Allahabad HC Quashes Remand Order, Faults Police and Magistrate for Ignoring Article 22(1) Obligation
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court freed an accused because neither the arrest memo nor the General Diary entry contained specific grounds of arrest, and the Remand Magistrate signed a blank printed proforma without checking compliance.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a judgment delivered by Justice J.J. Munir (Justice Tarun Saxena concurring), allowed a criminal misc. writ petition filed by one Rakesh and quashed the remand order dated 20 April 2025 passed in Case Crime No. 132 of 2025, Police Station Gunnour, District Sambhal. The FIR, registered under Sections 87, 127(4), 64(1), and 143(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, alleged that Rakesh had lured away and confined the wife of the informant. The court's inquiry was confined to a single question: whether the arrest was made in compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Finding that the arrest memo contained only generic reasons and no grounds personal to the accused, and that the Remand Magistrate used a pre-printed proforma without ascertaining compliance, the bench ordered Rakesh's release on bond.
The FIR and Arrest
The informant, Umar Ahmad, lodged the FIR on 18 April 2025 at Police Station Gunnour, District Sambhal. He stated that on 3 April 2025, his wife “X”, aged about 36 years, was taken away by blandishment by the petitioner Rakesh, who later kept her in confinement. On 14 April 2025, she was found in a disoriented condition in Village Bairpur, P.S. Junavai.
After the FIR was registered, Rakesh was shown to have been arrested on 20 April 2025 at 08:50 hours. He was produced before the Remand Magistrate on the same day, who remanded him to judicial custody. The petitioner later moved a bail application before the Sessions Judge, Sambhal at Chandausi, which was rejected on 5 August 2025.
Rakesh then filed this writ petition challenging not the merits of the prosecution case but the legality of the arrest itself — a right the bench confirmed is independent of, and not foreclosed by, the pursuit of bail.
The Petition's Scope: Arrest Legality, Not Bail Merits
The bench was careful to demarcate the petition's office at the outset. The inquiry, as Justice Munir set it out, was “limited to the question, if the petitioner has been validly arrested in accordance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution read with the statutory safeguards engrafted in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.”
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Shikhar Neelkanth, argued that the arrest memo carried no column for grounds of arrest, and that the petitioner was never informed of the grounds either orally or in writing, either at the time of arrest or before his production before the Remand Magistrate. The State, represented by Additional Government Advocate-I Ms. Manju Thakur, relied on the memo of arrest and G.D. Entry No. 27 dated 20 April 2025 as furnishing the grounds, and contended that the seriousness of the allegations — rape and human trafficking — precluded the petitioner from questioning his arrest on what the State characterised as an academic ground.
The State also invoked the Supreme Court's decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kusum Sahu (Criminal Appeal No. 4710 of 2025, decided 3 November 2025) to argue that since the bail plea had already been rejected, the petitioner could not use a writ to indirectly secure what he failed to obtain on merits.
What the Arrest Memo and General Diary Actually Said
The bench reproduced both documents in the judgment. The arrest memo, Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition, contains a column 10 headed giraftari kaa karan (reasons for arrest). The main field was left entirely blank. The sub-columns — ka, kha, ga, gha, anga — set out standard printed entries such as “to prevent such a person from further committing an offence”, “for the purpose of appropriate investigation into the offence”, and “to prevent such a person from destroying evidence or tampering with it”. Against each, the only entry was haan (yes).
The bench found that these sub-columns carried generic reasons applicable to any arrested person, not grounds personal to Rakesh. This distinction — between “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of arrest” — had been drawn by the Supreme Court in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254, at paragraphs 37 and 48, and the bench applied it squarely.
G.D. Entry No. 27 dated 20 April 2025, made at 09:38 hours, fared no better. When its operative text was rendered into English, it stated only that the accused Rakesh was informed of “his crime under Sections 87, 127(4), 64(1), 143(2) BNS” and that the “guidelines of the Supreme Court and the Human Rights Commission were fully complied with.” The bench found this to be a bare assertion, carrying no contemporaneous record of what specific grounds were communicated. The case diary recorded the manner of arrest, information from a secret informer, and confinement to the police lockup — but nothing that could have been brought to the petitioner's notice as the grounds on which he was being taken into custody.
The bench concluded: from arrest to production before the Remand Magistrate on 20 April 2025, the petitioner was never informed of the grounds of his arrest. As the burden of proving compliance with Article 22(1) rests on the Police, and it had not been discharged, the arrest was illegal.
The Remand Order: A Printed Proforma With Blanks
The Remand Magistrate's order, certified copy of which is at page 39 of the writ petition paper-book, was described by the bench as a “Remand Sheet” — a printed proforma with blanks filled in, the bench observing it was done “in a routine and mechanical manner” without application of mind.
The bench reproduced a photostat of the remand order in the judgment to illustrate how it was granted. The Magistrate had not inquired whether the grounds of arrest had been communicated to Rakesh before granting judicial custody. Under the law as stated in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799 at paragraph 25, a Magistrate is duty-bound, when an arrested person is produced before him, to ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) has been made before ordering remand. The failure to do so rendered both the arrest and the ensuing custody illegal.
The Legal Framework: From Pankaj Bansal to Mihir Rajesh Shah
The bench traced the development of the Article 22(1) obligation through four Supreme Court decisions.
In Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576, the Supreme Court held that the mode of conveying grounds of arrest must be meaningful and that furnishing them in writing is the advisable course. The court drew a clear line between the mere oral reading of grounds, which could degenerate into a dispute of word against word, and written communication.
In Prabir Purkayastha, (2024) 8 SCC 254, the Supreme Court extended the obligation to arrests under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and held explicitly that the constitutional obligation under Article 22 is not statute-specific. It distinguished “reasons for arrest” (generic formal parameters printed in most arrest memos) from “grounds of arrest” (facts personal to the accused justifying his specific arrest). Non-compliance was held to vitiate the arrest, regardless of a subsequent charge-sheet.
In Vihaan Kumar, (2025) 5 SCC 799, the Supreme Court applied these principles to an ordinary IPC case, departing from the position that the rule was confined to special statutes with onerous bail conditions. It held that Article 22(1) requires the arrested person to be informed of grounds in a language he understands and in a manner that gives him sufficient knowledge of the basic facts. A diary entry that merely asserts compliance, without recording the actual grounds, does not satisfy this standard. The burden to prove compliance is on the investigating officer. Filing of a charge-sheet does not cure a constitutionally defective arrest.
The bench also noticed Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500, which holds that grounds must be communicated in writing in the language the arrestee understands, and that if they cannot be furnished at the time of arrest, they must be furnished at least two hours before production before the Magistrate. The bench held this principle prospective, applicable to arrests made after the date of that decision (6 November 2025). Since Rakesh was arrested on 20 April 2025, Mihir Rajesh Shah was not directly attracted, but the principles from Pankaj Bansal, Prabir Purkayastha, and Vihaan Kumar applied in full.
Distinguishing Kusum Sahu
The bench engaged at length with the State's reliance on Kusum Sahu. In that case, the Supreme Court had disapproved of a High Court which, after four successive bail rejections in four months, allowed a habeas corpus petition by examining the merits as if it were a bail appeal. The bench found the factual matrix entirely different here: no bail application had ever been moved before the High Court, still less rejected; and this court had examined only the legality of the arrest and remand, not the prosecution's merits or the defence. The principle in Kusum Sahu operated in a context of bail-plea abuse, which was absent here. The State's argument on this point was rejected.
The bench also separately remarked on the systemic problem underlying such cases — the tendency of police to regard judgments enforcing fundamental rights as inconvenient impositions, and the corresponding expectation in some quarters that exceptions carved in specific fact situations represent license to continue time-worn practices. These observations were directed at the pattern of police conduct, not at the individual case.
Order
The writ petition was allowed and the remand order dated 20 April 2025 in Case Crime No. 132 of 2025 was quashed. The petitioner Rakesh is to be produced before the Magistrate or the Trial Court where the case is pending. On production, he is to be released from custody upon furnishing a bond in accordance with Section 91 of the BNSS to the satisfaction of the concerned court. The bond must contain an undertaking to attend every date of trial and not to seek adjournment on any ground. The bench clarified that the order does not affect the ongoing trial or the merits of the charges.
The learned Sessions Judge, Sambhal was directed to ensure that all Magistrates functioning under his subordination do not grant police or judicial remand on a printed proforma, and certainly not without first ascertaining whether the grounds of arrest have been communicated to the accused in writing by the Police or the agency concerned.
The Registrar (Compliance) was directed to communicate the judgment to the Sessions Judge, Sambhal, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sambhal, and through the Chief Judicial Magistrate to the Jail Superintendent of the jail where the petitioner is held.