Notifications Dated 27.12.2013 But Published After 1 January 2014: Allahabad HC Declares Lucknow Land Acquisition Void Ab Initio

A Division Bench held that land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot begin before the Section 4(1) notification is actually published, regardless of the date printed on it.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, comprising Justice Rajan Roy and Justice Manjive Shukla, has declared the entire acquisition of land measuring 0.5020 hectares at Khasra No. 431P, Village Aahmamau, Tehsil Sarojni Nagar, District Lucknow, to be void ab initio. The acquisition had been carried out by the Lucknow Development Authority under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but every step of the process — newspaper publication, Official Gazette notification, and public notice — took place after 1 January 2014, the date on which the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 had come into force and repealed the 1894 Act. The judgment, authored by Justice Rajan Roy, turned on a single question: when exactly does a land acquisition proceeding “initiate” under the Act, 1894 — and whether a notification merely dated before repeal but published after it could save the proceedings.

The Dispute Before the Court

The petitioner, Lohia Developers (India) Pvt. Ltd., had purchased 0.5020 hectares forming part of Khasra No. 431P at Village Aahmamau, Tehsil Sarojni Nagar, District Lucknow, through a registered sale deed dated 5 February 2007 from the recorded tenure holders.

A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued bearing the date 27 December 2013. However, it was published in the Hindi daily Dainik Jagran on 2 January 2014, in Amar Ujala on 3 January 2014, and in the Official Gazette of the Government of Uttar Pradesh on 4 January 2014. The public notice and munadi in the locality followed on 6 February 2014. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 23 January 2015. An award was declared on 13 July 2016 and later amended on 2 December 2022. The total area subject to these notifications was 2.737 hectares, of which 0.720 hectares comprised Khasra No. 431P.

The petitioner sought quashing of the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration, or in the alternative, a declaration that the acquisition had lapsed. A direction was also sought restraining the respondents from interfering with the petitioner's possession during the pendency of the petition. The petitioner's case, argued by Senior Counsel Shri Amrendra Nath Tripathi assisted by Shri Sanjeev Kumar Mishra, was that the acquisition had been carried out under a repealed enactment and was therefore void ab initio.

The Legal Questions

The Division Bench framed the central questions precisely: had land acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894 commenced prior to 1 January 2014; what was the effect of the saving clause in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 read with Section 114(2) of the Act, 2013; and whether notifications published after repeal of the Act, 1894 could sustain the acquisition.

The State, through Additional Chief Standing Counsel Ms. Isha Mittal, sought to justify the acquisition on the basis that the notification was dated 27 December 2013 and relied on a Government Order dated 13 July 2016. Shri Ratnesh Chandra, appearing for the Lucknow Development Authority, argued delay — the proceedings had begun in 2013/14 and the petition was filed in 2023 — and submitted that the proposal for acquisition had started well before 1 January 2014. He could not, however, deny that the publications under Section 4(1) had all taken place after that date.

Section 114 of the Act, 2013 expressly repealed the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, with a savings provision preserving the general operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 separately addressed land acquisition proceedings “initiated” under the Act, 1894, preserving them in defined circumstances. The pivot of the entire case was the meaning of “initiated.”

How the Bench Reasoned

The court began with the structure of Section 4 of the Act, 1894. Under Sub-section (1), a notification must be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers, and the Collector must cause public notice to be given in the locality. The statute itself defines the “date of publication of the notification” as the last of these three dates. It is only after that composite date that Sub-section (2) empowers any authorised officer to enter the land, survey it, dig, bore, mark boundaries, or take any other step. The bench held that no preliminary investigation can precede this publication, and therefore no acquisition proceeding can be said to have commenced before it.

The bench drew on a chain of Supreme Court authority. A Constitution Bench in Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1975) 4 SCC 296 had held that land acquisition proceedings commence with the notification under Section 4. A three-judge bench in Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. v. Deepak Aggarwal, (2023) 6 SCC 512 extended that principle to Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013, holding that the point of initiation is “issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification in the Official Gazette of the appropriate Government.” The court in Deepak Aggarwal rejected the argument that a Section 4(1) notification was a mere formality; it was the foundation upon which all subsequent steps rested.

The bench also relied on Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985) 3 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court had held that even assuming a notification under Section 4(1) is a formal expression of the Government's decision, that decision remains a “paper decision” unless and until notified in the Official Gazette. Preparation of a notification and retaining it on file has no legal significance for the purpose of initiating acquisition proceedings.

On the meaning of publication, the court referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Universal Cans & Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 1991 SCC OnLine Del 784, which had held that what matters is the date on which the Official Gazette is made available to the public, not the date printed on it. The court applied this reasoning directly: printing the date 27 December 2013 on the notification was of no consequence unless and until the notification was published in the Gazette, which happened on 4 January 2014.

Three Judges Bench decisions in V.K.M. Kattha Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2013) 9 SCC 338 and Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal, (2002) 7 SCC 712 further confirmed that publication in the Official Gazette is a condition precedent for acquisition, and that it is this publication that marks the starting point. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sandeep S. Metange v. State of Maharashtra, 2022 (1) Mh.L.J. 146 reached the same conclusion when it considered the interaction between Section 4 of the Act, 1894 and Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013.

With these authorities in place, the conclusion was direct. Every act of publication under Section 4(1) — both newspaper publications and the Official Gazette notification — as well as the public notice, took place after 1 January 2014. The Act, 1894 had by then been repealed by Section 114 of the Act, 2013. Publication under a repealed provision is a nullity. No right, privilege, obligation or liability had accrued or been incurred under the Act, 1894 before its repeal because no valid notification had been issued before that date. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which saves things “duly done” or rights “acquired, accrued or incurred” under a repealed enactment, cannot operate where nothing was validly done under the repealed law in the first place. Section 24 of the Act, 2013 equally has no application because it addresses proceedings “initiated” under the Act, 1894, and no such initiation had occurred.

The bench also addressed the objection of delay. The notifications were issued in 2013/14, the first award in 2016, and the writ petition was filed in 2023. The court held that where the proceedings are a nullity in the eyes of law, where possession has not been taken, where the purpose of the acquisition — construction of a 45-metre-wide road — had not been achieved even after twelve years, and where the illegality is so fundamental that it cannot be cured by the passage of time, delay cannot be a ground to dismiss the petition. The non-completion of the acquisition over twelve years was itself treated as a factor weighing against the respondents.

Balancing Public Purpose Against Violated Rights

Having found the acquisition void ab initio, the bench considered whether to quash the proceedings entirely. It noted that the purpose was construction of a 45-metre public road. The total land acquired is only about 2.737 hectares; the petitioner's share is 0.5020 hectares. The bench declined to quash the acquisition outright, holding instead that equities must be balanced: the public purpose should not be defeated, but the petitioner's violated rights under Article 14 and Article 300-A of the Constitution, and under the Act, 2013, must be suitably compensated.

The court observed that the Act, 2013 is a more beneficial legislation from the point of view of the land owner. The compensation determined under the existing award had been calculated on the basis of the Section 4(1) notification date from January/February 2014. The bench held that this was illegal. Compensation must be redetermined under the Act, 2013 at rates applicable as on the date of the judgment, not on the basis of the 2014 notification date.

Order

The Division Bench directed that the compensation already determined under the relevant award shall be redetermined and paid to the petitioner under the Act, 2013 in the light of the judgment within a period of three months from 3 July 2026. The respondents are restrained from taking possession of the land until compensation is recalculated and paid in accordance with this direction. The entire acquisition proceedings are to be completed within six months. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.