MP High Court Refuses to Quash FIR Against Ganga Jamuna School Accused, Cites Advanced Trial Stage and Disputed Facts

The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur dismissed three quashing petitions arising from a 2023 FIR against persons linked to Ganga Jamuna Higher Secondary School, Damoh, over allegations of forced religious practices on students.

Justice Himanshu Joshi, sitting singly at the Jabalpur bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, dismissed three petitions filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking to quash FIR No. 498/2023 registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Damoh. The petitioners — Shailendra Kumar Jain (M.Cr.C. No. 1001/2026), Anas Athar and Rustam Ali (M.Cr.C. No. 49886/2023), and Abdul Wasim Bari (M.Cr.C. No. 52398/2025) — are accused persons connected to Ganga Jamuna Higher Secondary School, Damoh. The court found that the allegations, read alongside material gathered during investigation, were not inherently absurd or improbable, and that the defences raised raised factual disputes that belong before the trial court. A significant circumstance was that 32 of 33 prosecution witnesses had already been examined by the time the petitions were heard.

The FIR and the Allegations

The FIR dated 7 June 2023 was registered pursuant to an enquiry conducted by a committee constituted by the Collector, Damoh, following complaints about Ganga Jamuna Higher Secondary School. The school was run by Ganga Jamuna Welfare Society, registered under the M.P. Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973.

The FIR initially covered offences under Sections 295-A, 120-B and 506 Part-II of the Indian Penal Code, and Sections 75 and 87 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. After investigation, Sections 3 and 5(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 were added, along with Section 120-B IPC.

The FIR recorded a student's statement that from Class VI onwards, wearing Hijab and Dupatta was compulsory; that students were allegedly stopped from wearing Tilak and Kalawa; that Urdu was taught compulsorily; and that prayers were recited during assembly. The allegation was that these practices were imposed by threat and coercion, and that the complainant's religious sentiments were thereby hurt.

The enquiry was triggered in part by a separate incident on 6 June 2023, when certain persons allegedly intercepted the vehicle of the District Education Officer, Damoh, threw ink on him, and threatened him. That incident was registered as Crime No. 495/2023. Communal tension followed in the town, and the Collector constituted an enquiry committee, whose report led to Crime No. 498/2023.

A charge-sheet was filed against Afsa Sheikh, Anas Athar, and Rustam on 8 August 2023. The matter proceeded as S.T. No. 54/2023. The Principal, teacher and peon of the school were arrested and later released on bail. Shailendra Kumar Jain and Abdul Wasim Bari were also arrested and granted bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Damoh, subject to a condition requiring appearance before the concerned police station every seventh day.

Petitioners' Arguments: Jurisdiction, Membership, and Sanction

Counsel for Shailendra Kumar Jain and Abdul Wasim Bari argued that both persons were members of the school management committee only in 2020 and were not part of the subsequently constituted committee for the period 1 April 2023 to 1 April 2026. They contended there was no basis for attributing the alleged acts to them since they held no office at the school during the relevant period.

On the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021, both petitioners relied on Section 4 of the Act, which they argued requires a written complaint from the person converted, or a person against whom conversion was attempted, before the police can investigate. Since the FIR was lodged by the enquiry committee and not by any such person, they argued the investigation was without jurisdiction. This Court's earlier order in Jerald Almeda and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, M.Cr.C. No. 24589/2023, dated 19 June 2023, was pressed in support.

Both petitioners also contended that merely requiring girl students to wear Hijab could not constitute “conversion or an attempt to convert” within the Act's meaning. They further argued that the ingredients of Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act — which requires the accused to have actual charge or control over the children — were absent, and that Section 87, dealing with abetment, would therefore not be attracted either.

Anas Athar and Rustam Ali, described in the proceedings respectively as a teacher and a peon at the school, raised an additional and distinct challenge. They argued that cognizance of the offence under Section 295-A read with Section 120-B IPC was taken by the trial court on 18 August 2023, whereas the prosecution sanction required under Section 196 CrPC was obtained only on 18 September 2023 and placed before the trial court on 20 September 2023 — after cognizance had already been taken. They relied on General Officer Commanding v. CBI, Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, and Darshan Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 654, to argue that subsequent sanction cannot cure initial want of jurisdiction.

Shailendra Kumar Jain also pointed out that the only material against him was the memorandum of co-accused Afsa Sheikh recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Affidavits filed by parents and students stating that the books supplied were Government-prescribed and that no religious education beyond the syllabus was imparted were placed on record as Annexure A-10.

State's Response

The State, represented by Deputy Advocate General Shri B.D. Singh, opposed all three petitions. On the facts, the State submitted that substantial material was collected during investigation disclosing prima facie involvement of the accused, including statements of students. The allegations, it was argued, were not limited to Hijab but included prohibition on Tilak and Kalawa, compulsory Urdu teaching, compulsory prayers, and coercion.

On Section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, the State argued the provision could not be read in isolation to bar every investigation where the allegation concerned an attempt to convert rather than a completed conversion. Section 3 of the Act, the State said, covers attempts to convert by force, coercion, or undue influence — not merely completed conversions.

On the Section 196 CrPC objection, the State relied on Dharmesh @ Nanu Nitinbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 6 SCC 370, State of M.P. v. Bhooraji, (2001) 7 SCC 679, Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732, and Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186. These decisions, the State argued, establish that a sanction objection does not automatically result in quashing where no failure of justice is demonstrated and the requisite sanction was subsequently obtained.

How the Court Reasoned

The court accepted that wearing Hijab alone cannot constitute an offence under the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act. However, it found that the prosecution case did not rest solely on Hijab. The allegations also covered compulsory religious practices, prohibition of Hindu religious symbols, and use of threat and coercion. Whether those allegations are true and whether they meet the statutory ingredients are matters for the trial court to determine on evidence.

On the Section 4 jurisdictional objection, the court declined to hold the prosecution void at this stage. It observed that the argument about who may lodge a complaint under the Act requires examination in the specific factual setting, particularly when the State's case is that the offences are cognizable and concern an attempt to convert. The court also noted that the prosecution had collected statements of students and other witnesses, and that the prior order in Jerald Almeda was rendered on a different set of facts and statutory material.

On the Section 196 CrPC objection raised by Anas Athar and Rustam Ali, the court noted that the sanction was obtained on 18 September 2023 and placed before the trial court on 20 September 2023, before charges were framed. Applying Dharmesh @ Nanu Nitinbhai Shah, the court observed that the Supreme Court had declined to interfere in comparable circumstances, finding that remitting the matter would cause further delay without corresponding advantage to the accused.

On Sections 75 and 87 of the Juvenile Justice Act, the court held that whether the applicants fall within the statutory description — persons employed by or managing an organisation entrusted with the care and protection of children — and whether their acts constitute cruelty within Section 75 are evidence-dependent questions.

The court declined to treat the affidavits filed by parents and students as a standalone ground for quashing. Such affidavits, it held, constitute material for the trial court to weigh alongside the statements recorded during investigation and the evidence already adduced. Exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS does not permit the court to select one piece of material and reject the rest.

As for Shailendra Kumar Jain and Abdul Wasim Bari, the court acknowledged that the documents on record — Annexures A-5 and A-6 — may support their defence that they were not members of the management committee during the relevant period. However, the prosecution had alleged their involvement and relied upon investigation material. Whether they had any role in the school's affairs or exercised influence over its functioning were factual questions that the trial court must answer.

The court also gave weight to the advanced stage of the trial. As disclosed in the State's reply, 32 of 33 prosecution witnesses had already been examined. The court held that this was a relevant circumstance when considering whether to exercise extraordinary inherent jurisdiction to terminate the prosecution.

Order

M.Cr.C. No. 1001/2026 filed by Shailendra Kumar Jain, M.Cr.C. No. 49886/2023 filed by Anas Athar and Rustam Ali, and M.Cr.C. No. 52398/2025 filed by Abdul Wasim Bari were all dismissed. No relief was granted on any of the grounds urged — jurisdiction under the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, the Section 196 CrPC sanction objection, the Juvenile Justice Act ingredients, or non-membership of the management committee.