Allahabad HC Revives Motor Accident Claim Dismissed on Territorial Jurisdiction After Full Trial at Sitapur Tribunal
The Allahabad High Court set aside the Sitapur MACT's dismissal of a road accident compensation claim, holding that no prejudice was shown and that dismissing after a full trial on a technical jurisdictional ground defeats the Motor Vehicles Act's remedial purpose.
Justice Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, sitting singly at the Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench, has set aside an order by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Sitapur, that dismissed a compensation petition solely for want of territorial jurisdiction—and did so only after framing eight issues, conducting a full-fledged trial, and examining witnesses. The claimants are the widow, children, and mother of Rajendra Singh, who died on 7 September 2012 after a car bearing registration number UP35L7733 struck his motorcycle near Sarsaul, Kanpur. Their petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking Rs 30,41,000 in compensation, was registered as MAC Case No. 19 of 2013 before the Sitapur Tribunal. The High Court found that the Tribunal erred in non-suiting the claimants at the final stage when no respondent had demonstrated any prejudice or failure of justice from the proceedings being held at Sitapur.
The Accident and the Claim Petition
On 7 September 2012, at around 1:30 p.m., Rajendra Singh was returning home on his motorcycle (UP78W2188) from Kanpur. A car (UP35L7733), owned by Respondent No. 1 Gajendra Singh of Unnao and driven by Respondent No. 2 Satendra Singh, also of Unnao, hit the motorcycle from behind near Sarsaul, inflicting grievous injuries. Rajendra Singh died during treatment. The offending car was insured with National Insurance Company Limited, Unnao (Respondent No. 3), while Respondent No. 4 was United India Insurance Company.
After the accident, Appellant No. 1, Smt. Santosh Singh (widow of the deceased), moved with her minor children to Village Hempur, District Sitapur, where she began residing at the house of a relative. On the advice of her counsel at the time, she filed the claim petition before the MACT at Sitapur, listing her current address as Hempur, Sitapur. The claim sought Rs 30,41,000 under various heads along with interest at 12 per cent per annum. One claimant, Smt. Kamla Devi (mother of the deceased), died during the appeal and was substituted by her legal heirs by order of the High Court dated 27 October 2023.
What the Sitapur Tribunal Decided
The Tribunal framed eight issues on 16 December 2013, the last of which (Issue No. 8) asked whether the court had territorial jurisdiction to hear the claim under Section 166(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Rather than deciding this as a preliminary issue, the Tribunal allowed all parties to lead documentary and oral evidence and conducted a complete trial.
At the final adjudication stage, the Tribunal took up Issue No. 8 first. It concluded that the claimants had failed to produce any document confirming that they had permanently shifted their residence from Kanpur to Sitapur. The income certificate filed by Appellant No. 1 (Paper No. 60Ga) mentioned Kanpur as her current address. The agricultural land of the deceased was also situated in Kanpur. Neither the respondents resided in Sitapur nor carried on business there, according to the Tribunal's findings. The Tribunal relied on a prior Allahabad High Court ruling that defined “residence” under Section 166(2) as permanent residence, not temporary residence.
On these findings, the Tribunal dismissed MAC Case No. 19 of 2013 by its order dated 2 July 2014 solely for lack of territorial jurisdiction, without deciding the remaining seven issues on their merits. The claimants were granted liberty to approach the competent Tribunal. Aggrieved, they filed First Appeal From Order No. 364 of 2015 before the Allahabad High Court.
Arguments Before the High Court
Counsel for the appellants pressed three principal contentions. First, that Section 166(2) gives a claimant three options: the place of the accident, the place where the claimant resides or carries on business, or the place where the defendant resides or carries on business. Since Smt. Santosh Singh was actually residing in Sitapur when the petition was filed, the Tribunal had jurisdiction. Second, that having conducted a complete trial without deciding jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, the Tribunal could not non-suit the claimants on a technical ground at the final stage, particularly when no respondent had pleaded or proved any prejudice. Third, and independently, National Insurance Company Limited (Respondent No. 3) had filed its written statement before the Tribunal with the place of swearing shown as Sitapur, which itself established that the insurer was carrying on business at Sitapur—thus satisfying the third limb of Section 166(2).
The appellants also filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to place on record, as additional evidence, a school leaving certificate dated 31 July 2014 issued by the Principal of Shanti Niketan Shiksha Mandir, Rampur, Sitapur, in respect of Appellant No. 3 (Om Singh, Class I). The certificate recorded his address as Village Hempur, Post Neri Kalan, District Sitapur. Counsel explained that Smt. Santosh Singh, a housewife with limited familiarity with legal proceedings, could not produce this document before the Tribunal because her erstwhile counsel at Sitapur failed to advise her to do so.
Respondent No. 4, United India Insurance Company, opposed the appeal by affidavit dated 17 October 2019. Its counsel argued that all documents on record disclosed the appellants' address as Kanpur, that no satisfactory explanation had been offered for the delay in filing the appeal, and that the Tribunal's order deserved to be affirmed.
The Legal Framework: Section 166(2) and the Prejudice Threshold
Justice Rizvi set out the text of Section 166(2), which provides that every application for compensation shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business, or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides.
The court then examined a line of Supreme Court authority beginning with Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 244. In Mantoo Sarkar, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of a Claims Tribunal must be read more widely than that of a civil court, that the residence of the claimant determines jurisdiction and what constitutes residence depends on the facts of each case, and that an appellate court should not, having regard to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entertain a challenge to territorial jurisdiction in the absence of demonstrated prejudice. The Supreme Court in that case noted that requiring the claimant to restart proceedings at another Tribunal would mean the same evidence being led all over again.
This position was reaffirmed in Malati Sardar v. National Insurance Company Limited, reported in (2016) 3 SCC 43, where the Supreme Court observed that the provision for territorial jurisdiction under Section 166 has to be interpreted consistently with the object of facilitating remedies for accident victims and that “hyper technical approach in such matters can hardly be appreciated.”
The court also drew on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Balveer Batra v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4072, which addressed a situation where a Tribunal decided jurisdiction only after years of proceedings. The Supreme Court there held that where a finding on territorial jurisdiction is returned after a long lapse of time and the remaining issues are effectively decided against the claimant solely because of the negative jurisdictional finding—without examining those issues on their merits—it defeats the purpose of the benevolent legislation. The court invoked the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit: no party should suffer for the mistake of a court.
On the question of waiver, Justice Rizvi referred to a four-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199, which drew a sharp distinction between inherent lack of jurisdiction (which goes to the root and cannot be waived) and territorial jurisdiction (which does not go to competence and can be waived). Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court noted, gives statutory recognition to that principle.
Admission of Additional Evidence
The High Court turned separately to the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Justice Rizvi noted that the provision is couched in negative terms: parties to an appeal have no entitlement as of right to adduce additional evidence. The three permissible grounds are: the lower court refused to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted; the party establishes that despite due diligence the evidence was not within its knowledge or could not be produced at the time the decree was passed; or the appellate court itself requires the evidence to pronounce judgment.
The court found that the school leaving certificate of 31 July 2014 had material bearing on the sole issue on which the claim was dismissed—the residence of the claimants at Sitapur. On the explanation that Smt. Santosh Singh could not produce it because her former counsel failed to advise her, the court applied the principle from Rafiq and Another v. Munshilal and Another, (1981) 2 SCC 788, holding that a party who has engaged a counsel and done everything expected of her cannot be made to suffer for the counsel's omission or inaction.
Since no objection or reply had been filed by the respondents to the application for additional evidence, the court allowed Application No. 15 of 2014 and took the school leaving certificate on record as additional evidence, treating it as admitted.
How the Court Reasoned on Jurisdiction
Justice Rizvi identified two independent grounds that undermined the Tribunal's dismissal. The first was the school leaving certificate now on record, which categorically recorded the address of Appellant No. 3 as Village Hempur, Post Neri Kalan, District Sitapur, corroborating Smt. Santosh Singh's affidavit that she had relocated to Sitapur with her children after the death of the deceased.
The second was a material circumstance already present in the Tribunal's own record that the Tribunal had failed to notice: National Insurance Company Limited had filed its written statement before the Tribunal with the place of swearing shown as Sitapur, which established that the insurer carried on business and maintained a branch in that district. Under the third limb of Section 166(2)—permitting a claim to be filed where the defendant resides or carries on business—this fact alone was sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Sitapur Tribunal. The court held that the Tribunal committed grave error in overlooking this circumstance while deciding Issue No. 8.
The court then emphasised the central failing in the Tribunal's approach: throughout the entire proceedings, no respondent raised any plea of prejudice attributable to the claim being heard at Sitapur. No material was placed on record to show that any party had suffered because of the Tribunal's location. The Tribunal itself allowed all evidence to be led without dealing with the jurisdictional issue as a preliminary question. Having permitted a complete trial to run its course, the Tribunal was not justified in nullifying the entire proceedings at the final adjudication stage on a purely technical basis.
Justice Rizvi held that rejecting the claim petition after the lapse of considerable time, solely on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, when witnesses had already been examined, would defeat the object of Section 166(2) and frustrate the remedial purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Allowing a technical objection to override the substantive rights of the dependants of the deceased was, in the court's view, impermissible.
Order
The High Court set aside the judgment and order dated 2 July 2014 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No. 7, Sitapur, in MAC Case No. 19 of 2013.
The matter was remanded to the MACT, Sitapur, with two specific directions. First, the Tribunal is directed to entertain MAC Case No. 19 of 2013 and decide it on its merits strictly in accordance with law. Second, since the accident occurred in 2012 and the claim petition was filed in 2013, the Tribunal is directed to decide the petition as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four months of receipt of a certified copy of the High Court's order.
The Registry was directed to transmit the original records of the claim petition to the MACT, Sitapur, forthwith. There was no order as to costs.