Allahabad HC Dismisses Muslim Girl Student's Petition to Wear Headscarf Over School Uniform at Tagore Public School, Prayagraj
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissed a writ petition seeking a mandamus to allow a Class-XI applicant to add a headscarf to her school's prescribed uniform, holding that the dress code authority rests with the institution and that no enforceable fundamental right to modify a uniform had been established.
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, in a judgment delivered by Justice J.J. Munir on behalf of a Division Bench he shared with Justice Indrajeet Shukla, dismissed a writ petition filed by Sukaina Rizvi, a minor student, through her mother. Rizvi had passed Class X from Tagore Public School, Attarsuiya, Prayagraj — a private unaided institution affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) — and sought admission to Class XI there. The School refused her admission on the ground that she insisted on wearing a headscarf in addition to the prescribed uniform. The petition asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the School to permit the headscarf. The Division Bench declined, holding that so long as a school's dress code is uniform, bona fide, non-discriminatory and intended to maintain discipline and institutional identity, the authority to determine that uniform lies with the school, not with individual students.
The Dispute Before the High Court
Rizvi had studied at Tagore Public School from Class VI to Class X. According to the writ petition, she had worn a headscarf throughout those years and no objection was raised by the School. Her ID cards and group photographs from Classes VIII, IX and X, appended to the petition, showed her in school uniform with the headscarf added to her attire.
When she sought admission to Class XI, the School refused, insisting she could not wear the headscarf. There was no written order of refusal, but the stand was not in dispute. Rizvi approached the District Magistrate, Prayagraj, by applications dated 14 May 2026 and 10 June 2026, requesting intervention so that she could continue her education without discrimination.
The District Magistrate, though without jurisdiction over a private unaided CBSE-affiliated school, called for a report from the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS). The DIOS caused the School Principal's statement to be recorded by the Assistant DIOS, who summoned both the Principal and the petitioner and heard them. The Assistant DIOS submitted a report on 10 July 2026, which was incorporated by the DIOS into his own report dated 13 July 2026 to the District Magistrate.
The Principal's position, as recorded, was that the School is a co-education institution with a uniform dress code followed by all students. Other girls from the same religious community complied with the dress code. Permitting one student to sit in class with a headscarf would violate the dress code and, in the circumstances, granting an exemption to one student would affect the administration of the school. The Assistant DIOS himself remarked in the report that the School, as a self-financed CBSE institution, had the freedom to enforce its internal discipline and that it did not appear feasible to permit a particular student to violate the dress code and by exerting pressure, secure admission.
The Petitioner's Constitutional Claims
In the writ petition, Rizvi made three broad constitutional claims. First, she argued that wearing a headscarf was an essential religious practice protected under Article 25 of the Constitution and that she, as a Muslim of the Shia community, could not be compelled to forsake it as a condition of admission. Second, she argued that the headscarf was part of her freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a). Third, she argued that the School's conduct was discriminatory and violated Article 14, particularly because the School otherwise permitted girls to wear any formal and decent Indian or western non-revealing dress, yet treated the headscarf as something indecent.
The State and the CBSE, through their respective counsel, opposed the petition. The Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State submitted that the prescription of a school uniform is a matter within the policy of the school administration, aimed at upholding uniformity, and that no fundamental right to practise, profess or propagate religion was genuinely at stake. Counsel for the CBSE supported that position.
How the Division Bench Reasoned
Justice Munir, writing for the Bench, framed the core question as whether an individual student can insist, as a matter of enforceable rights, upon an addition to the uniformly prescribed dress code. The Bench's answer was clear: where the dress code is uniform, bona fide, non-discriminatory, and intended to maintain discipline and institutional identity, the choice of the prescribed uniform lies primarily within the domain of the school.
The Bench addressed the argument based on past practice directly. Rizvi had worn the headscarf in lower classes without any formal objection. The Bench held that this could not, by itself, create a vested or enforceable right to compel the school to relax its uniform policy for Class XI admission. The school's earlier non-enforcement could be attributed to lethargy, inaction, lack of will, even courtesy — but none of these would give rise to an estoppel when the school decides to enforce its dress code. The Bench also noted it was open to a school to change or enforce its uniform policy and that students must adhere to it.
On the role of Article 226, the Bench observed that the High Court would be reluctant to substitute its opinion for that of the policy maker in a matter such as adherence to a prescribed dress code, absent a brazen violation of fundamental rights. The Bench explained the purposes served by a uniform: it instils discipline, creates equality among children, projects institutional identity, and promotes a religion-neutral classroom atmosphere because it applies to all students regardless of their faith.
The Bench relied on Pradeep Kumar Srivastava v. Ministry of Human Resource Development, New Delhi and others, 2014:AHC:79135-DB, a Division Bench decision of the same Court, which had repelled a challenge to a school dress code prescribing skirts for girl students, cautioning against judicial interference with institutional uniform policy.
On the essential religious practice argument, the Bench aligned itself with a consistent line of High Court authority. It referred to Fathima Thasneem (Minor) and another v. State of Kerala and others, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 5267, where the Kerala High Court held that when a student's individual right to dress is claimed against a private institution's equally fundamental right to manage and administer, individual interest must yield to the larger institutional interest. The Kerala High Court had said that it is purely within the domain of the institution to decide whether a student can attend class with a headscarf, and that the Court cannot even direct the institution to consider such a request.
The Bench also referred to Fathema Hussain Sayed a Minor v. Bharat Education Society and others, 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 713, where a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that asking a student in a class to maintain the dress code prescribed by the school could not be said to violate her fundamental right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 25. The Bombay Court had examined verse 31 of Chapter 24 of the Holy Quran and held that a girl student not wearing a head covering while studying in an all-girls section cannot be said to be acting inconsistently with that verse or violating any injunction in Islam.
Most extensively, the Bench engaged with the Full Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in Resham v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 1 HCC (Kar) 43. The Full Bench had answered four questions: whether wearing a hijab or headscarf is an essential religious practice in Islam protected by Article 25; whether prescription of school uniform violates fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21; whether the Government Order dated 5 February 2022 was constitutionally valid; and connected questions. On the first question, the Karnataka Full Bench held that wearing hijab by Muslim women does not form part of essential religious practice in Islamic faith, and that the petitioners before it had miserably failed to meet the threshold requirement of pleadings and proof. On the second question, the Full Bench held that permitting the headscarf alongside the prescribed uniform would mean the uniform ceases to be a uniform, creating two categories of students — those who wear the uniform with the headscarf and those who do not — establishing a sense of social separateness, which it held was not desirable.
The Allahabad Division Bench was aware that the validity of Resham reached the Supreme Court in Aishat Shifa (Hijab Case-2 J.) v. State of Karnataka and others, (2023) 2 SCC 1, where a two-judge Bench delivered a split verdict — Justice Hemant Gupta dismissed the appeals, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia allowed them — and the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Bench. The Division Bench noted that there is no authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement finally settling the issue. It treated the Karnataka Full Bench as persuasive authority of great value and found no reason to depart from it.
The Bench also considered the petitioner's reference to an interim order of the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 34086 of 2024, passed on 9 August 2024, staying a clause of the Bombay High Court's judgment in Zainab Abdul Qayyum Choudhary and others v. Chembur Trombay Education Society's, N.G. Acharya and D.K. Marathe College of Art, Science and Commerce and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1925, to the extent it prohibited hijab, cap or badge. The Division Bench held that an interim order without reasons is not a binding precedent. “It is only reasons, which bind.” The consistent, preponderant and reasoned opinion of multiple High Courts would therefore carry persuasive precedential weight.
The Absence of Factual Foundation for the Article 25 Claim
The Bench separately addressed the pleadings in the writ petition on the essential religious practice point. It found that the assertion that wearing a headscarf is an essential religious practice was a bare assertion unsupported by any authoritative religious text, affidavit from any religious scholar, or material on record sufficient to establish that the practice is obligatory and that non-observance would alter the fundamental character of the petitioner's faith. The pleadings contained no such foundation except the statement that she had been wearing the scarf since childhood and since she joined the School in Class VI.
The Bench examined photographs submitted by the petitioner from various classes. It observed that except for Rizvi, no other girl student — including those belonging to the same religious community — was wearing a headscarf. Wherever the issue had arisen before High Courts, they had been unanimous that wearing a headscarf is not an essential part of Islamic faith for a woman to don in the absence of which faith would be jeopardised. In the absence of the necessary pleading and material, the Bench said it was unable to hold in the petitioner's favour on this ground.
On the School's Jurisdictional Status
The Bench remarked that the District Magistrate had no control over the School, it being a private unaided institution affiliated to the CBSE. Similarly, the DIOS had no jurisdiction over such a school. The Bench did not hold that the School was beyond writ jurisdiction, reasoning that education is a public function entrusted to private hands. But on the merits, the School was not seeking to curtail the petitioner's freedom of faith. All it required was conformity to institutional discipline, of which a uniform is an essential part. Permitting individual students to depart even a little from the prescribed uniform on subjective grounds would transfer the authority to determine school discipline from the institution to the individual student.
Order
The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition. There was no order as to costs. The judgment was dated 21 August 2026 and was delivered by Justice J.J. Munir, with Justice Indrajeet Shukla concurring.