Private School Staff Cannot Be Requisitioned for Census Duty, Allahabad HC Stays DIOS Order
The Allahabad High Court has prima facie held that teaching and non-teaching staff of private aided and unaided institutions fall outside the definition of ‘local authority’ under the Census Act, 1948, and has stayed two district-level orders that sought to press them into census service.
Justice Siddharth Nandan, sitting singly at the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, on 21 May 2026 stayed two orders issued by district authorities in Gautam Budh Nagar that had directed the managers and principals of all aided and unaided private institutions to furnish lists of their teaching and non-teaching staff for census duty. The court found, at the prima facie stage, that such staff cannot be treated as employees of a “local authority” within the meaning of Section 4A of the Census Act, 1948. The petition was filed by the Independent Self Financed Schools Association, which argued that the district-level orders went well beyond what the statute permits and that coercive action was being threatened against members whose staff had not attended census training.
The Orders Under Challenge
The dispute arose from two letters issued in April 2026. On 8 April 2026, the District Inspector of Schools (D.I.O.S.), Gautam Budh Nagar, directed the managers and principals of all aided and unaided institutions to provide lists of their teaching and non-teaching staff for census duty. This order was the primary target of the writ petition.
The petitioner's counsel, Sri Udit Chandra, pointed out that the D.I.O.S. order was itself inconsistent with an earlier letter dated 1 April 2026, in which the Additional District Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar, had written to the B.S.A. (Basic Shiksha Adhikari), D.I.O.S., and the District Panchayat Raj Officer (D.P.R.O.) requesting a list of employees who were appointed and available in their own offices. The Additional District Magistrate's letter was addressed to those three local authorities, not to private institutions. The D.I.O.S., however, extended the requisition to unaided schools, which the petitioner argued was contrary to both the letter and the spirit of Section 4A.
A second letter, dated 29 April 2026, written by Respondent No. 5 (the charge officer at Greater Noida) to the District Basic Education Officer and the D.I.O.S., noted that individuals listed for training had not attended, and warned that necessary action would be taken. The petitioner submitted that members of the Association had, under compulsion, forwarded their staff lists, and that coercive action was now imminent.
The Statutory Question: Who Is a ‘Local Authority’ Under Section 4A?
Section 4A of the Census Act, 1948, inserted by Act No. 11 of 1994, reads: “Every local authority in a State shall, when so directed by a written order by the Central Government or by an authority appointed by that Government in this behalf, make available to any Director of Census Operations such staff as may be necessary for the performance of any duties in connection with the taking of census.”
The petitioner's core argument was that a private college, whether aided or unaided, is neither a local authority, nor a State Government office, nor a subsidiary company set up by the State Government. Accordingly, Section 4A simply does not reach the staff of such institutions.
To reinforce this reading, counsel drew an analogy from Section 159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which requires local authorities to make staff available to Returning Officers for election duties. The petitioner argued that the same logic applies to census duty: only local authorities are obligated, and private institutions stand outside that category.
Counsel also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Election Commission of India v. State Bank of India Staff Association, Local Head Office Unit, Patna and Others, reported in 1995 Supplementary (2) SCC 13. In that case, the Apex Court had held that government servants appointed to public service under the Central or State Government, and local authorities, are required to be made available for election duties. The petitioner drew from this that the obligation is confined to government servants and local authorities, not to employees of private institutions.
The Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, had taken a similar view in Writ Petition No. 3612 of 2026, The Sikh Education Society, Nagpur v. Union of India and Others, while interpreting Section 4A of the Census Act, 1948 in light of the same Supreme Court precedent.
Counsel further relied on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court dated 5 February 2019 in Special Appeal No. 244 of 2019, which examined Section 7C of the Census Act, 1948. That bench had held that while the Act empowers the District Magistrate to call upon officers and staff of any factory, firm, or establishment to assist in taking a census of persons present in the premises at the time of the census, such assistance is limited to the officers and staff of the respective establishment and does not extend beyond the premises of that establishment.
A further argument concerned the delegation of authority. The petitioner submitted that the Additional District Magistrate's letter of 1 April 2026 was addressed to the B.S.A., D.I.O.S., and D.P.R.O. as local authorities. The B.S.A. is not itself a delegated authority under Sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Census Act, 1948, and therefore had no power to seek lists from private institutions. The benefit of that sub-section, which allows the State Government to delegate the power of appointing a Census Officer, could not be extended to the B.S.A. in a delegated capacity.
The State’s Defence: Section 4 and Section 27 RTE
The learned Standing Counsel, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, advanced two statutory arguments. First, Section 4 of the Census Act, 1948 provides that the State Government may appoint any person as a Census Officer for carrying out the census within a specified local area, and such person when appointed is bound to serve. Sub-section (4) of Section 4 further allows the State Government to delegate the power of appointing a Census Officer to such authority as it thinks fit.
Second, the Standing Counsel pointed to Section 27 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which permits the deployment of teachers for the decennial population census as an exception to the general prohibition on deploying teachers for non-educational purposes. Section 27 reads: “No teacher shall be deployed for any non-educational purposes other than the decennial population census, disaster relief duties or duties relating to elections to the local authority or the State Legislature or Parliament, as the case may be.” The Standing Counsel argued this provision would apply to primary teachers, i.e., those teaching from Class 1 to Class 8.
In rejoinder, the petitioner's counsel countered that Section 27 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 applies to government teachers and not to teachers working in private institutions. Counsel also cited Surya Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and 7 Others, reported in 2025 (2) ADJ 351, in which it was held that even for government teachers, deployment for census should be minimal and preferably during holidays and non-teaching hours to avoid loss of academic work.
Prima Facie Finding and Interim Stay
Justice Siddharth Nandan accepted the petitioner's reading at the prima facie stage. The court found that the teaching and non-teaching staff of private institutions, whether aided or unaided, cannot be said to fall within the purview of ‘local authorities’ — that is, the B.S.A., D.I.O.S., and D.P.R.O., who alone are required to provide their staff, as also contemplated in the Additional District Magistrate's letter of 1 April 2026. The court further found that, in view of the list forwarded by the B.S.A. to the charge officer pursuant to the D.I.O.S. letter of 8 April 2026, the employees of aided and unaided institutions cannot be made liable for any task under the Census Act, 1948.
Order
The court directed the respondents to file counter-affidavits within four weeks. Two weeks thereafter were granted to the petitioner's counsel to file a rejoinder affidavit. The matter was listed for hearing after the exchange of pleadings.
Until further orders, the court stayed both the D.I.O.S. order dated 8 April 2026 and the charge officer's letter dated 29 April 2026. The stay protects the members of the Independent Self Financed Schools Association from any coercive action arising from non-compliance with those two directions.