Allahabad HC Sets Aside POSH Inquiry Against HRI Astrophysicist, Orders Fresh Proceedings After Finding Victims' Statements Were Never Recorded
The Allahabad High Court quashed a censure order against an Associate Professor at Harish Chandra Research Institute, finding the ICC inquiry violated natural justice by never recording complainants' statements or granting cross-examination.
Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, sitting singly at the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, on 7 May 2026 set aside an order dated 9 July 2017 by which the Governing Council of Harish Chandra Research Institute, Allahabad (“HCRI”) had imposed a penalty of ‘Censure’ on Dr. Tapas Kumar Das, an Associate Professor-G in Astrophysics, and barred him from supervising any female students, post-doctoral fellows, or research associates. The court found that the Internal Complaints Committee had concluded its inquiry without recording the statements of any complainant and without affording Dr. Das an opportunity of oral hearing or cross-examination — a failure that struck at the root of the proceedings under Section 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and Rule 7 of the Rules made thereunder. The matter has been remitted to the ICC for a fresh decision, beginning with a reasoned determination on whether the complaints are barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Act.
The Dispute Before the Court
Dr. Das challenged Writ-A No. 12736 of 2018 before the Allahabad High Court, impugning the order of 9 July 2017 passed by the Chairman, Governing Council of HCRI. That order followed an inquiry by the ICC — also referred to in the record as the Women's Grievances' Cell — which had received as many as ten complaints of sexual harassment against Dr. Das from female students and post-doctoral fellows who had worked under him.
The ICC's summary described the complaints as spanning the period 2013 to 2016, characterised Dr. Das as a “serial harasser and repeat offender,” and recommended a range of punishments including suspension, stoppage of increment, and a bar on taking female students. The Governing Council, after considering the ICC report and Dr. Das's responses, imposed a penalty of Censure and directed that he not be permitted to take any female students, post-doctoral fellows, or research associates to work with him.
The complaints themselves, extracts of which were placed before the court, described incidents including unwelcome physical contact, late-night summons to a closed office, sexually coloured remarks, sharing of a link to pornographic content, and Facebook messages of an inappropriate nature. One complainant described being physically restrained inside Dr. Das's office after she resisted his advances.
The Procedural and Legal Issues
Two distinct legal issues arose before the court. The first was whether the ICC had followed the mandatory procedure for inquiry prescribed under Section 11 of the POSH Act read with Rule 7 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013. The second was whether the complaints were barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Act, which requires a complaint to be filed within three months of the incident, extendable by a further three months in exceptional circumstances — giving a maximum window of six months from the date of the last incident.
Senior Advocate for Dr. Das argued that the POSH Act is a special statute whose provisions must be followed strictly. He submitted that the complaints related to alleged incidents between 2013 and 2016, were filed beyond the six-month outer limit under Section 9, were undated, and did not specify the dates of individual incidents. He relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in X v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1964, which held that a complaint patently barred by limitation may be rejected at the threshold on the analogy of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, without requiring the other side to participate.
On procedure, the Senior Advocate submitted that the ICC had not recorded the statements of any complainant, had not provided Dr. Das with an opportunity to cross-examine the complainants, and had not granted him any oral hearing. He argued that the inquiry report and the consequent order were therefore unsustainable.
Counsel for HCRI, while opposing the limitation argument, conceded — or at least could not demonstrate to the court's satisfaction — that the statements of the victims had been recorded before the ICC, that Dr. Das had been granted a personal hearing, or that the impugned order reflected any specific consideration of the individual allegations. Counsel for the respondents submitted that if the court found procedural defects, the matter should be remitted to the ICC to recommence from the stage of a fresh reply by Dr. Das.
How the Court Reasoned
The court began by examining Section 11 of the POSH Act and Rule 7 of the Rules. Section 11 requires the ICC to conduct the inquiry in accordance with applicable service rules or, where none exist, in the prescribed manner, and mandates that both parties be given an opportunity of being heard and that a copy of the findings be made available to both parties. Rule 7 requires the ICC to conduct the inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and empowers the committee to summon and examine witnesses on oath in the manner of a civil court.
The court found that the ICC report contained no reference to whether the statements of the complainants had been recorded before the committee. There was equally no reference to whether copies of those statements had been provided to Dr. Das, whether he had been asked to cross-examine the complainants, or whether he had been given any opportunity of oral hearing. The Senior Advocate for HCRI was unable to satisfy the court on any of these points.
On that basis, the court held that the procedure adopted by the ICC was defective and that its outcome — the inquiry report, the Council's decision, and the order of 9 July 2017 — could not be sustained.
The court then turned to the limitation question under Section 9. It acknowledged that the complaints did not mention specific dates of incidents and that the court was not in a position to determine precisely when the complaints had been filed with the ICC. It took note of the Supreme Court's observations in X v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti that in certain circumstances delay may not be treated as fatal at the threshold, particularly where complainants were working under the delinquent and delay in approaching the committee was explicable by the power imbalance and the potential impact on their careers.
The court observed that the complaints could not be rejected at the threshold without specific consideration of the time period of the allegations, the dates on which the complaints were actually filed, and any explanation offered by the complainants for the delay. It therefore declined to dismiss the complaints outright on limitation grounds, but directed the ICC to address this question first, with a reasoned decision, before proceeding to any inquiry on the merits.
The court was careful to delineate the scope of Dr. Das's participation at the fresh stage. His right to participate in the inquiry would arise only if the ICC, after its reasoned consideration of the limitation issue, decided to proceed further. At the threshold stage of determining whether the complaints should be entertained at all, Dr. Das's locus to participate had not yet arisen.
The Complaints and the ICC's Findings
The court reproduced extracts from several complaints placed on record, without identifying the complainants. These described a pattern of conduct including: an offer to share a hotel room during a trip to Varanasi; late-night calls and insistence on meetings at night in a closed office; Facebook messages unrelated to academic work; remarks about masturbation and incest under the guise of philosophical discussion; unwelcome physical contact including holding a student's hand and attempting to pull her onto his lap; and an incident in which a student was allegedly prevented from leaving the office and told not to speak of what had happened.
The ICC's summary had found that at least three complaints were of a very serious nature, that one had documentary evidence, and that two others were corroborated by other students. The committee had also found that Dr. Das had admitted in a meeting on 20 July 2016 to sending a link to pornographic content to one of the complainants, and had later denied this in his written response — a contradiction the committee found indicative of untruthfulness.
The court noted that the contents of the complaints fell within the definition of “sexual harassment” under Section 2(n) of the POSH Act, which covers physical contact and advances, sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, and any other unwelcome physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature. This observation was made in the context of explaining why the complaints could not be dismissed at the threshold without proper consideration, not as a finding of guilt.
The Limitation Question Under Section 9
Section 9 of the POSH Act permits a complaint to be filed within three months of the incident, or within three months of the last incident in a series, with a further extension of up to three months available if the ICC records reasons in writing for being satisfied that circumstances prevented earlier filing. The outer limit is therefore six months from the last incident.
The ICC had itself noted in its report of 17 August 2016 that the incidents had not been reported within three or six months, but had proceeded on the basis that the complaints were extremely serious and multiple. Dr. Das's counsel argued that the POSH Act, as a special statute, did not permit any such departure from the prescribed time limits.
The court did not resolve this question finally. It directed the ICC to examine, with reference to the specific time period of each allegation and the date each complaint was received, whether the complaints were within limitation or whether any explanation for delay warranted condonation. The ICC was required to pass a reasoned order on this issue before taking any further step.
Order
The impugned order dated 9 July 2017 imposing the penalty of Censure on Dr. Tapas Kumar Das and barring him from supervising female students, post-doctoral fellows, and research associates was set aside.
The ICC of HCRI, Allahabad was directed to consider all complaints afresh. It must first examine the time period of each allegation, the specific date on which each complaint was filed, and any explanation offered by the complainants for approaching the committee at a belated stage. On the basis of that examination, the ICC must pass a reasoned decision on whether the complaints are to be rejected at the threshold or whether the inquiry is to proceed. A copy of that decision is to be provided to Dr. Das, though he has no right to participate at this stage. If the ICC decides to proceed with the inquiry, it must do so in the manner prescribed under Section 11 of the POSH Act and Rule 7 of the Rules, including recording the statements of complainants and affording Dr. Das an opportunity of cross-examination and oral hearing.
The fresh decision on the threshold question was directed to be passed within eight weeks from 7 May 2026. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.