Small Cause Court Cannot Dismiss Suit on Merits After Finding Bona Fide Title Dispute, Allahabad HC Rules

The Allahabad High Court set aside a Small Cause Court decree that dismissed an eviction suit on merits despite its own finding of a serious, competing title dispute between the parties, holding that the only lawful course was to return the plaint under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.

A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, sitting in Court No. 35, allowed a civil revision filed by the plaintiff-revisionist and set aside the judgment and decree dated 30 October 2025 passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Etah in S.C.C. Suit No. 11 of 2010. The trial court had dismissed an eviction and rent-recovery suit on merits even after recording a categorical finding that two rival chains of title existed and that the title dispute was serious, substantial, and bona fide. The High Court held that once such a finding is recorded, the Small Cause Court is required to return the plaint for presentation before a competent civil court under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, and has no jurisdiction to decide the suit on merits.

The Eviction Suit and the Competing Title Claims

The revisionist, Suresh Shah Sisodiya, claimed to have become the owner and landlord of the disputed tenanted premises on 7 November 2008 by virtue of a registered lease deed executed by the managers of temple property — Shri Raj Rajeshwar Maharaj Mahadev Ji Maharaj Virajman Mandir. He asserted that the opposite party, Jai Prakash Yadav, was already in occupation as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 3,500, and that upon execution of the lease deed, the revisionist stepped into the shoes of the erstwhile landlord.

The revisionist further pleaded that the tenant defaulted in payment of rent. Notices terminating the tenancy were issued and served, but the tenant neither vacated the premises nor cleared the arrears. This led to the institution of S.C.C. Suit No. 11 of 2010 before the Small Cause Court at Etah, seeking eviction, recovery of arrears of rent, and damages for use and occupation.

The defendant-tenant contested the suit by specifically denying any landlord-tenant relationship with the revisionist. He set up an independent and competing chain of title through one Shishupal Singh, supported by registered sale deeds tracing back to earlier transactions, and asserted that he continued to be a tenant under Shishupal Singh and not under the plaintiff.

What the Trial Court Found — and What It Did Instead

After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court recorded findings that the plaintiff had failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, that two rival chains of title had been set up by the parties, and that the dispute regarding title was serious, substantial, and bona fide in nature.

Despite reaching those conclusions, the trial court did not invoke Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 to return the plaint. Instead, it proceeded to dismiss the suit on merits. That dismissal is what the revisionist challenged before the High Court.

Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887

Section 23 provides that when the right of a plaintiff and the relief claimed in a Court of Small Causes depend upon proof or disproof of a title to immovable property or other title which such a court cannot finally determine, the court may at any stage of the proceedings return the plaint to be presented to a court having jurisdiction to determine the title. On return of the plaint, the court is required to comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure, make such order as to costs as it deems just, and the court is deemed, for purposes of the Limitation Act, to have been unable to entertain the suit by reason of a cause akin to a defect of jurisdiction.

The High Court explained that the provision embodies a jurisdictional limitation on the summary powers of the Small Cause Court. It operates as a mechanism to ensure that disputes requiring final adjudication of title are not decided in a forum not competent to conclusively determine such issues. The provision preserves the distinction between the summary jurisdiction exercised in rent and eviction matters and the plenary jurisdiction vested in ordinary civil courts for adjudication of complex proprietary disputes.

How the Bench Reasoned

Dr. Justice Srivastava drew a careful distinction between incidental examination of title and final adjudication of title. A mere denial of title by a defendant does not, by itself, attract Section 23. In suits for eviction and arrears of rent, the principal issue is ordinarily the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, not adjudication of absolute title. The Small Cause Court is competent to incidentally examine questions of title to a limited extent for the purpose of determining that relationship, and such incidental scrutiny does not amount to a final declaration of ownership.

The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Shamim Akhtar v. Iqbal Ahmad, (2000) 8 SCC 123, which clarified that a Court of Small Causes can incidentally examine questions of title for the limited purpose of determining the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, and that such incidental findings do not amount to final adjudication. The Supreme Court had further held that the power under Section 23 is to be exercised only where the relief claimed is inseparably dependent upon final determination of title, and that a tenant cannot avoid eviction proceedings merely by denying the landlord's title or raising collateral disputes.

The court also drew on Budhu Mal v. Mahabir Prasad, (1988) 4 SCC 194, for the proposition that the power to return the plaint is to be exercised in those cases where doing so is necessary to ensure complete justice between the parties and to avoid prejudice arising from adjudication by an inappropriate forum.

The High Court was clear that a defendant cannot, by merely raising a plea of title, convert a summary eviction proceeding into a regular title suit. Section 23 must be construed in a manner that prevents procedural subversion while preserving the legislative object of providing a speedy remedy in landlord-tenant disputes. A tenant cannot be permitted to frustrate summary proceedings by setting up a bald, illusory, or superficial dispute of title.

At the same time, the court held, where the controversy is genuine, substantial, and supported by material disclosing competing claims of ownership going to the very root of the landlord-tenant relationship, the court must recognise the limits of its summary jurisdiction. The discretion conferred by Section 23 is judicial in nature and must be exercised upon examination of the real controversy. Where the dispute of title is real, substantial, supported by material on record, and goes to the root of the landlord-tenant relationship, and adjudication of the plaintiff's right and relief necessarily depends upon determination of a substantial and intricate question of title, the proper course is to return the plaint for presentation before the competent civil court.

The court was equally emphatic that Section 23 does not contemplate dismissal of the suit in such circumstances. Dismissal would defeat the very purpose of the provision and may seriously prejudice the rights of the parties by foreclosing adjudication before the proper forum.

The Jurisdictional Error in the Trial Court's Approach

Applying these principles to the facts, the High Court found that the trial court had itself recorded a categorical finding that two competing chains of title existed and that the dispute was serious, substantial, and bona fide. Having reached that conclusion, the trial court ought to have exercised jurisdiction under Section 23 by returning the plaint for presentation before the competent civil court.

The dismissal of the suit on merits, despite those findings, amounted to a jurisdictional error in two respects: the court below failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law, and simultaneously assumed jurisdiction to decide issues falling beyond the permissible scope of its summary powers.

Counsel for the respondents did not dispute the legal position regarding the scope and ambit of Section 23, and did not controvert that where the Court of Small Causes forms an opinion that adjudication of the dispute would necessarily involve determination of complex and substantial questions relating to title, the proper course in law is to return the plaint for presentation before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Order

The High Court set aside the judgment and decree dated 30 October 2025 passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Etah in S.C.C. Suit No. 11 of 2010. The Judge, Small Causes was directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation before the appropriate court, as contemplated under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. The revision was allowed.