Allahabad HC Rejects State's Leave to Appeal Against Rape Acquittal, Finds Trial Court Took a Possible View

The Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench dismissed the State of UP's appeal against acquittal of two accused under Sections 376 and 452 IPC, holding the trial court's view was legally sustainable and not perverse.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at its Lucknow Bench has refused to grant the State of Uttar Pradesh leave to appeal against the acquittal of two accused persons charged with rape and house trespass. Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava, deciding Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal) No. 196 of 2019, found that the Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court, Gonda had reached a view that was entirely possible on the evidence before it. Since the threshold for interference with an acquittal was not met, the leave application was rejected and the government appeal was dismissed on the same day.

The Prosecution Case and the Trial Court's Decision

The FIR in this matter was registered on 12 April 2014 at Police Station Umri Begumganj, District Gonda, under Sections 376, 323, and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that at about 7.00 p.m. on that date, accused Babloo @ Ashok Singh entered the informant-victim's house, caught her hand, pulled her into a room, undressed her, and committed rape. Co-accused Maksoodan was alleged to have assaulted the victim's husband and father-in-law when they attempted to intervene.

Seven prosecution witnesses were examined, including the victim as PW-1, her relative Radhe as PW-2, the examining doctor Dr. Karuna Gupta as PW-3, Investigating Officer Awadesh Singh as PW-4, Dr. V.K. Gupta as PW-5, Lady Constable Neha Singh as PW-6, and Head Constable Sachhidanand Mishra as PW-7. The defence examined two witnesses — Praveen Singh (DW-1) and Ram Bahadur (DW-2) — both of whom deposed that the accused had been falsely implicated on account of village rivalry and election enmity.

By judgment dated 23 July 2019, Sessions Trial No. 443 of 2016, the trial court convicted both Babloo @ Ashok Singh and Maksoodan under Section 323 IPC. However, it acquitted Babloo @ Ashok Singh of the charges under Sections 376 and 452 IPC, and acquitted Maksoodan of the charge under Section 452 IPC. The State challenged these acquittals by filing the present leave application under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Why the Trial Court Acquitted on the Rape and Trespass Charges

The trial court's reasoning for acquittal rested on several factual findings. It observed that the alleged incident took place at 7.00 p.m. when all family members of the victim were present in the house. Given that setting, the court found it not possible for the accused to have dragged and raped the victim without interference. The victim, a married woman with five children, had stated that the accused threw her, dragged her, and committed rape, yet Dr. Karuna Gupta (PW-3) found no external or internal injury on her person, and no abrasion or marks on her back.

The trial court also found material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses, which were not corroborated by cogent or reliable evidence. The victim's own statement was found to contain contradictions and a shifting of stand on the question of rape. The court noted that no independent witness was examined in support of the prosecution's case on the rape charge. The defence witnesses' account of false implication was not dislodged. On these findings, the accused were given the benefit of doubt and acquitted of the rape and trespass charges.

The State's Challenge Before the High Court

Sri Anurag Verma, learned Additional Government Advocate, argued before the Division Bench that the trial court had erred in appreciating the evidence. His principal submission was that the court had acted inconsistently by accepting part of the victim's evidence — enough to convict for the assault under Section 323 — while rejecting her testimony on the rape charge. He urged that the victim's evidence must be read as a whole, and that her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC was consistent with her deposition before the court. He also argued that the trial court had given undue weight to the defence evidence and that the findings were not a possible view.

How the Bench Reasoned on Interference With Acquittal

The Division Bench began its analysis by surveying the settled legal position on appeals against acquittal before applying it to the facts. It drew upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Bannareddy and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, where the Apex Court had cautioned that the High Court should not reappreciate evidence in its entirety when there is no grave infirmity in the trial court's findings, and that there is no justification for setting aside an acquittal when the prosecution case itself suffers from contradictions and infirmities.

The bench then referred to Jayamma v. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, where the Supreme Court had articulated the limits of the High Court's power under Section 378 CrPC. The High Court may not set aside an acquittal merely because it finds its own view more probable. It must find that the trial court's view was perverse, or that there was a complete misreading of material evidence leading to miscarriage of justice, before interfering. The self-restraint doctrine was described in that case as not denuding the High Court of its power to re-appreciate evidence, but as requiring a threshold of perversity before that power is exercised.

The bench also relied on its own earlier Division Bench decision in Virendra Singh v. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, which had collated the Supreme Court's guidelines on acquittal appeals. Those guidelines, drawn from decisions including Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, and Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450, affirm that while an appellate court has full power to re-appreciate evidence, it must remember that an acquittal reinforces the double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Where two reasonable conclusions are possible on the evidence, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal.

Applying these principles, the bench examined the record and found the trial court's approach sound. It accepted that all family members of the victim were present at the time of the alleged incident and that the victim had not stated she raised any alarm. The medical evidence of Dr. Karuna Gupta (PW-3) showed no external or internal injury on the victim's private parts. No independent witness supported the prosecution case on rape. Defence witnesses DW-1 and DW-2 had deposed about false implication due to village rivalry and election enmity, and this evidence remained unchallenged. The bench also found material discrepancy in the victim's statement on the commission of rape, concluding she was not a sterling witness on that point.

On these facts, the bench held that “the trial Court has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this Court taking a different view.” The State had not demonstrated that the trial court's conclusions were perverse, impossible, or based on a misreading of evidence.

Outcome

The Division Bench rejected the Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal) No. 196 of 2019 filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Consequent upon the rejection of the leave application, the government appeal was also dismissed. The order was dictated by Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava and pronounced by the bench on 7 July 2026.