Unilateral Revocation of Gift Deed Before Sub-Registrar Is Void, Says Andhra Pradesh High Court, Dismissing Partition Suit

The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that a registered gift deed cannot be cancelled unilaterally before a Sub-Registrar; only a competent civil court can set it aside after notice to the donee.

A partition suit filed by a son against his parents and sisters over family properties in Guntur has been dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Amaravati. Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao, sitting singly, dismissed Appeal Suit No. 1776 of 2001 on 25 June 2026, confirming the trial court's decree of 24 April 2001 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur. The appeal had been pending for over two decades. The court held that the plaint schedule properties were the self-acquired properties of the plaintiff's father, and that registered revocation deeds executed before a Sub-Registrar without notice to the donee and without a court order were void and non-est in law. Both findings went against the appellant, leaving the trial court's dismissal of the partition suit undisturbed.

The Partition Dispute Before the High Court

The appellant, Davuluri Venkateswara Rao, a resident of Pandaripuram, Guntur, filed the original suit O.S. No. 733 of 1989 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur, seeking partition of two sets of properties described as plaint ‘A’ schedule (a house and house site) and plaint ‘B’ schedule (agricultural lands in several survey numbers) into two equal shares, with allotment of one share to himself.

The plaintiff claimed that he and his father, defendant No. 1, constituted a Hindu coparcenary joint family, and that both the house property and agricultural lands were ancestral joint family properties acquired from the income of partitioned ancestral lands. He asserted that he had been residing in the plaint ‘A’ schedule house along with his wife and children, and that the properties had been in joint possession and enjoyment of himself and his father.

The plaintiff further alleged that his mother, defendant No. 2, had taken advantage of his father's old age and, in collusion with the sisters, had obtained several documents from the father behind the plaintiff's back, with the intention of depriving him of his share in the coparcenary properties.

Defendant No. 1, the father, filed a written statement broadly supporting the plaintiff's claim of joint family character of the properties, while admitting that certain gift deeds had been obtained from him by fraud. He stated that he had executed registered revocation deeds dated 26 July 1989 and 27 July 1989 to cancel the earlier gift settlement deeds dated 29 April 1988 and 30 April 1988. He expressed willingness to partition the remaining properties between himself and the plaintiff.

Defendant No. 4, a sister of the plaintiff, contested the suit vigorously. She pleaded that the plaint ‘A’ schedule property was the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1, supported by a chain of registered documents: a sale deed dated 10 August 1967, a relinquishment deed dated 2 March 1971, and a further purchase on 14 March 1972. She contended that defendant No. 1 had gifted the property to defendant No. 2 by registered gift deeds dated 29 April 1988 and 30 April 1988, and that defendant No. 2 had thereafter sold the property to defendant No. 4 under a registered sale deed dated 15 December 1989 for Rs. 1,50,000. She also asserted that plaint ‘B’ schedule properties were self-acquired properties of defendant No. 1, portions of which had been gifted to her towards pasupu kumkuma at the time of her marriage.

During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, the appeal against respondent Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 7 was dismissed for default by order dated 8 February 2011, leaving the contest between the appellant and the remaining respondents.

Whether the Properties Were Ancestral or Self-Acquired

The court framed three points for determination: whether the plaint schedule properties were ancestral properties of the plaintiff and his father; whether the gift deeds Ex. B-13 and Ex. B-14 were invalid; and whether the trial court was justified in dismissing the partition suit.

On the first point, the court examined the plaintiff's own pleadings and evidence. The plaintiff had claimed in the plaint that defendant No. 1 had partitioned ancestral joint family properties with his brothers about eighty years before the filing of the suit in 1989. The court observed that since defendant No. 1 was himself about seventy-five years old at the time of filing of the suit, the claim that a partition of ancestral properties had occurred eighty years ago was prima facie false.

More significantly, the plaintiff's own admissions in cross-examination proved fatal to his case. He conceded that his father had purchased item Nos. 1, 2, and 4 of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property from his own earnings, and that these constituted his father's separate property. P.W.2, a witness produced by the plaintiff himself, made a categorical admission that the plaint schedule properties were the self-acquired properties of defendant No. 1. P.W.3, another plaintiff's witness, also admitted that defendant No. 1 had purchased the land and house from his own earnings.

The court applied the settled principle that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property merely on account of the existence of a Hindu joint family. The person asserting joint family character must prove that a joint family nucleus existed from which the properties could have been acquired. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision reported at 2025 (5) ALD 73 (SC), the court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish any such nucleus. The documentary evidence, including the registered gift deeds executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2, also expressly described the plaint ‘A’ schedule property as defendant No. 1's self-acquired property. The court accordingly held that all plaint schedule properties were the self-acquired properties of defendant No. 1 and answered point No. 1 against the appellant.

Revocation of Registered Gift Deeds Without Court Order Is Void

The second and more legally significant point concerned the validity of the registered revocation deeds Ex. A-10 and Ex. A-11, by which defendant No. 1 had purported to cancel the gift settlement deeds Ex. B-13 and Ex. B-14 executed in favour of defendant No. 2.

The court found that the gift deeds dated 29 April 1988 and 30 April 1988, covering 131 square yards and 98 square yards respectively of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property, had been duly executed, registered, and accepted by the donee, defendant No. 2. Her name had been mutated in the municipal records, as evidenced by Ex. B-16. Defendant No. 2 had subsequently sold the property to defendant No. 4 for Rs. 1,50,000 under the registered sale deed dated 15 December 1989.

Defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff contended that the gift deeds had been obtained by fraud, and that the revocation deeds executed before the Sub-Registrar on 26 July 1989 and 27 July 1989 were therefore valid cancellations. The court rejected this position on several grounds.

The court referred to the Kerala High Court's ruling in Kesava Kurup Raghava Kurup v. Thomas Idicula and Another, AIR 1969 Ker. 21, which held that a gift, to be valid, must be accepted by the donee during the lifetime of the donor, and that under Mithakshara law, acceptance of a gift of immovable property must be express. Having established that acceptance had occurred, the court then applied the Supreme Court's ruling in K. Bala Krishnan v. K. Kamalam, AIR 2004 SC 1257, which held that a gift duly accepted in law is complete and irrevocable under Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that it was not competent for the donor to cancel the gift and deal with the gifted property thereafter.

The court further noted the Full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Yanala Malleshwari v. Smt. Ananthula Sayamma, AIR 2007 AP 57 (FB), which held that what is required to be done through a court decree cannot be permitted to be undertaken by a party unilaterally, and that Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act prescribes the manner in which a document can be cancelled. However, the court also noted that the Apex Court had overruled that Full Bench judgment.

The Supreme Court in Thota Ganga Laxmi and Another v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, reported at 2012 (1) ALD 90 (SC), had referred to Rule 26(i)(k) under Section 69 of the Registration Act applicable to Andhra Pradesh, which requires that cancellation deeds of registered conveyances on sale must be accompanied by a declaration showing natural consent or orders of a competent civil or High Court. The Apex Court had held that it is only when a sale deed is cancelled by a competent court that the cancellation deed can be registered, and that without such a court declaration or notice to the parties, both the cancellation deed and its registration are wholly void and non-est.

The court applied this ratio to the facts before it. Defendant No. 1 had not approached any civil court to challenge the gift settlement deeds on the ground of fraud. Instead, he executed revocation deeds before the Sub-Registrar more than a year after the gift deeds were executed, without issuing any notice to the donee, defendant No. 2. The Sub-Registrar had entertained those documents without authority.

The court also relied on the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench ruling in Veena Singh (Deceased) through L.Rs. v. District Registrar and Another, (2022) 7 SCC 1, which held that “a document, once it is registered, can be cancelled or set aside only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction.” That decision further confirmed that the Sub-Registrar's role is discharged once a document is registered, and that there is no express provision in the Registration Act empowering the Registrar to recall or cancel a registration.

Applying these principles, the court held that Ex. A-10 and Ex. A-11 revocation deeds were void, non-est, and meaningless transactions. Ex. B-13 and Ex. B-14 gift deeds remained valid and subsisting documents. Point No. 2 was accordingly answered against the appellant.

Trial Court's Dismissal Confirmed

Having answered both points against the appellant, the court held on point No. 3 that the trial court was fully justified in dismissing the partition suit. The trial court had appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record correctly, and there was no ground to interfere with its findings. The court declined to set aside the judgment and decree dated 24 April 2001 of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur.

Order

Appeal Suit No. 1776 of 2001 was dismissed by Justice V. Gopala Krishna Rao on 25 June 2026. Each party was directed to bear their own costs in the appeal. Any miscellaneous petitions pending in the appeal were directed to stand closed.