Andhra Pradesh HC Enhances Motor Accident Compensation to Rs 8.40 Lakh After APSRTC Bus Kills Wholesale Trader at Nellore Bus Stand

The Andhra Pradesh High Court at Amaravati enhanced compensation for a family whose breadwinner was crushed under an APSRTC bus tyre, holding the driver's breach of duty far outweighed any contributory fault of the deceased.

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati, in a common judgment pronounced on 13 March 2026, dismissed the appeal of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and allowed a cross-appeal by the claimant family, raising the total compensation from Rs 3,85,000 to Rs 8,40,000. The deceased, Mamidi Satyanarayana, a wholesale provisions trader aged 47, was killed on 13 July 2009 when the rear tyre of an APSRTC bus ran over his head at Nellore–Atmakur Bus Stand as he tried to reserve a seat through a window. Justice A. Hari Haranadha Sarma, sitting singly, held that the driver’s failure to check his right-side mirror before moving the bus constituted a substantial breach of duty, while the deceased’s lapse in attempting to reserve the seat through the window was, in comparison, trivial. The court also held that the caps on compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, were not binding where the respondents had themselves invited examination of negligence.

The Accident and Proceedings Before the MACT

Mamidi Satyanarayana, his wife Mamidi Padmavathi, and their children had travelled to Tirumala for darshan. On the evening of 13 July 2009, after darshan, the family arrived at Nellore–Atmakur Bus Stand to catch a bus to their village of Pamur in Prakasham district. A bus bearing registration AP 10 Z 9078, operated by APSRTC and bound for Pamur, stopped at the stand. To secure a seat before boarding, Satyanarayana attempted to place a kerchief on a seat through the bus window. The driver moved the bus without checking for bystanders. Satyanarayana fell, and the rear tyre of the bus ran over his head. He died from his injuries.

A case was registered as Crime No. 40 of 2009 at Nellore Traffic Police Station, and the driver was charge-sheeted in C.C. No. 499 of 2009 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Nellore. The claimants — the widow, two minor children, and the mother of the deceased — filed M.V.O.P. No. 491 of 2009 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-FAC/I Additional District Judge, Ongole (the MACT), claiming compensation.

The MACT, by its award dated 19 June 2012, assessed the deceased’s monthly income at Rs 3,500, applied a multiplier of 13, and awarded Rs 3,64,000 towards loss of dependency. Adding Rs 10,000 for loss of estate, Rs 7,000 for loss of consortium, and Rs 4,000 for funeral expenses, the total came to Rs 3,85,000 with interest at 9% per annum. APSRTC challenged the award in M.A.C.M.A. No. 3084 of 2012, while the claimants filed M.A.C.M.A. No. 943 of 2014 seeking enhancement.

Competing Arguments on Appeal

APSRTC contended that the MACT had wrongly dismissed the contributory negligence of the deceased, had incorrectly fixed income at Rs 3,500 per month without adequate evidence, and had applied a multiplier of 13 when, for a deceased aged above 50 years, a multiplier of 11 would have been appropriate. APSRTC also argued that the rate of interest was excessive.

The claimants, in their cross-appeal, argued that the deceased’s stated turnover of over Rs 5,00,000 per annum yielded a net income of around Rs 50,000 per annum from his wholesale provisions business, which was far higher than the Rs 3,500 per month accepted by the MACT. They argued that compensation under multiple heads had been under-assessed.

Negligence, Contributory Negligence, and Duty of Care

Justice Hari Haranadha Sarma examined the legal distinction between negligence, contributory negligence, and composite negligence at length, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pavan Kumar v. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal (2014) 3 SCC 590 and T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan (2008) 3 SCC 748. The court identified the four-part inquiry: who bore the duty of care; whether that duty was breached; whether the victim also owed a duty and breached it; and who had the better and last opportunity to prevent the mishap.

On the facts, P.W.1, the widow and an eyewitness, deposed that her husband was trying to reserve a seat and that the driver moved the bus without observing the people around it. R.W.1, the driver himself, stated that he heard cries from bystanders only after the incident and then stopped. He acknowledged that the deceased had attempted to place luggage through the window from the right side of the bus and had fallen under the rear wheel.

The court observed that the driver’s seat and the rear-view mirror are both positioned on the right side of the bus. The deceased had approached from that same side. The driver therefore had a clear means of observing what was happening before setting the bus in motion. The court placed the social context of 2009 on record: reserving bus seats by placing kerchiefs or bags through windows was a common practice at rural and semi-urban bus stands, and bus operators had a legal obligation to take precautions against foreseeable hazards of exactly this kind.

Justice Hari Haranadha Sarma held that while the deceased could have avoided the accident had he not attempted to reserve the seat through the window, the driver had both the opportunity and the duty to prevent the mishap. The last clear chance to prevent the accident lay with the driver. Any lapse on the part of the deceased was, in the court’s assessment, trivial and negligible, whereas the breach by APSRTC was substantial. The MACT’s finding of negligence was accordingly confirmed.

The court also addressed bus stand administration, observing that posting trained volunteers to guide passengers and prevent free movement in vehicle-parking areas would be appropriate precautionary measures — recording this as a lesson rather than a direction.

Section 163-A Caps and the Shift to Section 166 Standards

The petition before the MACT had been filed invoking Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which ordinarily requires adoption of the Second Schedule — a table that fixes notional incomes and caps amounts for conventional heads such as funeral expenses at Rs 2,000, loss of consortium at Rs 5,000, and loss of estate at Rs 2,500.

However, the court held that APSRTC had, by disputing negligence and examining its own driver as R.W.1, effectively invited the tribunal to proceed on the negligence framework under Section 166. Having done so, APSRTC could not turn around and insist that the Section 163-A caps apply to limit the compensation payable.

The court further held, relying on Kurvan Ansari Alias Kuran Ali v. Shyam Kishore Murmu (2022) 1 SCC 317 and Meena Devi v. Nunu Chand Mahto (2023) 1 SCC 204, that even in pure Section 163-A claims, the caps in the Second Schedule are not binding because the Central Government had repeatedly failed to update them since their insertion in 1994, despite Supreme Court directions to do so. The Second Schedule, along with Section 163-A itself, was omitted entirely by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 32 of 2019, though the court noted that the applicability of the pre-amendment provisions to pending causes of action remained a separate question.

Recalculation of Compensation

The deceased was 47 years old at the time of death and was self-employed, running a wholesale provisions shop at Pamur. The court accepted his monthly income at Rs 5,000 — higher than the MACT’s Rs 3,500 — having regard to the socio-economic circumstances of 2009 and the evidence on record. Applying the 25% addition for future prospects applicable to self-employed persons in the 40–50 age bracket, as directed by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, the income was brought to Rs 6,250 per month, or Rs 75,000 per annum. After deducting one-third towards the deceased’s personal expenditure, the multiplicand was Rs 50,000 per annum. APSRTC’s argument for a multiplier of 11 was rejected; for a deceased aged 47, the applicable multiplier under the Sarla Verma guidelines is 13. Loss of dependency was thus Rs 6,50,000.

Under the conventional heads, the court applied the scales set by the Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130, which permit loss of consortium to be awarded not only to the spouse but also to children and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium. Each of the four claimants received Rs 40,000 towards loss of consortium, totalling Rs 1,60,000. Funeral expenses were fixed at Rs 15,000 and loss of estate at Rs 15,000.

The total compensation was fixed at Rs 8,40,000. The court reduced the rate of interest from 9% to 7.5% per annum from the date of the petition until realisation, noting that the enhanced principal warranted a moderated interest rate.

The court also confirmed the settled legal position, drawing on Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh (2003) 2 SCC 274, Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413, and Ramla v. National Insurance Company Limited (2019) 2 SCC 192, that a MACT or court is not precluded from awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed, as long as the evidence justifies it. The function under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act is to award just compensation.

Order

M.A.C.M.A. No. 3084 of 2012, filed by APSRTC, was dismissed. M.A.C.M.A. No. 943 of 2014, filed by the claimants, was allowed. The MACT award of Rs 3,85,000 at 9% interest was modified and enhanced to Rs 8,40,000 at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition until realisation.

Apportionment was directed as follows: the widow, Mamidi Padmavathi (Claimant No. 1), receives Rs 3,40,000 with proportionate interest and costs; the two minor children, Mamidi Manikanta and Mamidi Manisha (Claimant Nos. 2 and 3), receive Rs 2,00,000 each with proportionate interest; and the mother of the deceased, Mamidi Venkata Lakshmamma (Claimant No. 4), receives Rs 1,00,000 with proportionate interest. APSRTC was held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount.

APSRTC was given two months to deposit the balance. If the claimants furnish their bank account details within 15 days, APSRTC is to remit directly to those accounts and file proof before the MACT. If the claimants fail to do so, APSRTC is to deposit the amount before the MACT, from where the claimants may withdraw it immediately. Court fee on the enhanced portion is payable by the claimants before the MACT. No order as to costs was made in either appeal. All pending miscellaneous petitions in both appeals stand closed.