Allahabad HC Upholds Conviction of Son Who Poured Acid on Father, Condemns Four-Decade-Old Sentence as Gravely Inadequate

Razzak's Section 326 IPC conviction is confirmed but the Allahabad High Court sharply censures the trial court for omitting mandatory fine and for failing to consider culpable homicide.

A criminal appeal filed in 1983 finally concluded on 15 July 2026, when Justice Santosh Rai, sitting singly at the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dismissed the appeal of Razzak and confirmed his conviction under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous means. Razzak had poured acid on his father, Gulam Husain, on 5 September 1981 at their shared home in village Bichhia, Gorakhpur. The father died approximately three weeks later from septicaemia and exhaustion caused by the burns. While upholding the conviction, the court recorded strong disapproval of the trial court's sentencing, finding that the Sessions Judge had failed to impose the mandatory fine required under Section 326 IPC and had improperly stopped short of examining whether the offence warranted conviction under Section 304 IPC for culpable homicide.

The Incident and the Trial Court's Findings

The occurrence took place inside the upper floor of a double-storeyed house at village Bichhia, Gorakhpur, where Razzak and his father Gulam Husain lived together. At around 7 a.m. on 5 September 1981, a quarrel broke out between them, during which Razzak poured acid on his father. The prosecution's case was that the incident happened within the four walls of the home, in circumstances where independent outsiders were not ordinarily present.

P.W.-1 Mahatam Singh, the informant, stated that while going to his field at around 9 a.m., he heard an alarm and saw Razzak fleeing towards a drain. He and other villagers chased and apprehended him. P.W.-1 did not personally witness the acid being poured. The injured Gulam Husain was taken to the Medical College not by his son but by Abdul Nisar, a rickshaw puller.

P.W.-4, Dr. K.K. Dixit, who examined Gulam Husain on the day of the incident, found approximately 60% acid burn injuries covering the face, neck, chest, and upper body. He opined that such burns were sufficient to endanger life and carried the possibility of causing death. P.W.-5, Dr. K.N. Singh, who conducted the post-mortem, found extensive corrosive burn injuries covering almost the entire upper body, including a 20” × 12” burn over the neck and chest, a 29” × 14” ulcerated burn from the back of the neck to the hip, and a shrunken left eyeball. He concluded that the cause of death was septicaemia and exhaustion resulting from the extensive acid burns, and that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

P.W.-3, Dr. U.N. Pandey, examined Razzak and found only superficial acid splash injuries on his hand. In his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement, Razzak admitted that acid was thrown during the scuffle but failed to explain how his father came to sustain such extensive injuries.

The Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur framed the charge against Razzak under Section 302 IPC on 18 June 1983 but ultimately convicted him only under Section 326 IPC, sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment. No fine was imposed. The State filed no appeal against the conviction or the sentence.

The Dying Declaration and the Investigating Officer's Evidence

P.W.-6, Sub-Inspector Umesh Chand Upadhyay, visited Gulam Husain at the Medical College Hospital on 8 September 1981 and recorded his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Gulam Husain, though unable to speak properly, specifically stated that some material had been thrown on him by his son Razzak. The Sub-Inspector admitted in court that, by inadvertence, the word “liquor” had been written in the Case Diary instead of “acid,” which he clarified before the court.

Gulam Husain died approximately twelve to fourteen days after the statement was recorded. The High Court held that the statement, having been made by the deceased in relation to the cause of his death and followed by his death, satisfied the requirements of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and was admissible as a dying declaration, notwithstanding that it was not recorded before a Magistrate.

The court also noted that Razzak attempted to flee the scene immediately after the occurrence and was apprehended by independent witnesses a short distance away. He made no effort to take his father to hospital; that act was performed by a third person despite Razzak being present on the spot.

The High Court's Assessment of the Evidence and the Correct Offence

Justice Santosh Rai rejected the defence argument that the father's death was purely accidental and that Razzak sustained burns while trying to rescue him. The court pointed to the stark disparity in injuries: Razzak suffered only superficial acid splashes on his hand, while Gulam Husain sustained 60% deep burns covering most of his upper body. That disparity, the court observed, was itself a strong pointer to Razzak being the aggressor.

The court went further on the question of the correct offence. It held that acid is a substance whose corrosive and dangerous nature is a matter of common knowledge, and that its deliberate use on the body of another person, particularly in the manner reflected by the injuries, was sufficient to impute to Razzak knowledge that his act was likely to cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death. On this basis, the court found that the trial court's conclusion that Razzak lacked the requisite knowledge to attract the offence of murder or culpable homicide was not correct or sustainable on the evidence.

The court's own analysis was that Razzak ought to have been convicted under Section 304 IPC — culpable homicide not amounting to murder — on the ground that he had knowledge, at the time of committing the offence, that pouring acid on the vital parts of his father's body was likely to cause death. However, since the State had not filed any appeal or revision for enhancement of the sentence, and since a well-settled principle restrains an appellate court from enhancing a sentence or converting a conviction to a higher offence on an appeal preferred by the accused alone, the court declined to disturb the conviction or the sentence.

Sentencing Deficiency: The Omitted Mandatory Fine

The court identified a separate legal error in the trial court's sentencing. Section 326 IPC, as it stood applicable, prescribed imprisonment along with fine as a mandatory component. The Sessions Judge imposed three years' rigorous imprisonment but omitted to impose any fine. The High Court held that where a provision of the IPC prescribes punishment in the form of imprisonment “and shall also be liable to fine,” the sentencing court is required to impose fine as well, and failure to do so amounts to a legal error in sentencing.

Despite finding this error, the court declined to correct it in the absence of an appeal by the State. The conviction under Section 326 IPC was accordingly upheld as it stood.

Judicial Censure of the Trial Court

Justice Santosh Rai devoted considerable space to recording disapproval of the manner in which the Sessions Judge had dealt with the trial. The court observed that the evidence — both ocular and medical — unmistakably required careful examination against the ingredients of Section 302 or Section 304 IPC, but the trial judge recorded a conviction only under Section 326 IPC without assigning any legally sustainable reason for discarding the charge of murder.

The court described the combined effect of these errors — misappreciation of evidence, failure to apply correct legal principles, and omission of mandatory fine — as resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice. It added that judicial discretion is never synonymous with judicial arbitrariness, and that sympathy or misplaced leniency has no place where the statute and the evidence demand reasoned and lawful adjudication.

The court acknowledged that the judgment under appeal was delivered more than four decades ago and that the concerned presiding officer had in all probability demitted office. Even so, it stated that the passage of time could not dilute the duty of the court to record disapproval. The judgment was directed to serve as a reminder that failure to discharge fundamental judicial obligations may invite serious judicial criticism and, where the officer is in service, appropriate administrative consequences in accordance with law.

Probation Plea Rejected

Counsel for Razzak had sought the benefit of release on probation of good conduct, pointing out that the appeal had remained pending since 1983 and that Razzak was now more than sixty years of age. The court rejected the submission. Having regard to the gravity of the offence — an acid attack by a son on his own father within their shared home, resulting in the father's death after prolonged suffering — the court found no reasonable ground to extend the benefit of probation.

Outcome

The criminal appeal was dismissed. The conviction of Razzak under Section 326 IPC and the sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment awarded by the Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur in S.T. No. 219 of 1983 were upheld. The sentence, though found to suffer from a legal infirmity on account of the non-imposition of mandatory fine, was not disturbed in the absence of any appeal or revision by the State for enhancement.

Razzak, if on bail, was directed to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of the sentence. His bail bonds were cancelled and sureties discharged. Should he fail to surrender within the stipulated period, the trial court was directed to take immediate coercive steps, including issuance of a non-bailable warrant. A copy of the judgment was directed to be transmitted to the trial court along with the trial court record. The Registrar (Compliance) was directed to serve a copy by fax or e-mail to the concerned court through the District and Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur within 48 hours. Amicus curiae Ms. Vaishali Rai was directed to be paid her remuneration within two weeks.