AP High Court Dismisses Father's Habeas Corpus Petition for Custody of Minor Daughters, Directs Him to Pursue Guardian Court Proceedings

A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction where a detailed welfare enquiry was warranted and a Guardian and Wards Act petition was already pending.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed a habeas corpus writ petition filed by a father seeking custody of his two minor daughters, aged five and three years, who were living with their maternal grandmother. The Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Subhendu Samanta held that this was not an apt case to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The bench found that the welfare of the children could not be adequately assessed in a summary writ proceeding and that the father had already filed a petition under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 before a civil court — making that the appropriate forum for all questions of custody and welfare.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioner, Kondrakunta Chandrakanth, is the father of two minor daughters. After the death of their mother under suspicious circumstances, the children came to be in the custody of their maternal grandmother, respondent No. 5. An FIR No. 31 of 2024 under Sections 498A and 306 IPC was registered against the petitioner in connection with the mother's death. The petitioner, in turn, lodged FIR No. 11 of 2025 against respondent No. 5.

The petitioner had already approached the civil court, filing GWOP No. 50 of 2025 under Section 25 read with Sections 10 and 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 before the XIII Additional District Judge, Narasaraopet. That proceeding was pending when the present writ petition was filed.

Respondent No. 5's counsel raised a preliminary objection: given the pending GWOP proceedings, a habeas corpus writ was not maintainable. The bench identified the core question as the maintainability and entertainability of the writ of habeas corpus in a child custody matter where a statutory remedy was already being pursued.

The Legal Framework on Habeas Corpus in Custody Matters

The bench set out the established scope of the writ. Habeas corpus is a prerogative process for immediate release from illegal or improper detention. In child custody disputes, detention of a minor by a person not entitled to legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention. The writ court therefore has jurisdiction to restore custody to a guardian who has been wrongfully deprived of it.

However, that jurisdiction is not without limits. The bench drew on Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari, (2019) 7 SCC 42, where the Supreme Court held that the writ is maintainable in child custody matters only when it is proved that the detention is illegal and without authority of law. The Supreme Court in that case also stated that ordinary remedy in such matters lies under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and Wards Act, as the case may be.

The bench quoted paragraphs 19 and 20 of Tejaswini Gaud in full. A passage that carried particular weight was: “It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus.” The bench noted that in writ proceedings, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits — a limitation that matters when a full welfare enquiry is needed.

The bench also referred to four subsequent Supreme Court decisions that reaffirmed these principles: Jose Antonio Zalba Diez Del Corral v. State of W.B., (2024) 12 SCC 419; Nirmala v. Kulwant Singh, (2024) 10 SCC 595; Gautam Kumar Das v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 10 SCC 588; and Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 342.

In Nirmala, the Supreme Court held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down on maintainability, and that whether a writ court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where a detailed enquiry including the welfare of the minor child is involved, such enquiry can only be conducted in proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act and not in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.

Jose Antonio Zalba Diez Del Corral was directly on point. The Supreme Court there dismissed a habeas corpus petition where the father had already filed a petition under the Guardians and Wards Act. The court held: “The statutory remedy available under the Guardians and Wards Act is the appropriate remedy, which has already been availed by the petitioner.” The court also noted that the question of custody must be decided after evidence is adduced by the parties following due procedure under the Act, and that no extraordinary or exceptional circumstances existed to warrant invocation of writ jurisdiction.

Why the Bench Declined to Exercise Writ Jurisdiction

Applying these principles to the facts, the bench identified a combination of factors that made this an unsuitable case for summary writ proceedings. The children are very young — five and three years of age. Their mother is dead. An FIR under Sections 498A and 306 IPC has been registered against the petitioner-father. The children are currently with their maternal grandmother.

The bench held that a detailed enquiry, particularly into the welfare of the minors, deserved to be conducted in the Guardians and Wards Act proceedings, which could not be replicated effectively in a summary enquiry under Article 226. The proceedings before the XIII Additional District Judge, Narasaraopet — GWOP No. 50 of 2025 — were already pending, meaning the petitioner was already availing the most efficacious statutory remedy.

The bench drew a direct parallel with Jose Antonio Zalba Diez Del Corral, where the Supreme Court dismissed the writ on the same ground: the petitioner had filed a Guardians and Wards Act petition which was pending, and the statutory remedy was appropriate and effective for all questions of welfare and well-being.

The bench was careful to record that it had not entered into the merits of the petitioner's claim for custody. The dismissal was confined to the question of the appropriate forum and the unsuitability of a summary writ enquiry in the present circumstances.

Order

The Division Bench dismissed Writ Petition No. 8105 of 2026. It expressly clarified that no finding was returned on the merits of the petitioner's claim for custody, and that those questions remained open for consideration in GWOP No. 50 of 2025 in accordance with law before the XIII Additional District Judge, Narasaraopet. No order as to costs was made. Any miscellaneous petitions pending in connection with the writ petition were also closed.