Justice J.J. Munir Justice V.K. Dwivedi Allahabad HC BAIL GRANTED No prearranged plan, noconviction under Section 34 IPC
[ High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ]

Allahabad HC Acquits Laddan of Murder After 35 Years, Finds No Pre-Concert for Section 34 IPC Conviction

The Allahabad High Court set aside a 1990 life-sentence against Laddan, holding that only suspicion linked him to the 1987 shooting, with no prearranged plan for Section 34 IPC to apply.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi (who delivered the judgment), allowed a criminal appeal filed by accused Laddan and set aside his life sentence for the murder of Nanhey @ Abdul Rehman in 1987. The IXth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad had convicted Laddan under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC on 28 May 1990, finding him part of a group that attacked the deceased at Rajapur, Allahabad. The High Court found that no prearranged plan or prior concert between Laddan and the principal accused was established, that only one bullet was recovered from the scene, that Laddan had no motive or demonstrated relationship with the main accused Shaheed, and that the prosecution's account of his involvement rested entirely on suspicion. The appeal had been pending since 1990; the other two appellants, Shaheed and Rahmat, died during its pendency and their appeals abated.

The Rajapur Shooting of 1987 and the Trial Court's Findings

On the night of 21 September 1987, at around 8:30 pm, informant Shakeel Ahmad (PW-1) stated that he and his mother went to call his brother Nanhey @ Abdul Rehman near the iron gate of Rehman Ali's house in Rajapur, Allahabad. As Nanhey returned with Chiku @ Nandlal, four persons — Shaheed, Laddan, Rahmat, and Chunnu — were standing near the wall of Majnu's house. According to PW-1, Shaheed fired at Nanhey, hitting him. When witnesses raised an alarm, Laddan and Rahmat also fired and fled. The incident was said to have been witnessed in the light of a tube-light.

Nanhey was taken to T.B. Sapru Hospital where Dr. Swatantra Singh (PW-2) documented two firearm wounds — an entry wound on the left chest and an exit wound on the right abdomen. Nanhey subsequently died. The postmortem conducted by Dr. U.S. Sinha (PW-9) confirmed a gunshot wound of entrance on the left side of the abdomen, with cause of death recorded as shock and haemorrhage due to the gunshot.

The Investigating Officer, Karan Singh (PW-6), reached the scene, prepared a site-plan in the light of a street tube-light, and recovered a single bullet from the place of occurrence three days after the incident. No empty cartridges, pellets, or ticklis were recovered. A charge-sheet was filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court. Charges under Section 302 IPC were framed against Shaheed individually, and against Laddan and Rahmat under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC on 4 May 1988. Accused Chunnu was acquitted by the trial court. Shaheed was convicted under Section 302 IPC and Laddan and Rahmat were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, each sentenced to life imprisonment.

The stated motive in the written report (Exhibit Ka-1) was that Nanhey had previously had illicit relations with Safina, the sister of accused Shaheed. Shaheed's family wanted the two to marry; Nanhey refused. This created enmity between Nanhey and Shaheed's family.

The Legal Issue: Whether Section 34 IPC Could Sustain Laddan's Conviction

With the deaths of Shaheed and Rahmat, only Laddan's appeal survived for adjudication. His counsel argued before the High Court that Laddan had been falsely implicated on the basis of mohalla suspicion. The direct act of shooting the deceased was attributed exclusively to Shaheed. Laddan's alleged role, as stated by the prosecution witnesses, was limited to firing a shot in the air after PW-1 and PW-3 raised an alarm — not at the deceased.

Counsel pointed out that the Investigating Officer recovered only one bullet from the scene. No pistol or tamancha was recovered from Laddan's possession. PW-1 himself admitted in cross-examination that Laddan and Rahmat had no relationship with Shaheed, and that Laddan and Rahmat had no enmity with Nanhey. The defence argued that without a prearranged plan or prior concert, conviction with the aid of Section 34 IPC was legally impermissible.

The State, through the Additional Government Advocate (AGA), countered that PW-1 and eye-witness Nand Lal (PW-3) had both placed Laddan at the scene and deposed that he fired from a pistol to intimidate witnesses. The AGA submitted that the trial court had correctly appreciated the evidence and found Laddan's presence proved; there was no illegality or perversity in the trial court's judgment.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi, delivering the judgment, examined the written report Exhibit Ka-1 and the oral evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 closely. The Bench accepted that Shaheed fired the shot that killed Nanhey. The sole role attributed to Laddan was that, after Shaheed fired, Laddan and Rahmat fired in the air when the witnesses raised a hue and cry.

The court noted a critical physical fact: the Investigating Officer recovered only one bullet from the place of occurrence. No pellets, empty cartridges, or ticklis were found — a fact PW-3 Nand Lal also conceded in cross-examination. If Laddan had genuinely fired, the Bench reasoned, either some physical trace would have been found at the scene, or PW-1 and PW-3 would have sustained injuries. Neither occurred. The absence of any firearm injury on the prosecution witnesses, and the absence of any ballistic material beyond the single bullet attributable to Shaheed, led the court to conclude that Laddan's alleged firing was doubtful.

The Bench further weighed PW-1's cross-examination admission that Laddan had no relationship with Shaheed and no enmity with Nanhey. Without any motive, any established connection with Shaheed, and any physical corroboration of his firing, the court found it probable that Laddan was named in the written report mechanically, on the ground that he was a relative of Smt. Nazma who resided at Rajapur and occasionally visited that locality. The court observed that this proximity to the neighbourhood, rather than any evidence of participation, appeared to be the reason for his implication.

On the Section 34 IPC question, the Bench applied the principle from Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413, that common intention requires a prearranged plan and that the criminal act must be done pursuant to that plan. The court found that the trial court had convicted Laddan under Section 34 without recording any finding that he had a prior concert with Shaheed or any other accused. That omission was itself a legal error, separate from the evidentiary infirmities.

The Bench also relied on Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406, for the proposition that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for proof, and that the mental distance between “may be” true and “must be” true must be covered by clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence. It also cited State of Odisha v. Banabihari Mohapatra and Another, (2021) 15 SCC 268, reaffirming that an accused is presumed innocent unless guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Applying these principles, the Bench found that the trial court's reasoning against Laddan was not sustainable. No cogent evidence established his presence at the scene, no physical evidence corroborated his alleged firing, he had no motive, and no prearranged plan with Shaheed was found. The conviction rested on suspicion alone.

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed Criminal Appeal No. 1140 of 1990. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 28 May 1990 passed by the IXth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad in Sessions Trial No. 72 of 1988, convicting Laddan under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentencing him to life imprisonment, was set aside. The court noted that Laddan was already on bail during the appeal. His bail bonds were cancelled and his sureties discharged from their liabilities. The judgment and record were directed to be sent to the trial court for necessary compliance forthwith.