Allahabad HC Upholds Life Sentences in Kerosene Burning Murder, Rejects Challenge to Dying Declaration
The Lucknow Bench upheld convictions of two women for burning a daughter-in-law to death, finding the Magistrate-recorded dying declaration reliable despite inconsistencies in a parallel Section 161 statement.
The Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court has dismissed two connected criminal appeals and upheld the life imprisonment awarded to Smt. Sarita Devi and Smt. Malti Sharma (also referred to as Malti Devi) for the murder of Manisha Sharma, a daughter-in-law who was doused with kerosene and set ablaze at her matrimonial home in Lucknow on 27 October 2015. The Division Bench of Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava, with the judgment authored by Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava, found no illegality or perversity in the Additional Sessions Judge's conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The central contest before the High Court was whether material divergences between the dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate and a subsequent statement taken by the Investigating Officer were sufficient to destroy the prosecution case. The court held they were not.
The Incident and Trial Court Proceedings
Manisha Sharma was married to Kamlesh Sharma on 3 July 2003. Her brother, Manish Rai (PW-1), deposed that she faced continuous harassment at her matrimonial home and that her father-in-law, Vimal Sharma, had developed an illicit relationship with co-accused Malti Devi, which the deceased consistently opposed. This friction allegedly led all four accused — Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi, her son Shambhu Sharma, and Sarita Devi (wife of Shambhu Sharma) — to harbour deep animosity toward the deceased. On 12 July 2015, roughly three months before the incident, the deceased had submitted a written complaint about the harassment to Police Station Sarojini Nagar, Lucknow.
On the evening of 27 October 2015, at approximately 7:30 P.M., the deceased was attacked at her matrimonial residence in Village Chillawan, near Sunny Toyota, within the limits of Police Station Sarojini Nagar. Neighbours heard her screams and found her running from the house engulfed in flames. PW-3, Santosh Kumar Sahu, an independent local resident, deposed that he and a friend covered her with a bedsheet to extinguish the fire. She was rushed to the Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee (Civil) Hospital, Lucknow, where she was admitted to the Burn Ward at around 8:40 A.M. on 28 October 2015.
An FIR was registered on 28 October 2015 as Case Crime No. 426 of 2015 initially under Sections 307 and 326 IPC. The deceased was subsequently transferred to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, on 2 November 2015, and succumbed to her injuries on 4 November 2015 at 11:45 P.M. The case was then converted to Section 302 IPC. After investigation, Vimal Sharma and Shambhu Sharma were arrested and charge-sheeted first; Malti Devi and Sarita Devi were found to be absconding and were arrested on 1 May 2016, with a supplementary charge-sheet following.
The case was tried in Session Trial No. 641 of 2016 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 11, Lucknow. The prosecution examined ten witnesses and proved documentary exhibits including the written tehrir (Exhibit Ka-1), inquest report (Exhibit Ka-2), the Magistrate-recorded dying declaration (Exhibit Ka-3), and the post-mortem report (Exhibit Ka-4). FSL analysis of material objects confirmed traces of kerosene oil on half-burnt clothes and ash recovered from the scene. By judgment dated 4 April 2023, the Trial Court convicted Vimal Sharma, Malti Devi, and Sarita Devi under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, sentencing each to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000, with six months' additional rigorous imprisonment in default. The co-accused Shambhu Sharma was acquitted.
The Dying Declaration Dispute
The appellants' primary argument before the High Court was that the prosecution relied on multiple dying declarations that were irreconcilably inconsistent with one another.
The first dying declaration (Exhibit Ka-3) was recorded by Tehsildar Rajesh Kumar Srivastava (PW-2), functioning as Executive Magistrate, at the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, on 28 October 2015 at 8:44 A.M. In this declaration the deceased stated that after tea she went to her room, her father-in-law Vimal Sharma punched her causing her to hit the wall, the “daughter-in-law of his mistress” brought kerosene oil, and both Vimal Sharma and Malti Sharma sprinkled it and set her ablaze. Shambhu Sharma was not mentioned in this declaration.
The second statement, recorded by Sub-Inspector Akhilesh Dwivedi (PW-7) as a Section 161 CrPC statement on 29 October 2015, presented a different sequence: Vimal Sharma called Shambhu Sharma, who then gagged the deceased's mouth; Sarita Devi poured kerosene oil; Malti Devi handed over the matchbox; and Vimal Sharma set her on fire.
The appellants contended that in the Magistrate's declaration, it was Sarita Devi who only brought the kerosene (as the mistress's daughter-in-law), while in the Section 161 statement she was separately described as pouring it. They argued that Malti Devi's role shifted from actively sprinkling kerosene in the first declaration to merely handing a matchbox in the second. These variations, they submitted, rendered both declarations mutually destructive.
How the Bench Reasoned
The Division Bench framed the core question as whether the Trial Court had committed a legal error or perversity in convicting the appellants on the evidence available.
The court began with the legal framework. It noted that the statutory provision governing dying declarations, formerly Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is now encapsulated in Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. The bench invoked the maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri — a person will not meet their Maker with a lie in their mouth — and affirmed that a dying declaration, if voluntary, truthful, and free from external tutoring, can be the sole basis of conviction without independent corroboration.
For cases with multiple dying declarations, the bench applied the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2024) 13 SCC 660. Those principles require, among other things, that all declarations be voluntary and made in a fit state of mind, that inconsistencies be assessed for materiality, that the Magistrate-recorded declaration be preferred where inconsistencies exist (subject to it being truthful and free of suspicion), and that the medical fitness of the declarant at the relevant time be carefully examined.
Applying these principles, the bench drew a clear distinction between the Magistrate-recorded declaration and the Section 161 statement. PW-2, the Tehsildar, deposed that the deceased's voice was clear and intelligible when he recorded her statement, and that the attending doctor had certified her mentally fit beforehand. PW-10, Dr. Rahul Chaudhary, testified that he examined the patient at around 8:40 A.M. on 28 October 2015, certified her as fully conscious, oriented, and fit to make a voluntary statement, and then stepped outside the room while the Magistrate recorded the declaration. After the recording was complete, he examined her again and appended a second certification. He also stated in cross-examination that he had actively excluded Kamlesh Sharma and other relatives from the room before examining her.
The bench contrasted this with the Section 161 statement, observing that neither PW-1 (the informant) nor PW-7 (the Investigating Officer) was a medical expert capable of certifying the deceased's cognitive fitness at the moment they interacted with her. It held that it could not be conclusively presumed that the deceased was in a perfectly fit state of mind when giving the informal narrative to her brother or the statement to the IO. This reasoning led the court to accord overriding weight to the formal dying declaration before the Magistrate.
The bench also addressed the defence theory of self-immolation directly. The appellants relied on the cross-examination of PW-3, who stated that when the deceased ran out of the house, she appeared to be alone at that moment. The court examined PW-3's evidence carefully. PW-3 had also stated that the accused persons had shifted to a second house four or five houses away from the place of occurrence. The bench held that this proximity — a matter of a few houses — did not support any inference that the accused could not have been present at the time of the crime. Their departure before neighbours arrived was entirely consistent with the prosecution's account of immediate flight after the attack.
The court then pointed to a significant internal contradiction in the defence strategy. The appellants' counsel relied on the oral depositions of PW-3 and PW-4 to argue innocence. However, in their Section 313 CrPC examinations, both Malti Sharma and Sarita Sharma had explicitly denied the testimony of PW-3, calling it false. Similarly, they had dismissed PW-4 as a liar. Yet, crucially, when asked about the dying declaration recorded by PW-2, both appellants stated they had nothing to say. The bench found this telling: having disowned the witnesses their counsel relied upon, the appellants had offered no response to the core incriminating document.
The court rejected the suggestion that the deceased's reference to twelve years of struggle indicated mental distress pointing toward self-immolation. It held that this statement disclosed the historical backdrop of continuous torture, culminating in the attack, and could not by any stretch be read as evidence of suicide. The post-mortem findings of Dr. Ashish Kumar (PW-5) — ante-mortem flame burns covering approximately 80% of total body surface area, with signs of active infection and septicaemic shock as cause of death — further demolished the self-immolation theory.
The bench also relied on Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 17 SCC 735, for the proposition that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction; corroboration is a rule of prudence, not an absolute rule of law. It cited Jemaben v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2299, for the principle that minor discrepancies in the versions of prosecution witnesses do not justify discarding a solemn dying declaration made before an independent Magistrate if it forms a coherent chain of events.
On the question of the motive pleaded by the defence — that the deceased had allegedly pressured Vimal Sharma to deposit retirement funds into her personal bank account, causing her to self-immolate — the bench characterised this theory as highly speculative and entirely unsubstantiated by the record.
Outcome
The Division Bench found no illegality, infirmity, or perversity in the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 4 April 2023 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 11, Lucknow. Both Criminal Appeal No. 1491 of 2023 (Sarita Devi) and Criminal Appeal No. 1587 of 2023 (Malti Sharma) were dismissed. The conviction and sentence of both appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC — life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 each, with six months' rigorous imprisonment in default of fine — were upheld. Pending bail applications were also dismissed. A copy of the judgment along with the trial court record is to be transmitted to the Trial Court immediately for necessary compliance.