Jharkhand HC Dismisses Bias Challenge Against Lokayukta Who Decided Case Involving His Own Brother

The High Court of Jharkhand held that the doctrine of necessity permitted a single-member Lokayukta to decide a complaint touching his own brother, and found no illegality in the impugned order rejecting a demand for CBI or Accountant General investigation.

The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, in a judgment delivered on 9 June 2026, dismissed a writ petition that sought to invalidate an order of the Jharkhand Lokayukta on the twin grounds that the order was contrary to the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001 and that the Lokayukta had decided a complaint concerning his own brother in violation of the oath of office. Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, sitting singly, held that the Lokayukta had correctly applied the statute in declining to direct central agencies to investigate, and that the doctrine of necessity displaced any inference of bias given that the Lokayukta is a single-member institution with no other authority to whom the matter could have been referred.

The Dispute Before the Court

The petitioner, Satyadeo Roy, had been appointed as an Audit Officer at Ranchi University by order dated 1 August 2003. He resigned after a period, citing obstruction by the then Pro Vice Chancellor. His arrears from the University remained unpaid. He filed W.P.(C) No. 972/2010, which was disposed of on 5 January 2011 with a direction to the University to settle his claims. Despite that direction, he received only 25 per cent of the admissible bill, the remaining bills being untraceable because they were kept under lock and key and because an FIR had been registered against the then Finance Officer of Ranchi University.

While pursuing his arrears, Roy came across news reports about embezzlement of UGC funds at Ranchi University. He obtained a certified copy of FIR and seizure list in PS Case No. 364/2010 dated 1 June 2010, registered at Kotwali Police Station against Dr. S.K. Prasad, the then Finance Officer, and the proprietor of M/s ESOFTNET, Ranchi. On reading the FIR, Roy formed the view that respondent no. 3 — Sri Jyoti Kumar, who happened to be the brother of the then Lokayukta, Justice Amreshwar Sahay (Retd.) — was implicated throughout the chain of events as a signatory to all advice notes, yet the investigation against him had remained inconclusive.

Roy filed an application before the Lokayukta on 19 April 2012 seeking a direction for investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation or the Accountant General. The Lokayukta dismissed that application by order dated 30 April 2012, holding that both the CBI and the Accountant General are central agencies outside the Lokayukta's jurisdiction, and that the police were already investigating the matter.

Roy then filed W.P.(C) No. 656 of 2013 before the High Court, seeking a declaration that the order of 30 April 2012 was contrary to Section 19 read with Section 13(3)(ii) of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001, and a further declaration that the Lokayukta had violated his oath of office under Section 3(2) read with Schedule 1 of the Act by deciding a complaint touching his own brother without delegating the matter to another officer.

The Legal Issues

Two distinct questions arose. First, whether the Lokayukta had the statutory power to direct the CBI or the Accountant General to investigate, and whether the impugned order was therefore legally correct. Second, whether the Lokayukta was disqualified by bias from deciding the complaint at all, given that respondent no. 3 was his own brother, and whether Section 19 of the Act obliged him to delegate the matter to another officer.

The petitioner relied on P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee and Others, (2011) 8 SCC 380, particularly paragraph 41, for the proposition that a judge or quasi-judicial authority subject to an apprehension of bias is disqualified from acting, and that proceedings decided by such an authority are vitiated. He also relied on Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India and Another, (2018) 8 SCC 396, to establish that the High Court is competent to issue a declaratory writ.

How the Court Reasoned on Jurisdiction

On the first question, the court examined Section 13(3) of the Jharkhand Lokayukta Act, 2001. That provision allows the Lokayukta, for the purpose of conducting investigation, to utilise the services of any officer or investigation agency of the State Government with the concurrence of the State Government, or any other person or agency. The court read the phrase “any other person or agency” as confined to State agencies, consistent with the overall scheme of the sub-section.

The court also examined Section 8(1)(a) read with the Third Schedule (b) of the Act. Section 8 lists matters not subject to investigation by the Lokayukta. The Third Schedule (b) covers action taken for the purpose of investigating crime or protecting the security of the State. Since the police had already registered an FIR and were investigating the matter when the Lokayukta passed the impugned order, the court held that Section 8(1)(a) read with the Third Schedule independently barred the Lokayukta from ordering a parallel investigation.

The court further noted that a Government of Jharkhand notification dated 16 February 2006 had clarified that for the purpose of enquiry, the Lokayukta could direct State machinery such as the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, reinforcing that the Lokayukta's investigative reach was confined to State agencies. The prayer for a direction to the CBI or the Accountant General therefore fell outside the Lokayukta's statutory competence, and the impugned order was held to be legally correct on this ground.

How the Court Reasoned on Bias and the Doctrine of Necessity

On the bias question, the petitioner's argument rested on Section 19 of the Act, which confers a power to delegate. Section 19 reads that the Lokayukta may, by a general or special order in writing, direct that any powers conferred or duties imposed on him under the Act — except the power to make reports to the Governor under Section 12 — may also be exercised or discharged by such officers, employees or agencies as may be specified. The petitioner argued that the Lokayukta was obliged to invoke this provision and hand the matter to another officer rather than decide it himself.

The court rejected that argument on two grounds. First, it held that Section 19 is an administrative provision designed to manage operational workload and optimise human resources. The main power of giving a finding or final evaluation on a completed inquiry cannot be delegated under Section 19. The compilation and submission of annual or special reports to the Governor is also explicitly excluded. The provision does not require the Lokayukta to delegate quasi-judicial decision-making whenever a conflict of interest is alleged.

Second, and more fundamentally, the court applied the doctrine of necessity. The Jharkhand Lokayukta is a single-member institution. Unlike the Supreme Court or a High Court, where a judge who perceives a conflict can refer the matter to another bench with the permission of the Chief Justice, there is no other member of the Lokayukta to whom the matter could have been sent. The court drew on Election Commission of India and Another v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 104, where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for an authority to decide when there is no other authority available, and that if the choice is between allowing a potentially biased person to act or stifling the action altogether, the former must prevail.

Applying that principle, the court held that when the petitioner's application was filed before the Lokayukta and there was no other member to take a final decision, the Lokayukta had no option but to pass an appropriate order. The doctrine of necessity therefore displaced the rule against bias in these circumstances.

The court also noted that Section 16(2) of the Act provides that no proceeding of the Lokayukta shall be held bad for want of form except on the ground of jurisdiction. Reading Section 16(2) alongside the doctrine of necessity, the court concluded that bias was not proved against respondent no. 2.

The court further observed that the impugned order was not passed in favour of respondent no. 3. The Lokayukta had simply applied the law and dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds. An order adverse to neither party, grounded in a correct reading of the statute, did not disclose the kind of partiality that would vitiate proceedings.

Distinguishing the Relied-Upon Precedents

On P.D. Dinakaran (1), the court held that the facts and circumstances of that case were otherwise and that the question of the doctrine of necessity had not arisen there. The judgment was therefore not applicable to the present facts. On Shanti Bhushan, the court accepted the proposition that the High Court is competent to issue a declaratory writ, but held that no case for such a writ had been made out on the merits.

The court also took note of the subsequent history of the criminal case. The petitioner had separately filed W.P.(PIL) No. 5409 of 2012 seeking investigation against respondent no. 3. That PIL was disposed of by a Division Bench on 12 July 2016 after the State's counsel submitted that investigation was almost complete and a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be filed. The trial court thereafter disposed of the matter by judgment dated 5 October 2024. The court observed that by efflux of time the criminal case had been tried and concluded, leaving nothing further to investigate against respondent no. 3.

Order

The writ petition was dismissed. The court held that there was no illegality in the order dated 30 April 2012 passed by the Lokayukta, that bias against respondent no. 2 was not proved, and that no declaratory writ could be issued in terms of the prayers made. All pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.