Justice A. Sreedharan Justice J.K. Upadhyay Allahabad HC ACQUITTAL Husband acquitted after 39-yearwait as homicide proof collapses
[ High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ]

Allahabad HC Acquits Husband in 1979 Dowry Death After Four-Year FIR Delay and Contradictory Medical Evidence

The Division Bench set aside a 1987 life-sentence conviction, citing a four-and-a-half-year delay in lodging the FIR, conflicting postmortem opinions, and the prosecution's failure to prove homicide beyond reasonable doubt.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on 30 July 2026 acquitted Triveni, the husband of a woman who died on 30 June 1979, allegedly on account of an unfulfilled dowry demand for a motorcycle. The bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay, with the judgment authored by Justice Jai Krishna Upadhyay, reversed a conviction and life sentence imposed by the 2nd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Azamgarh in Session Trial No. 185 of 1984. The court found that the prosecution had not proved the homicidal nature of the death, could not explain why the FIR was filed more than four years after the incident, and had produced medical evidence that directly contradicted itself on the cause of death.

The Conviction That Prompted the Appeal

The trial court in its judgment dated 8 May 1987 convicted three accused — Triveni (husband), Chhote Lal (father-in-law), and Shanti Devi (mother-in-law) — for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC (murder with common intention), Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence), and Section 120-B IPC (criminal conspiracy). The sentences ran to life imprisonment under Section 302/34, three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 201, and seven years rigorous imprisonment under Section 120-B, each with a default clause. A fourth accused, Chintamani, was acquitted at trial.

The prosecution's case, as lodged by the deceased's father Bhagwandin, was that his daughter had been married to Triveni in 1978 and that the husband and in-laws were dissatisfied with the dowry and demanded a motorcycle. Due to non-fulfilment of that demand, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment. On 1 July 1979 the informant received word that his daughter had been electrocuted the previous day and had died. The chik FIR, however, was not lodged until 18 November 1983 — over four years and four months after the death.

By the time the criminal appeal came to be decided, Chhote Lal and Shanti Devi had died. Their appeal had abated by order dated 22 May 2018. Triveni alone remained as the surviving appellant before the High Court.

The FIR Delay as a Threshold Problem

The bench began its analysis with what it described as a “staggering delay of more than four years.” The incident occurred on 30 June 1979; the FIR was registered on 18 November 1983. The court acknowledged that delay in filing an FIR is not automatically fatal if it is satisfactorily explained, and that courts may consider factors such as the emotional state of informants, lack of awareness, or threat and intimidation. However, it held that an abnormal and unexplained delay casts a grave shadow of doubt on the prosecution's case. In the present matter, no satisfactory explanation for the four-and-a-half-year gap was placed before the court. The bench observed that inordinate unexplained delay results in the risk of embellishment, coloured versions, and concocted stories, and that the entire evidence in such cases must be evaluated with greater caution.

Eleven Prosecution Witnesses and the Medical Contradiction at the Centre

The prosecution examined eleven witnesses. Bhagwandin (PW-1), the informant and father of the deceased, stated that his daughter died due to burns caused by the accused on account of the non-fulfilment of the motorcycle demand, and not due to electric shock. Raghuwar Dayal (PW-4), the deceased's brother, and Shiv Prasad Dubey (PW-5) corroborated PW-1's version. The Investigating Officer, Kharag Bahadur Singh (PW-6), proved the investigation papers. PW-10, a Junior Engineer from the concerned sub-station, stated that on 30 June 1979 there was no electricity supply from 1:45 a.m. to 12:00 noon.

The critical conflict lay between two medical witnesses. PW-2, Krishna Kumar Singh, a State Medico Legal Expert, opined that the burning was more likely caused after pouring an inflammable substance and that he did not agree with electrocution as the cause in the absence of characteristics usually seen in electrocution wounds. PW-3, Dr. H.K. Verma, who had actually conducted the postmortem on 1 July 1979, found seven ante-mortem injuries and recorded the cause of death as extensive electric burns due to ante-mortem shock of burns. He noted that the body was in a pugilistic attitude, that there was no smell of kerosene oil, and that there were entrance and exit points of electric burns on the thumbs and index fingers of the left and right hands respectively — features he, with reference to Parikh's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, associated with electrocution and not with burning by an inflammable substance.

Importantly, PW-2 himself conceded that he had not disputed the absence of any smell of kerosene from the body, and that injury numbers 4, 5, and 6 could have been caused by electric burns. The bench concluded that neither opinion could yield an ultimate conclusion, and that the scope of suspicion as to the nature of the death remained alive.

The Electricity Supply Argument Does Not Close the Gap

The State placed considerable weight on PW-10's evidence that there was no electricity supply at the sub-station on 30 June 1979 from 1:45 a.m. to 12:00 noon, arguing this ruled out accidental electrocution. The Division Bench rejected the argument. The court pointed out that the incident occurred “in the intervening night of 29/30.06.1979 at unknown time” and that it was entirely possible the incident had taken place before 1:45 a.m. on that night, when electricity may well have been available. The precise time of death was not established, and the absence of supply after 1:45 a.m. could not be used to foreclose the possibility of electrocution at an earlier hour.

No Proof of Homicide, No Active Role Assigned to Triveni

The bench articulated the legal position that where the core question of whether a death was homicidal, accidental, or suicidal remains shrouded in doubt, the prosecution's case necessarily fails. Conviction cannot rest on a mere presumption of homicide, and where evidence leaves open the possibility of accidental or suicidal death, the benefit of the doubt goes to the accused.

Turning specifically to Triveni, the court examined his alleged presence at the house at the time of the incident. His defence was that he had gone out for a nature's call and was not present at the time. The prosecution relied on the circumstance of his being in the house to infer involvement. The bench held that, given the absence of any eyewitness, it remained doubtful whether Triveni was actually present at the house at the material time. It went further: even assuming, for the sake of argument, that he was present, no specific role in committing the alleged crime had been assigned to him by any of the prosecution witnesses in their evidence. In a case built entirely on circumstantial evidence, mere presence or suspicion of presence cannot alone sustain a conviction. The chain of circumstances was not consistent only with the hypothesis of the accused's guilt.

The Cumulative Effect of Infirmities

The bench drew together four distinct infirmities: the four-and-a-half-year unexplained delay in lodging the FIR; the contradictory and inconclusive medical opinions on whether the death was caused by an inflammable substance or by electrocution; the unresolved doubt over whether Triveni was even present at the scene; and the prosecution's failure to prove the homicidal nature of the death beyond reasonable doubt. Taken cumulatively, the court held that the prosecution had failed to bring home the charges. The trial court's conclusion was found to be not in accordance with law and the evidence on record.

Outcome

Criminal Appeal No. 1340 of 1987 was allowed. The conviction and sentence imposed on Triveni under Sections 302/34, 201, and 120-B IPC were set aside. He was acquitted of all charges. Since Triveni was already on bail, his bail bonds were cancelled and his sureties discharged. The records of the trial court were directed to be sent back. The judgment was delivered on 30 July 2026, nearly 39 years after the trial court's order and 47 years after the death of the deceased.