dispute Before the Court

Junaid Alam had filed an earlier writ petition, Writ-C No. 12801 of 2025, in which the Court by order dated 28 April 2025 directed the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, to consider the petitioner's reopening application dated 4 April 2025 and decide it within four weeks. The District Magistrate complied, but rejected the application on 22 May 2025.

The present petition sought to quash that rejection and to obtain a direction allowing the petitioner a reasonable period to modernise the slaughter house and resume operations. The petitioner relied on Food Safety Registration Certificate No. 22723651000475, issued on 29 June 2024 and stated to be valid until 29 November 2028, which described the business as “Slaughtering units, Distributor” with frozen beef and frozen poultry meat as products. He also relied on GST and Udyam registrations, laboratory test reports, and a No Objection Certificate said to have been issued by the Nagar Nigam, Kanpur Nagar.

The petitioner's counsel argued that these documents collectively permitted operation of two slaughtering units and that the authorities ought to have afforded a hearing and time for modernisation before preventing operations. Allegations of police harassment were also raised.

The State, represented by Standing Counsel Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra, countered that the petitioner had been given a personal hearing on 16 May 2025, the District Magistrate had considered inspection reports dated 14 and 15 May 2025, and no regular licence existed on the date of the impugned order.

The Legal Issue: Registration Versus Licence Under the FSS Act

The bench framed the question precisely: whether the registration certificate and the ancillary documents established a subsisting right to operate the slaughter house at the proposed capacity, so as to warrant interference with the order dated 22 May 2025.

The answer turned on the architecture of Section 31 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. Section 31(1) prohibits commencing or carrying on a food business without a licence. Section 31(2) carves out an exception for petty food manufacturers, who are required only to register. The two forms of statutory authorisation are distinct.

Regulation 1.2.1(4) of the Food Safety and Standards (Licensing and Registration of Food Businesses) Regulations, 2011 classifies a slaughtering activity as a petty food business only where capacity does not exceed two large animals, ten small animals, or fifty poultry birds per day. Beyond that threshold, Regulation 2.1.2 requires a valid licence.

The petitioner's own State-licence application, bearing reference No. 20250301107050316 and dated 19 March 2025, disclosed a proposed capacity of twenty large animals — well above the petty food business ceiling. That application was returned by the competent authority on 27 April 2025 for removal of deficiencies, and no licence had been granted by the time the District Magistrate passed the impugned order.

How the Bench Reasoned

The court held that the registration certificate dated 29 June 2024 was a registration under Section 31(2), not a licence under Section 31(1). Given the proposed capacity of twenty large animals, it was plainly insufficient. The licence application had not resulted in a grant; its acknowledgement proved only that an application had been filed, not that the activity was authorised.

The GST and Udyam registrations, laboratory reports, and the municipal No Objection Certificate were described as ancillary documents that do not replace the statutory licence. The bench was equally unimpressed by the argument that the petitioner should be given time to rectify deficiencies in an “existing licence”, observing that the impugned order had not cancelled any subsisting regular licence — none existed — so that request did not arise at this stage.

On the constitutional argument, the bench held that the right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution does not dispense with a valid licensing requirement imposed in the interest of food safety and public health. In the absence of the required licence, no direction to reopen or operate could be issued.

The bench also invoked the Supreme Court's directions in Laxmi Narain Modi v. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 309 of 2003, where the Supreme Court on 6 March 2014 directed that unauthorised or unlicensed slaughterhouses be closed and permitted to function only after obtaining the necessary licence and complying with the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Slaughter House) Rules, 2001, and applicable environmental norms. The bench held that the registration certificate could not substitute for those requirements.

On the police harassment allegations, the bench declined to adjudicate them, observing that no specific relief on those allegations had been sought in the petition and they were not necessary to decide the challenge to the order dated 22 May 2025.

Outcome

The writ petition was dismissed. The court made no order as to costs.

The bench clarified that dismissal does not foreclose the petitioner's path entirely. It remains open to him to remove the deficiencies identified by the competent authority and pursue the existing State-licence application, or to submit a fresh application with the prescribed documents and approvals, as may be permissible in law. Any such application is to be considered by the competent authority on its own merits and in accordance with law.