Andhra Pradesh High Court Acquits Two Accused in ACB Trap Case, Finds FIR and Trap Proceedings Were Backdated

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh set aside convictions under the Prevention of Corruption Act after finding that the FIR and all trap proceedings were fabricated after the fact at the ACB office, amounting to what the court called “table investigation.”

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, sitting singly through Justice B.V.L.N. Chakravarthi, on 5 May 2026 allowed two criminal appeals and acquitted both accused in a Prevention of Corruption Act case that had resulted in conviction by the Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, City Civil Courts at Hyderabad. The court found that the first information report and the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings were all prepared on the evening of 27 November 2002 at the ACB office in Ananthapur — after the alleged trap had already concluded — and not on 26 November 2002 as the prosecution claimed. That finding rendered the FIR non-compliant with Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the complaint statement hit by Section 162 CrPC, making the entire prosecution unsustainable.

The Charges and the Trial Court's Conviction

Y. Ramachandrappa (A-1), a government servant working as Stockist at the Mandal Level Stock Point, Gorantla, Ananthapur District, was responsible for processing transport bills submitted by a contractor (PW-1) who carried essential commodities to fair price shops in Gorantla and Chilamathur Mandals. PW-1 had submitted bills worth Rs. 63,000 towards transport charges for October 2002. A-1 allegedly held back the bills for fifteen days and then demanded Rs. 6,000 as a bribe to process them, later reducing the demand to Rs. 5,000.

B. Srinivasulu (A-2), a private individual described as a hamali, was alleged to have received the bribe amount from PW-1 on the instructions of A-1 at A-1's house in Gorantla Village on 27 November 2002. The ACB trap team, led by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (PW-5), entered the house, conducted a sodium carbonate test on A-2, whose right-hand fingers yielded a positive result, and seized the cash from A-2's possession.

The Special Court convicted A-1 under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment of one year each for both offences and a fine of Rs. 2,000 each. A-2 was convicted under Section 12 of the Act and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500. Both filed separate criminal appeals — Criminal Appeal No. 123 of 2008 by A-1 and Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 2008 by A-2 — which were disposed of by a common judgment.

The Two Grounds Pressed Before the High Court

Sri A. Hariprasad Reddy, appearing for both appellants, pressed two main contentions. First, that the FIR (Ex. P-15) was registered on 27 November 2002, after the trap proceedings had already taken place, and therefore the entire investigation was illegal. Second, that the evidence on record made it probable that the amount received by A-2 was not a bribe but hire charges owed to lorry owners who had transported essential commodities on behalf of PW-1.

Sri S. Syam Sunder Rao, Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for the ACB, appeared for the respondent State.

How the Court Traced the Backdating

The prosecution's case was that PW-1 visited the ACB office at Ananthapur at 10:00 a.m. on 26 November 2002 and reported A-1's bribe demand. PW-6 recorded the oral complaint as Ex. P-7 at that time. PW-5 then conducted a preliminary enquiry, obtained permission from higher authorities, and registered Ex. P-15 FIR at 6:00 p.m. on 26 November 2002, forwarding it immediately to the Special Court at Hyderabad through a special messenger.

The court found this account contradicted by the evidence of PW-1 himself. PW-1 deposed that A-1 made the bribe demand at his house in Gorantla Village at 8:00 a.m. on 26 November 2002, and that he reached the ACB office only at 4:00 p.m. that day. The distance between Gorantla Village and Ananthapur Town is approximately 110 kilometres. It was physically impossible for PW-1 to have arrived at the ACB office by 10:00 a.m. after leaving Gorantla at or after 8:00 a.m.

PW-5 himself admitted in cross-examination that he asked PW-1 to return at 4:00 a.m. the next day, implying PW-1 had come to the office in the evening of 26 November 2002, not at 10:00 a.m. The accounts of PW-1 and PW-5 were, in the court's words, diagonally opposite on this point.

Two documentary details clinched the finding. The signature of PW-5 on Ex. P-15 carried the date 27 November 2002 below it, not 26 November 2002. And Ex. P-15, along with Ex. P-8 (pre-trap proceedings) and Ex. P-12 (post-trap proceedings), was received by the Special Court on 28 November 2002 at 10:20 a.m. — all at the same time. If the FIR had genuinely been registered at 6:00 p.m. on 26 November 2002 and dispatched immediately by special messenger, it would have reached the Special Court on 27 November 2002, not on 28 November 2002 alongside documents from proceedings conducted on 27 November 2002.

PW-1 admitted in cross-examination that he signed his statement on 27 November 2002, and that the Deputy Superintendent of Police and mediators signed documents prepared at 4:30 p.m. on 27 November 2002 in the DSP's office. The court concluded that Ex. P-7, Ex. P-15, Ex. P-8, and Ex. P-12 were all prepared at 4:30 p.m. on 27 November 2002 at the ACB office in Ananthapur, after the trap proceedings had concluded.

The court described this as “table investigation,” holding that PW-5 had transgressed and abused his power of investigation by preparing proceedings at his office. Because Ex. P-7 was recorded after the commencement of investigation, it fell within Section 162 CrPC and could not be treated as an FIR. The court held that the investigation abridged the rights of the accused under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, and that any conviction based on such proceedings was not sustainable in law.

The Defence Plea on Hire Charges

The court also examined the second contention: whether the amount received by A-2 was a bribe or hire charges for lorries engaged to transport essential commodities.

PW-1 admitted in cross-examination that he owned only one lorry but was required to complete 120 trips in a month covering approximately 120 kilometres. He admitted that A-1 had hired additional vehicles on his behalf to meet the transport target, and that four or five vehicles were engaged per day in October 2002. He further admitted that Exs. P-1 to P-6 — the bills he submitted — did not disclose the numbers of the other lorries, even though those lorries had transported the food grains. The bills were prepared as if PW-1 alone had transported all the goods.

DW-1 and DW-2, owners of lorries bearing numbers ATA 2466 and ADD 1795 respectively, deposed that they had transported food grains on behalf of PW-1 in October 2002 and had not been paid. PW-1 admitted in cross-examination that these two lorries had transported food grains on his behalf and that DW-1 and DW-2 were their owners. The trial court had dismissed DW-1 and DW-2 as set-up witnesses, a finding the High Court characterised as perverse and not based on facts.

DW-3, an employee of the Civil Supplies Department, produced movement registers (Exs. X-1 to X-5) showing movement of commodities on 26 November 2002, with stock being unloaded the next morning at around 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. A-1's specific case was that he was at the stock godown on the morning of 27 November 2002 supervising unloading, leaving no occasion for PW-1 to visit his house and pay money to A-2 at that time.

The court found that all these circumstances made it probable that the amount paid to A-2 represented hire charges owed to the owners of the engaged lorries, not a bribe. The trial court's finding that A-2 received the amount as a bribe was held to be unsustainable on the facts.

The Supreme Court Precedent Applied

The court relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala and Others, reported at 2001(6) SCC 181, which explained that the FIR under Section 154 CrPC is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the officer in charge of a police station, and that all information made orally or in writing after the commencement of investigation falls under Section 162 CrPC. The Supreme Court had observed in that case that “all other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation… will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC.”

Applying that principle, the High Court held that Ex. P-7 — recorded after the trap proceedings had already taken place — could not be treated as an FIR, and that Ex. P-15 was not registered in accordance with Section 154 CrPC. The trial court was found to have lost sight of these aspects, its findings being based on surmises rather than evidence, and to have ignored material evidence, leading to what the court described as a travesty of justice.

Outcome

Criminal Appeal No. 123 of 2008 was allowed. The conviction of A-1 under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, recorded by the Special Court, was set aside. A-1 was acquitted of all charges. Any fine paid by A-1 was directed to be refunded in accordance with law.

Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 2008 was also allowed. The conviction of A-2 under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was set aside. A-2 was acquitted. Any fine paid by A-2 was directed to be refunded. The bail bonds of both appellants were cancelled. The common judgment was directed to be certified to the Special Court under Section 405 CrPC, and all pending interlocutory applications in both appeals were closed.