Andhra Pradesh HC Quashes FIR Against YSRCP Leaders Over Nandigama Rally, Finds Allegations Vague and Section 215 BNSS Bar Attracted

The Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed FIR No. 449 of 2025 against three YSRCP politicians, holding that mere participation in a political rally without specific overt acts cannot sustain prosecution under multiple BNS provisions.

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati, sitting singly before Dr Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao, has quashed FIR No. 449 of 2025 registered at Nandigama Police Station, NTR District, against three accused — a politician, a former Member of the Legislative Assembly, and a Member of the Legislative Council — all affiliated with the YSRCP. The FIR arose from a protest rally held on 9 September 2025 under the banner “Annadata Poru.” The court found that the allegations in the FIR were omnibus and vague, attributing no specific overt act to any individual petitioner, and that the invocation of multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 was legally unsustainable. Additionally, prosecution for the offence under Section 223 of the BNS was held to be barred in the absence of a written complaint by the concerned public servant, as mandated under Section 215 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The FIR and the Prosecution Case

On 9 September 2025, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on C.M. Road, Nandigama Town, police alleged that the accused persons, being leaders and workers of YSRCP, conducted a rally and dharna under the banner “Annadata Poru” without obtaining prior permission from the authorities. Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 had been enforced in the area. When Assistant Sub-Inspector Lankapalli Ravikumar issued a warning, the accused allegedly ignored lawful instructions, forcibly pushed aside police personnel, obstructed them in the discharge of official duties, and manhandled the complainant who was in uniform, thereby disturbing public peace and order.

The prosecution invoked Sections 132, 195(1), 189(3), 223, 285, 292 and 293 of the BNS read with Section 190 of the BNS. Two separate criminal petitions were filed: Criminal Petition No. 3423 of 2026 by Devineni Avinash (Accused No. 1), and Criminal Petition No. 3409 of 2026 by Monditoka Jagan Mohana Rao (former MLA, Accused No. 2) and Monditoka Aruna Kumar (MLC, Accused No. 3). Both petitions sought quashing under Section 528 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court heard them together and disposed of both by a common order.

What the Petitioners Argued

Sri Veladi Sai Sri Harsha, appearing for all three petitioners, submitted that the FIR was inherently infirm. The allegations, he contended, were vague and did not attribute any specific act to any petitioner. Mere participation in a political rally, without an allegation of assault or use of criminal force against a public servant, cannot attract Section 132 of the BNS, which requires active use of criminal force with intent to deter a public servant. At best, the conduct described amounted to passive disobedience of a police warning.

On Section 195(1) of the BNS, counsel argued there was no averment of deliberate obstruction of any official act. On Section 189(3) of the BNS, he submitted that an unlawful assembly requires a common object of the nature prescribed by law — such as mischief, criminal trespass, or resisting execution of law — and the FIR was silent on any such common object. On Section 285 of the BNS, he pointed out that the provision requires a grievance from a member of the public alleging obstruction of a public way, and no such complaint existed here; the allegation came only from the police. On Section 223 of the BNS, counsel argued that cognizance is expressly barred under Section 215 of the BNSS unless a written complaint is filed by the concerned public servant or an authorised superior, and no such complaint had been placed before any court.

How the Court Reasoned

Dr Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao analysed each offence separately against the contents of the FIR and reached the conclusion that none of the charges were sustainable.

On Section 132 of the BNS, the court observed that the provision requires assault or use of criminal force against a public servant with the intention of deterring him from lawful duty. The FIR contained no specific allegation of any act of assault committed by any of the petitioners. Refusing to disperse upon being warned, or continuing a protest, does not in itself amount to assault or criminal force within the meaning of the provision. Without foundational facts disclosing the essential ingredients, the invocation of Section 132 was found wholly unsustainable.

On Section 195(1) of the BNS, the court noted that the FIR did not specify the nature of the obstruction allegedly caused by the petitioners, and no material was placed to show that any official act was actually prevented or interrupted by any specific conduct attributable to any of them. The allegations remained broad and collective.

On Section 189(3) of the BNS, the court held that a political demonstration does not become an unlawful assembly merely because it is held without permission. The FIR would have needed to disclose that the accused assembled with an intention to commit an offence, to enforce an unlawful demand, to commit mischief, criminal trespass, or to resist execution of law by use of force. The FIR disclosed only that the petitioners participated in a protest concerning public issues. That recital was insufficient.

On Section 285 of the BNS, the court found that while the FIR made a general statement that the rally was conducted on a public road, there was no specific allegation that any member of the public was prevented from using the road, nor was any complaint lodged by any person allegedly inconvenienced. The FIR was entirely based on the version of police officials.

On Sections 292 and 293 of the BNS, the court found that the complaint disclosed no factual foundation. The mere mention of penal sections without corresponding factual assertions, the court held, cannot sustain a criminal prosecution. Criminal law cannot be set in motion on the basis of vague and generalised allegations devoid of essential elements.

The court then gave significant attention to the bar under Section 215 of the BNSS in relation to the offence under Section 223 of the BNS. Section 215 of the BNSS substantially corresponds to Section 195 of the CrPC and places a statutory embargo on a court from taking cognizance of specified offences against public justice unless a written complaint is made by the concerned public servant or by an officer administratively superior. The record did not disclose that any such complaint had been filed. The prosecution was founded solely on the FIR and the police report. The court held that a police report cannot be treated as a substitute for the complaint contemplated under Section 215 of the BNSS, and therefore even if the allegations were accepted at face value, the Magistrate would not be competent to take cognizance of the offence under Section 223 of the BNS.

To support this analysis, the court drew on a chain of Supreme Court authority. It referred to C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567, for the proposition that the bar under Section 195 CrPC cannot be evaded by misdescribing an offence or by attaching a wrong label. It cited Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar, (1971) 3 SCC 329, for the rule that Section 195 operates as a limitation on the Magistrate's power to take cognizance under Section 190, and the Magistrate must examine whether that power has been taken away before acting. Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533, was noted for articulating the policy behind the cognizance bar — protection from needless harassment through private vendetta and preservation of the purity of judicial process. The court also referred to State of Punjab v. Raj Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2005) 7 SCC 352; Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B., (1953) 1 SCC 637; State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh, (1994) 4 SCC 95; State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185; Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh, (1968) SCC OnLine SC 253; and Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) 20 SCC 1.

The court also placed reliance on two Andhra Pradesh High Court decisions. In Kantamaneni Ravishankar v. State of A.P., 2020 SCC OnLine AP 726, a learned Single Judge had held that to register a crime for disobedience of an order, there must be a complaint from the public servant, and a police officer is not competent to register a crime for an offence under Section 188 IPC on the complaint of any other person. In Kollu Ravindra v. State of A.P., the court had held that a complaint invoking offences under Sections 172 to 188 IPC must emanate from a public servant, and in the absence of such a statutory complaint, the Magistrate is divested of the competence to take cognizance. In Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar v. State of A.P., Criminal Petition No. 987 of 2020, the court had further held that when allegations arise out of a single, indivisible transaction giving rise to multiple offences — one falling within Section 195 CrPC and another ostensibly outside — mere deletion of the Section 188 IPC charge from the charge sheet does not remove the bar, because the factual substratum remains integrally connected to the disobedience of a promulgated order.

Pulling these threads together, the court concluded that the FIR did not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence by the petitioners. The allegations were inherently vague, omnibus, and lacking in specific particulars. Allowing the prosecution to continue would result in unnecessary harassment and would constitute an abuse of the process of law.

Outcome

By its common order dated 31 July 2026, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh allowed Criminal Petition Nos. 3423 and 3409 of 2026 and quashed all proceedings arising from FIR No. 449 of 2025 on the file of Nandigama Police Station, NTR District, as against Accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3.