Allahabad HC Division Bench Sets Aside Single Judge's Non-Speaking Remand Order, Holds Special Appeal Maintainable Against Reasonless Writ Orders

A Division Bench led by Chief Justice Arun Bhansali set aside a Single Judge's order that remitted a societies registration dispute without recording any reasons, restoring the writ petition for fresh hearing before the appropriate bench.

The Allahabad High Court's Division Bench, in Special Appeal No. 400 of 2026, allowed an appeal against a Single Judge's order that had set aside two orders of the Commissioner, Agra Division, and remitted the matter back to the appellate authority — all without recording a single reason. Chief Justice Arun Bhansali, writing for the Bench, held that the bar on special appeals under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 must yield when the order under challenge is itself non-speaking, since the requirement to pass a reasoned order is a facet of natural justice. The writ petition, concerning cancellation of a society's registration under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, has been restored to file and listed for fresh hearing on 14 July 2026.

The Dispute Before the Division Bench

The matter originates from an order dated 12 March 2019, by which the Deputy Registrar, Agra cancelled the registration of a society under Section 12-D(1)(c) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Committee of Management of the society, acting through its President Shri Niwas, challenged that cancellation. The Commissioner, Agra Division, dismissed the appeal on 18 September 2025 and, separately, dismissed a review application on 9 October 2025.

The Committee then filed Writ-C No. 140 of 2026 before the Allahabad High Court questioning all three orders. When the petition came up before the Single Judge, the court set aside both orders of the Commissioner and remitted the matter to the appellate authority to decide afresh. That order, dated 24 February 2026, is what the present appellant, Sanjay Agrawal, challenged by way of Special Appeal No. 400 of 2026.

What the Single Judge's Order Actually Said

The Division Bench reproduced the impugned order in full. It ran to three short paragraphs. The Single Judge recorded that counsel had been heard, observed that the appellate authority had “not considered the position of law correctly” with reference to the earlier judgment in Laljimal Dharamshala Society and another v. The Commissioner Agra Division Agra and others: 2020:AHC:12586, and directed that the Commissioner's orders be set aside and the matter be remitted for a fresh decision. The order granted the petitioners liberty to raise supplementary grounds of fact and law.

Crucially, the Single Judge's order did not identify the facts of the case, did not describe the orders being set aside, did not explain what legal position had been laid down in Laljimal Dharamshala Society, and did not say in what manner the Commissioner's orders had departed from that position. The order also did not indicate whether the writ petition was being allowed or merely disposed of.

Preliminary Objection: Was the Special Appeal Barred?

Counsel for the respondent-Committee raised a preliminary objection at the outset. Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 bars a special appeal against an order passed by a Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution where the judgment, order, or award of a government authority made in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any State Act is under challenge. The Commissioner's orders dated 18 September 2025 and 9 October 2025 were plainly appellate and revisional orders under the Societies Registration Act. The respondent placed reliance on Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur (M/s.) and others v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, U.P., Kanpur and another: (2003) 1 UPLBEC 496, Committee of Management and another v. State of U.P. and others: 2025 (10) ADJ 218 (DB), and Subhanti Rai and 5 others v. Committee of Management of Van Awadh Gram Shiksha Mandal District Mau and 19 others: 2025:AHC:29061-DB.

Counsel for the appellant countered that a bare reading of the impugned order showed the Single Judge had failed to record any reasoning whatsoever, had not even clarified whether the petition was allowed or disposed of, and that the bar under Rule 5 could not apply in these circumstances. The appellant placed strong reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Abhishek Gupta v. Dinesh Kumar and others: 2025 INSC 1406.

How the Bench Reasoned Through Rule 5

The Division Bench acknowledged at the outset that on a plain reading of Rule 5 and the settled position reflected in the Full Bench decision in Sheet Gupta v. State of U.P. and others: AIR 2010 All. 46 (FB), the appeal would ordinarily be barred. The Single Judge had exercised Article 226 jurisdiction over an appellate order passed under a State Act — precisely the situation that Rule 5 targets.

However, the Bench turned to Abhishek Gupta, in which the Supreme Court had considered both Rule 5 and the Full Bench decision in Sheet Gupta. The Supreme Court in that case held that Rule 5 “has to be read and understood in a manner that advances the cause of ‘access to justice’ and not thwart it.” The object of Rule 5, the Supreme Court explained, is to avoid a third tier of adjudication on the same lis once two tiers — quasi-judicial and judicial — have already operated. The general rule is that a party aggrieved by a Single Judge's order must seek remedy under Article 136 before the Supreme Court or seek review under the High Court's inherent jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court in Abhishek Gupta had, however, carved out an exception: where an order passed by a Single Judge in Article 226 jurisdiction adversely affects the rights of a party who was not even a respondent before the Single Judge, the bar under Rule 5 must yield to the foundational principles of natural justice, particularly the right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing.

The Division Bench in the present case drew on the reasoning of Abhishek Gupta to extend the exception to a different but analogous situation: where the Single Judge's order is entirely non-speaking. The Bench held that passing a speaking order and recording reasons are themselves facets of natural justice. An order that contains no reasoning cannot be subjected to meaningful scrutiny and therefore creates precisely the kind of injustice that the exception in Abhishek Gupta was designed to address. The three judgments cited by the respondent — Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Committee of Management, and Subhanti Rai — were held inapplicable because none of them dealt with the situation of a non-speaking order by a Single Judge.

The Speaking Order Requirement as Natural Justice

Having disposed of the maintainability objection, the Bench addressed the merits of the challenge to the Single Judge's order. It relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Kranti Associates Private Limited and another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and others: (2010) 9 SCC 496, which laid down detailed parameters on the requirement of reasoned orders across judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative fora.

The Bench quoted at length from paragraph 47 of Kranti Associates, which holds that recording of reasons is “virtually a component of human rights” and a requirement of due process; that “reasons are the life blood of judicial decision making”; that a “pretence of reasons or rubber-stamp reasons is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process”; and that transparency in decision-making is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.

Against that framework, the Division Bench found the Single Judge's order to be manifestly deficient. The order did not discuss the facts of the case. It did not describe what the Deputy Registrar's order of 12 March 2019 had directed, nor what the Commissioner had said on 18 September 2025 or 9 October 2025. It did not identify what legal principle had been laid down in Laljimal Dharamshala Society or explain how the Commissioner's orders had departed from that principle. It did not even resolve the basic question of whether the writ petition was being allowed or merely disposed of. The Bench characterised the order as “ex facie non-speaking” with “absolutely no discussion worth the name.”

Outcome

The Division Bench allowed Special Appeal No. 400 of 2026. The order dated 24 February 2026 passed by the Single Judge in Writ-C No. 140 of 2026 was set aside in its entirety. The writ petition has been restored to its original file and number. The Bench directed that Writ-C No. 140 of 2026 be listed before the appropriate bench on 14 July 2026 as a fresh case, to be heard and decided in accordance with law.