Allahabad HC Refuses to Quash SC/ST Act Proceedings Against Shahabuddin Shaikh, Directs Applicants to Raise Grievances at Charge-Framing Stage

The Lucknow Bench declined to interfere with a charge sheet and summoning order in a BNS and SC/ST Act case, holding that disputed facts cannot be adjudicated under Section 528 BNSS.

The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, on 3 June 2026 disposed of a petition seeking to quash criminal proceedings arising from a case registered at Police Station Sirsiya, District Shrawasti. Justice Praveen Kumar Giri, sitting singly, declined to interfere with the charge sheet dated 14 October 2025 and the summoning order dated 8 January 2026 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Shrawasti. The court held that it could not adjudicate disputed questions of fact while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and directed the applicants to raise all grievances at the stage of framing of charge before the trial court.

The Case Before the Lucknow Bench

Shahabuddin Shaikh and two others filed Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 2155 of 2026 seeking two reliefs: first, quashing of the entire proceedings in Session Case No. 24/2026 (State v. Shahabuddin Shaikh and Others) pending before the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Shrawasti; and second, a stay on further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.

The case arose from Crime Case No. 0321/2025, registered at Police Station Sirsiya, District Shrawasti. The charge sheet was filed under Sections 119(1), 115(2), 352, 351(3), and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — corresponding to the old Sections 327, 323, 504, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code — along with Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha), 3(2)(va), and 3(1)(f) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The offences are triable by the Sessions Court.

Counsel for the applicants, Shri Ankur Pandey, argued that no incident as alleged in the FIR had ever taken place and that the Investigating Officer had not collected any evidence capable of attracting the sections under which the charge sheet was submitted. The cognizance-cum-summoning order was therefore challenged as unsustainable.

The State's Response and the Legal Framework It Relied Upon

Shri Vivek Gupta, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State, countered on several fronts.

On the nature of an FIR, he relied on a line of Supreme Court decisions — V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2015) 9 SCC 588; Latesh alias Dadu Baburao Karlekar v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 66; and Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1 — for the proposition that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the event and its primary purpose is to inform the police of a cognizable offence so that investigation can begin.

He also drew the court's attention to paragraph 25 of the Supreme Court's recent decision in B.N. John v. State of U.P. and Another, [2025] 1 SCR 12 : 2025 INSC 4, which reiterated that while an FIR need not contain all detailed facts, it must disclose the nature of the offence alleged; otherwise it would be susceptible to quashing. The passage quoted the earlier observation in CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175, that what is significant is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and provide a basis for the police officer to suspect its commission.

On the validity of the summoning order, the State argued that the Special Court had taken cognizance in accordance with the law laid down in State of Gujarat v. Girish Radhakrishnan Varde, (2014) 3 SCC 659. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of that decision, quoted by the court, make clear that after submission of a charge sheet in a police case, the magistrate forms an opinion on whether to take cognizance but cannot add or subtract sections; that exercise is reserved for the trial court at the stage of framing of charge under the relevant provisions of the Code.

The State further submitted that in a case based on a police report, the magistrate is not required to record reasons for issuing summons. This position was supported by State of Gujarat v. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta, (2019) 20 SCC 539, as confirmed in paragraph 91 of Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19 SCC 62. The court in those cases held that because the magistrate has the advantage of the charge sheet, witness statements, and other investigation material, no separate reasoning is required when issuing process on a police report.

On the limits of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction, the State relied on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akhil Sharda, (2023) 11 SCC 626; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399; and Naresh Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 2 SCC 604, all of which hold that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) is not empowered to conduct a mini trial.

The State also pointed out that the material collected by the Investigating Officer during investigation cannot be treated as evidence under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, until witnesses are examined on oath in examination-in-chief and cross-examined, and documents are proved during trial. The cognizance-cum-summoning order, it was submitted, suffered from no irregularity that would vitiate the proceedings under Section 507 BNSS (corresponding to Section 461 CrPC).

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Giri accepted the State's position in its entirety. The court found no illegality or infirmity in the impugned cognizance-cum-summoning order that would justify granting relief at this stage.

The court's reasoning rested on two pillars. First, the inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS does not permit the High Court to adjudicate disputed questions of fact — a principle settled by the Supreme Court in the catena of judgments cited by the State. The applicants' core contention that no incident had taken place and that no evidence had been collected was precisely the kind of disputed factual question that cannot be resolved in such proceedings.

Second, the appropriate forum and stage for the applicants' grievances is the trial court at the time of framing of charge. Section 250 BNSS (corresponding to Section 227 CrPC) provides that the accused may prefer an application for discharge within sixty days of commitment of the case, and the Sessions Judge must hear both sides before deciding whether sufficient ground exists to proceed. The court noted that the offences under Sections 119(1), 115(2), 352, 351(3), and 3(5) BNS and the SC/ST Act provisions are triable by the Sessions Court, and the accused-applicants would have an opportunity of hearing at the stage of framing of charge under Section 262(2) BNSS (corresponding to Section 239 CrPC).

The court directed the trial court to evaluate all materials collected by the Investigating Officer and consider the case of the applicants at the time of framing of charge, strictly in accordance with law.

Outcome

The application was disposed of. No stay on the proceedings in Session Case No. 24/2026 before the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Shrawasti was granted. The applicants were left to pursue their remedies at the charge-framing stage before the trial court.