Divorce Decree Does Not Shield Husband from Domestic Violence Proceedings, Rules Allahabad HC

The Allahabad High Court dismissed a Section 482 application seeking to quash a Domestic Violence Act complaint, holding that a divorce decree does not extinguish a wife's right to relief for past acts of domestic violence committed during the marriage.

Justice Brij Raj Singh, sitting singly at the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, dismissed a petition filed by Puneet Rastogi under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Rastogi had sought to quash Complaint Case No. 107/2019, filed by his wife Pratima Rastogi under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, pending before the Civil Judge (J.D.)/FTC (Crime Against Women), Lucknow. The court held that a final decree of divorce does not bar a wife from pursuing remedies under the Domestic Violence Act for violence suffered during the subsistence of the marriage, and that proceeding to quash the complaint at this stage would amount to conducting a mini-trial.

The Dispute Before the Court

Puneet Rastogi and Pratima Rastogi were married on 18 April 2017 at Lucknow, after which the couple moved to Ghaziabad. The applicant's account, placed before the court by his counsel Ms. Soma Pandey and Mr. Mukul Sudhir Pandey, was one of marital breakdown driven by the wife's conduct. On 9 November 2017, when the applicant's father died after a prolonged illness, opposite party no. 2 and her brother allegedly raised inheritance disputes and created a scene near the deceased's body. From 8 April 2018 to 22 April 2018, the applicant was on an official trip to Germany. During that period, the wife was at her brother's house and, despite repeated requests, did not go to stay with the applicant's widowed mother.

The wife, in divorce proceedings, alleged that the applicant had beaten her and thrown her out of the house at Lucknow on 14 April 2018 — a date on which, as the Family Court itself recorded, the applicant was not even in India. That finding became significant: the trial court allowed the divorce petition filed by the applicant on 1 March 2025 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty committed by the wife.

The wife's petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights and her petition under Section 27 for return of Stridhan, both filed in 2025, were also dismissed by the same court in the same order dated 1 March 2025.

On 1 February 2019, opposite party no. 2 had filed the complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. The applicant now argued before the High Court that this complaint should be quashed because the marriage had ended, the allegations were identical to those already adjudicated and dismissed by the Family Court, and no domestic relationship subsisted between the parties after the divorce decree.

The Legal Question

The central issue was whether a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 can survive after a decree of divorce has been granted by a competent court, particularly where the Family Court has found that it was the wife who treated the husband with cruelty.

The applicant's counsel advanced two principal arguments. First, since the divorce decree had been passed on 1 March 2025 and had categorically found cruelty on the wife's part, permitting the Domestic Violence Act complaint to proceed would be a re-litigation of issues already decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The same allegations that formed the basis of the Domestic Violence Act complaint had been taken up by the wife in her written statement to the divorce proceedings, filed nearly three years late, and had been rejected. Second, no domestic relationship subsisted between the parties after dissolution of marriage, and therefore no cause of action survived under the Domestic Violence Act. The applicant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab and Another, (2011) 10 SCR 557, and Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 INSC 734.

Opposite party no. 2's counsel, Mr. Katyayan Mishra, contested quashing on the merits. He submitted that the applicant, employed with HCL Ltd. and earning approximately Rs. 40 lakhs annually, had been involved in an extra-marital affair with a female co-worker, and that when the wife raised objections she was mentally and physically tortured. The applicant's family members, it was submitted, supported the applicant and retained all jewellery received at the time of marriage. The wife's counsel placed reliance on Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, 2022(2) ABR (CRI) 484, Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori, AIRONLINE 2014 SC 224, and a coordinate bench decision in Shashank Pandey and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, 2024:AHC-LKO:14720.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Brij Raj Singh began with the maintainability question. Drawing on Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, the court accepted that a petition under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable to challenge proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Supreme Court had settled in that case that High Courts can exercise Section 482 CrPC (or Section 528 BNSS) power to quash proceedings under Section 12(1) of the Domestic Violence Act, though with caution: interference is normally warranted only in cases of gross illegality or injustice.

On the substantive question, the court turned to Inderjit Singh Grewal, where the Supreme Court had held that permitting a Magistrate to proceed with a Domestic Violence Act complaint after a subsisting divorce decree could amount to an abuse of process. The applicant leaned heavily on this. However, the court found that the facts before it did not justify the same outcome.

Justice Singh placed weight on the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(s) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which extends to persons who have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. Citing Prabha Tyagi, he noted that judicial separation does not end a marriage and that the domestic relationship continues even when spouses are not living together. More directly applicable was the principle from Juveria Abdul Majid Patni, where the Supreme Court held that “an act of domestic violence once committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability” of the respondent for the offence committed or deny the aggrieved person her entitlements under Sections 20 to 23 of the Act.

The court also noted the coordinate bench's ruling in Shashank Pandey, which held that even after a marriage is declared null and void, a woman who lived in a domestic relationship with the applicant remains an aggrieved person within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Act and retains the right to file an application under Section 12.

Justice Singh then addressed the applicant's argument that the wife's allegations had already been adjudicated and rejected by the Family Court. The court did not accept that the Domestic Violence Act complaint should be quashed on this basis at the threshold stage. Reliefs under the Act — monetary relief under Section 20, child custody under Section 21, compensation under Section 22, and interim or ex parte orders under Section 23 — all require evidence to be placed on record. Quashing the complaint without that process would effectively amount to conducting a mini-trial, which is impermissible under Section 482.

On the argument that the applicant's mother had no domestic relationship with the parties, and that the wife's occasional visits to the applicant's mother's house did not bring the mother within the statute, the court did not pronounce a final ruling but noted that these were matters to be determined on evidence at the trial stage.

The court found no gross illegality or injustice that would warrant interference at this stage. The fact that the divorce petition was allowed on the ground of the wife's cruelty did not, by itself, foreclose the Domestic Violence Act complaint, given that the complaint relates to acts alleged to have occurred during the subsistence of the marriage.

Outcome

The application filed by Puneet Rastogi under Section 482 CrPC bearing Application No. 6580 of 2025 was dismissed as devoid of merit. No order as to costs was made. The complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in Complaint Case No. 107/2019, titled Pratima Rastogi v. Puneet Rastogi and Others, pending before the Civil Judge (J.D.)/FTC (Crime Against Women), Lucknow, will proceed to trial. The judgment was pronounced and uploaded on 7 July 2026.