Allahabad HC Reinstates Teacher Terminated Without TET, Orders Full Salary Arrears With 6% Interest

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court reversed a Single Judge's order, holding that the proviso to Section 23 of the RTE Act saved a teacher's appointment and that the Committee of Management acted with malice in law by introducing a new ground — absence of TET certificate — only in its counter-affidavit, long after the original termination order had been disapproved by the statutory authority.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a judgment delivered by Justice Indrajeet Shukla and concurred in by Justice J.J. Munir, allowed the special appeal of Mohd. Mustafa Siddiqui, an assistant teacher at Bal Bari Junior High School, Kasya, Kushinagar. The Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 23 April 2015 that had dismissed the writ petition seeking continuance and salary. It directed reinstatement forthwith along with all consequential monetary benefits, including arrears of salary carrying 6% simple interest, to be computed and paid within two months of communication of the order. The appeal arose under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. The core finding was that the first proviso to Section 23(1) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — read with the Government Order dated 5 December 2012 — saved the petitioner's appointment despite his not having held a Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) certificate on the date of joining.

How Siddiqui Came to Be Appointed and Then Terminated

Siddiqui's father, a government servant, died in 2010. Under the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, the Committee of Management passed a resolution on 25 December 2010 to appoint him as an assistant teacher. The District Basic Education Officer (DBEO), Kushinagar, accorded approval on 30 July 2011 after verifying his qualifications — M.A. in Geography and B.Ed. An appointment letter followed on 8 August 2011. Siddiqui assumed charge on 10 August 2011 and continued to discharge duties without interruption.

The National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) had, by notification dated 23 August 2010 issued under Section 23(1) of the Act, 2009, made passing the TET a mandatory qualification for assistant teachers. The State of Uttar Pradesh, however, did not give effect to that notification in its own rules at once. Siddiqui did not hold a TET certificate when he joined in August 2011. He eventually cleared the TET on 22 February 2014.

Before his TET qualification came through, the Manager of the Committee of Management — acting unilaterally and without a valid resolution of the Committee — terminated Siddiqui's services by a letter dated 2 August 2014. The termination order referred to phrases such as concealment and forgery but did not identify the forged document or specify material particulars. Rule 15 of the U.P. Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 requires prior written approval of the DBEO before any assistant teacher may be removed. No such approval had been sought. When the termination order was placed before the DBEO, Kushinagar, for approval, it was disapproved by order dated 28 November 2014, with a direction to allow Siddiqui to rejoin. That order of disapproval was never challenged by the Committee of Management and has attained finality.

Siddiqui applied for resumption of duties on 6 December 2014. No heed was paid to his representation. He then filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7322 of 2015, seeking a mandamus directing the DBEO, Kushinagar, to ensure his continuance and payment of salary with arrears.

The Ground Shifted Mid-Litigation

When pleadings were exchanged before the Single Judge, the Committee of Management abandoned the forgery allegation that had formed the only stated basis for the termination order dated 2 August 2014. In its counter-affidavit, the Committee put forward a wholly new case: that Siddiqui lacked a TET certificate at the time of his appointment and was therefore ineligible from the outset.

The Single Judge accepted this line. He held that the NCTE notification dated 23 August 2010, being issued under a Central legislation binding on the State Government, rendered Siddiqui ineligible on the date of appointment. He observed that subsequent acquisition of the TET certificate could not cure the original ineligibility and dismissed the writ petition, though he left open the possibility of Siddiqui applying afresh under the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 for a different post.

Why the Division Bench Found the Single Judge's Reasoning Flawed

The Division Bench identified multiple errors in the Single Judge's approach.

The first was procedural. The termination order dated 2 August 2014 rested entirely on alleged forgery. The absence of a TET certificate did not appear anywhere in that order. The Bench applied the Supreme Court's dictum in Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, which holds that “an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out.” The Bench held that permitting the Committee of Management to introduce the TET ground for the first time in its counter-affidavit was directly contrary to this settled principle. An administrative order must stand or fall on its own stated reasons.

The second error was substantive. The Single Judge relied on the binding character of the NCTE notification dated 23 August 2010 to hold the appointment invalid. But the same Act that produced the notification — the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — carries in its first proviso to Section 23(1) a saving clause for teachers who did not possess the minimum qualifications at the commencement of the Act. That proviso gave existing teachers until 31 March 2015 to acquire the TET qualification. The Single Judge invoked the notification to invalidate the appointment but ignored the proviso of the very same statute that protected it.

The State Government's own Government Order dated 5 December 2012 translated this parliamentary protection into administrative practice. It stipulated a five-year window from 1 April 2010 (the date of commencement of the Act) — meaning until 31 March 2015 — for teachers already in service to acquire TET. Subsequently, the U.P. Basic Schools (Junior High School) Conditions of Teachers Recruitment and Service (6th Amendment) Rules, 2012 amended Rule 4 of the Rules, 1978 to make TET a mandatory qualification. Critically, while that amendment incorporated the TET requirement, the corresponding protection giving teachers a breathing period to acquire TET — which the Government Order envisaged — was inadvertently not carried into the Rules of 1978 by way of a formal amendment. The Bench held that this anomaly could not be used against Siddiqui. The notification imposing the TET requirement and the statutory protection against immediate invalidation of appointments were both sourced in the same Central legislation; neither could be applied selectively.

Siddiqui passed the TET on 22 February 2014 — well within the 31 March 2015 deadline. The Division Bench held that the Single Judge's failure to consider the Government Order dated 5 December 2012 and the first proviso to Section 23(1) of the Act, 2009 was an error apparent on the face of the record.

Approbate and Reprobate: The Doctrine Applied

The Bench applied the doctrine of approbate and reprobate — a species of estoppel recognised in service jurisprudence. The respondents could not simultaneously invoke the NCTE notification dated 23 August 2010 (issued under the Act, 2009) as the foundation for terminating Siddiqui's services while denying him the statutory protection afforded by the very same Act. The Bench cited Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam and others, (2020) 6 SCC 387 and Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Companies Ltd, (2011) 10 SCC 420 in support.

The Bench also invoked the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shiv Kumar Sharma and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2013 (6) ADJ 310, noting that the Full Bench had itself failed to take note of the first proviso to Section 23(1) of the Act, 2009 read with the Government Order dated 5 December 2012. In the Bench's view, that Full Bench decision could not, for that reason, operate against Siddiqui.

The respondents had relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala and others, (2004) 2 SCC 105, which holds that a false certificate renders an appointment void ab initio. The Bench distinguished that authority on the ground that no flaw or forgery had been established against Siddiqui's academic testimonials either before the DBEO or before the Court. The original termination had been grounded on an allegation of forgery, but that allegation was never substantiated and was eventually abandoned.

Malice in Law: The Management's Post-Disapproval Conduct

The Bench found the conduct of respondent No. 4 — the Committee of Management — infected with malice in law. After the DBEO's order of disapproval dated 28 November 2014 attained finality without challenge, the Manager wrote a letter on 16 December 2014 to the District Magistrate asking that the DBEO be directed to recall the disapproval order, with an intimation that an “unpleasant situation” would otherwise arise. The Bench characterised this as an attempt to hijack the system governed by the rule of law.

The Bench applied the Constitution Bench's reasoning in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3, that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality under Article 14. Where power is exercised not to advance the purpose of the statute but to circumvent its safeguards and perpetuate an otherwise unsustainable action, such exercise is vitiated by malice in law.

Back Wages: Why Full Arrears Were Directed

After setting aside the Single Judge's order, the Division Bench examined whether Siddiqui was entitled to arrears of salary and, if so, to what extent. Neither party had placed pleadings or material before the Court on whether Siddiqui had been gainfully employed in the interregnum of approximately twelve years between the disapproval of termination and the date of the appeal judgment.

The Bench surveyed several Supreme Court and Division Bench precedents: Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hisar, (2014) 10 SCC 301; Shiv Nandan Mahto v. State of Bihar, (2013) 11 SCC 626; State of Kerala v. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai, (2007) 6 SCC 524; the Supreme Court's recent decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 INSC 2018; and this Court's Division Bench decision in Sachindra Kumar Pandey v. Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank and others, 2026:AHC:166892-DB.

From this survey the Bench distilled that reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule upon wrongful termination. Full back wages can be denied only where the employer specifically pleads and proves gainful employment in the interregnum. No such plea or proof was advanced here.

The Bench held that this was not a case of wrongful termination or dismissal where the employer might have some bona fide defence. The termination was without jurisdiction, had been disapproved by the statutory authority under Rule 15 of the Rules, 1978, and that disapproval had been dishonoured. The Management had then attempted to manufacture a new ground of challenge through counter-affidavit. In these circumstances, the Bench held that Siddiqui was entitled to his legitimate salary for the entire period he was arbitrarily kept out of service. It invoked the Latin maxim Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria — no man may take advantage of his own wrong.

Outcome

The Division Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 23 April 2015. The special appeal was allowed. The Court directed:

• Reinstatement of Mohd. Mustafa Siddiqui as assistant teacher at Bal Bari Junior High School, Kasya, Kushinagar, forthwith.
• Payment of all consequential monetary benefits, including full arrears of salary.
• Arrears of salary to carry simple interest at 6%, to be computed and paid within two months of communication of the order.
• Costs were made easy.
• The Registrar (Compliance) was directed to communicate the order to respondent No. 1, the District Basic Education Officer, Kushinagar, for immediate compliance.

The judgment was marked as speaking and reportable.