No Documentary Proof, No Equity: MP High Court Refuses Stay for Shyamla Hills Occupants Claiming Forest Dweller Rights

The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur dismissed a writ appeal by occupants of Survey No.1413/1 at Shyamla Hills after they failed to produce any documentary evidence of lease, ownership, or forest-produce livelihood, while directing the State to provide rehabilitation amenities at the time of eviction.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, comprising Justice Vivek Agarwal and Justice Vivek Jain, on 1 May 2026 disposed of Writ Appeal No.1442 of 2026 filed by Maan Singh and others against the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appellants had challenged an order dated 27 April 2026 passed by a Single Judge in Writ Petition No.50542 of 2025, which vacated an earlier stay that had protected them from eviction from land at Shyamla Hills bearing Survey No.1413/1. The Division Bench found that the appellants could produce no documentary evidence of any lease, ownership, or livelihood derived from forest produce, and that their claimed title ran through a third party whose civil suit over the same land had been dismissed and whose first appeal had remained unattended for 29 years. The Bench declined to restore the stay but directed the State to provide rehabilitation amenities to any persons uprooted at the time of eviction.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The appellants, described as occupants of land at Shyamla Hills in Madhya Pradesh, had filed Writ Petition No.50542 of 2025 seeking protection from eviction. A coordinate bench had granted a stay in that petition. The Single Judge, by order dated 27 April 2026, vacated that stay. The appellants then filed the present writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, contending that the Single Judge had not taken into account vital facts before vacating the interim protection.

The land in question, Survey No.1413/1, is situated at Shyamla Hills. The appellants claimed that their families had been residing there for three generations and that the area is classified as “Chhote Jhad Ka Jangal”, which they argued implicitly recognised them as forest dwellers under State policy.

A separate grievance raised before the Division Bench was that directions had been issued to constitute a committee to deal with the rights of forest dwellers and tribal communities, and that the stay had been vacated before that committee could be constituted.

The Forest Rights Act Argument

Senior Advocate Shri Manoj Sharma, appearing for the appellants with Advocate Shri Qazi Fakhruddin, pressed the claim that the appellants qualified as forest dwellers under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. He specifically relied on Section 2(c) and Section 2(o) of that Act.

Section 2(c) defines “forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes” as members or communities of Scheduled Tribes who primarily reside in and depend on forests or forest lands for bona fide livelihood needs. Section 2(o) defines “other traditional forest dweller” as any member or community who has, for at least three generations prior to 13 December 2005, primarily resided in and depended on forest or forest land for bona fide livelihood needs, with each generation defined as a period of 25 years.

Shri Manoj Sharma argued that Section 2(o) covers even persons who have traditionally grazed cattle on forest land, and that resettlement of such persons is obligatory before any eviction. On this basis, he submitted that the interim stay should be restored until such settlement was made.

He also argued, by way of passing reference, that the land was to be used for a “Manas Bhawan”, which he contended had no right to use land belonging to forest dwellers.

The State's Position on Title and Land Classification

Advocate General Shri Prashant Singh, appearing for the State through video conferencing, drew the Bench's attention to paragraph 11 of the Single Judge's order, where the appellants themselves had argued that they were tenants of one Shri Khurshid Ahmed. The Advocate General submitted that this admission meant the appellants were claiming through Shri Khurshid Ahmed, not independently, and that Revenue or Municipal Authorities were therefore not barred from evicting them.

The Advocate General also pointed to paragraph 16 of the impugned order, which referred to a letter dated 5 January 2026 issued by the Conservator of Forest. That letter specifically stated that Survey No.1413/1 is not a reserved or conserved forest land.

On the question of title, the Advocate General informed the Bench that Shri Khurshid Ahmed had filed a civil suit for declaration of title over forest survey numbers including new Survey No.1413, measuring 103 acres. That suit was dismissed by the Civil Court. First Appeal No.395/1997 was then filed before the High Court, but it was dismissed for want of prosecution. The Advocate General submitted that in the absence of any lease or allotment letter in favour of Shri Khurshid Ahmed or those claiming through him, no equity needed to be balanced and no Fundamental Right of the appellants had been established.

How the Bench Reasoned

The Division Bench, after hearing both sides, directly asked Shri Manoj Sharma to produce documentary evidence that any leasehold or ownership rights had ever been granted in favour of the appellants. Senior Advocate Shri Manoj Sharma fairly admitted that no such documentary evidence was available, and that the appellants' only basis was three generations of residence in the area.

The Bench then asked whether the appellants — noting that not all of them belonged to the Scheduled Tribe community — had any cattle to graze or any record of earning their livelihood through forest produce, so as to fall within the definition of traditional forest dwellers under Section 2(o) of the Act. Again, Shri Manoj Sharma fairly admitted that no such documentary evidence existed.

On the question of the Conservator of Forest's letter, Shri Manoj Sharma argued that the letter only stated the land was not a protected forest land, and that there was a legal difference between protected forest land and reserved or conserved forest land. He submitted that this distinction meant the appellants' rights could not be abrogated. The Bench considered this argument but did not find it sufficient to restore the stay in the absence of any documentary foundation for the appellants' claim.

The Bench observed that the appellants were neither allottees of the land nor holders of any legal right. They had themselves admitted to claiming title through Shri Khurshid Ahmed. The suit filed by Shri Khurshid Ahmed had been dismissed, and the first appeal filed in 1997 had received no indulgence from the High Court for 29 years. The Bench concluded that the appellants had failed to establish any Fundamental Right over Survey No.1413/1 and that no equity existed in their favour.

Rehabilitation Direction

Before disposing of the matter, the Bench recorded that while equity did not favour the appellants, fair play required the State to provide basic amenities for rehabilitation of persons who would be uprooted. The Bench directed that the State shall provide those amenities on the day of eviction itself, whenever that takes place.

The Advocate General, Shri Prashant Singh, gave an undertaking on behalf of the State that the State Authorities would be directed to provide amenities for rehabilitation as per the entitlement of the affected persons. The Bench recorded its tacit consent to this undertaking.

Outcome

The Division Bench disposed of the interim prayer and, consequently, the writ appeal itself, finding that nothing more survived for adjudication. The Bench was informed that the underlying Writ Petition No.50542 of 2025 was still pending. Both parties agreed that nothing survived for adjudication in the writ petition either, and it too was disposed of.

The Bench clarified that no observation made in the order would cause prejudice to the interests of the parties in First Appeal No.395/1997, which remains a live proceeding.