Andhra Pradesh HC Sets Aside Censure Against Deputy Tahsildar, Orders Promotion Consideration; Holds GO Ms No 53 Bars Promotion for One Year
The Andhra Pradesh High Court set aside a minor censure imposed on a Deputy Tahsildar for an alleged discourteous remark, while holding that GO Ms No 53 dated 04.02.1997 has the force of law and validly bars promotion by one year upon censure.
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati, in a judgment delivered on 15 July 2026, resolved two distinct questions arising from the same writ petition: whether a penalty of censure under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules bars an employee from promotion, and whether the specific censure imposed on the petitioner could withstand scrutiny. Justice Nyapathy Vijay, sitting singly, answered the first question in favour of the State — holding that GO Ms No 53 dated 04.02.1997, though executive in origin, carries the force of law and validly bars promotion for one year — but answered the second in favour of the petitioner, setting aside the censure itself as unwarranted on the facts.
The Dispute Before the Court
B Malathi, a Deputy Tahsildar working at Iragavaram in West Godavari District, was appointed as a Junior Assistant in 2005 on compassionate grounds, promoted as Senior Assistant in 2010, and again as Deputy Tahsildar in 2018. By mid-2026 she was eligible for promotion to Tahsildar.
A final integrated seniority list of Deputy Tahsildars was issued on 31 May 2026, placing her at serial number 238. A Departmental Promotion Committee met on 4 June 2026 and cleared candidates up to serial number 234. Before the DPC could consider her case, the District Collector issued her a show cause notice on 1 June 2026 — three days after the seniority list was published — based on a complaint from one Sri D. Prabhakar Rao, aged 77 years, of Kathuvapadu Village.
The complaint arose from an RTI application filed by Prabhakar Rao on 3 January 2026 seeking copies of revenue records relating to an RCM Church in Survey No 61/3. He alleged that when he visited the Tahsildar's office to follow up, Malathi responded in a rude and disrespectful manner. Malathi denied this, stating she had replied courteously, that the application had been forwarded to the Village Revenue Officer, and that she had subsequently been deputed to the RDO's office at Tadepalligudem by 28 February 2026.
The District Collector conducted a telephonic enquiry with the complainant, who stated that Malathi had said “meeku cheppala” — a Telugu phrase meaning, roughly, “I need not tell you” — which he perceived as disrespectful given his age. No verbal altercation was found. There was no finding of deliberate denial of RTI information. Nevertheless, a penalty of minor censure was imposed.
Following the censure, the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, in proceedings dated 24 June 2026, promoted 16 persons junior to Malathi, including four candidates from SC category shown from serial number 239 onwards. Malathi was informed that her case was deferred on account of the censure. She filed W.P. No. 17408 of 2026 under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging both the deferral and the validity of the censure itself, and also pursued an appeal against the penalty before the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration.
Two Legal Questions Framed
Justice Nyapathy Vijay framed two specific issues for consideration:
(a) Whether a penalty of censure under the APCS CCA Rules bars a government employee from promotion for a period of one year.
(b) Whether the punishment imposed on Malathi could be sustained.
The petitioner's senior counsel argued that censure, being a minor penalty with no express bar in the statutory rules themselves, cannot operate as a disqualification for promotion. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court and on coordinate bench decisions of this court which had followed that view. The learned Assistant Government Pleader, Sri S. Raju, countered that GO Ms No 53 dated 04.02.1997, issued in the name of the Governor and signed by the Chief Secretary, expressly provides that every censure shall debar a government servant from promotion or appointment by transfer for one year to both selection and non-selection posts, and that this GO has statutory force.
How the Court Reasoned on Issue (a): Statutory Value of GO Ms No 53
Justice Vijay began by noting that the APCS CCA Rules themselves prescribe censure as a minor penalty under Rule 9(i) but are silent on its consequences for promotion. GO Ms No 53 was issued on 4 February 1997 to fill precisely that gap. The GO defines censure as a “formal and public act intended to convey that the person concerned has been guilty of some blameworthy act or omission” and directs that every censure shall debar promotion for one year.
The court relied on the principle that executive instructions issued to fill gaps in statutory rules have binding force provided they are subservient to those rules and do not contradict them. Two Supreme Court decisions were cited to anchor this: District Registrar v. M.B. Koyakutty (1979) 2 SCC 150 and Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (2024) 7 SCC 103. Both recognise that where statutory rules made under Article 309 are silent, the executive under Article 162 may supplement them by instructions that carry binding force.
A parallel GO was instructive. GO Ms No 342 dated 4 August 1997, dealing with the consequences of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect, had already been considered by a Division Bench of this court in State of A.P. v. K. Abhimanyudu, reported at 2009 (6) ALD 636 (DB). That bench held that GO Ms No 342 has statutory value as a policy decision of the State issued under Article 162, and that it cannot be diluted by a subsequent circular memo issued by a Secretary to Government. Justice Vijay held that the reasoning in Abhimanyudu applies with equal force to GO Ms No 53.
The court also addressed a policy rationale. If censure carries no consequence for promotion, it becomes a dead letter. Discipline is maintained through fear of consequence, and treating a censured employee on par with one who has a clean record would itself offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Justice Vijay drew on State of Rajasthan v. Shankar Lal Parmar (2009) 16 SCC 329, where the Supreme Court upheld deferral of selection grade by one year on account of censure, and observed that employees with blemished service records cannot be equated with those who have impeccable records — such differentiation is not violative of Article 14 but is in fact demanded by it.
Several other Supreme Court decisions were also examined: Union of India v. A.N. Mohanan (2007) 5 SCC 425, K.V. Janakiraman v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 109, Union of India v. Mihir Kumar Bandhopandhyay (1998) 9 SCC 261, State of M.P. v. I.A. Quereshi (2011) 14 SCC 235, and Rajasthan SRTC v. Sadhu Singh (2022) 5 SCC 634. In none of these, the court noted, did the Supreme Court hold that censure is not a bar for promotion.
The court then examined the genesis of coordinate bench decisions that had treated censure as not a bar. Those decisions traced back to an interim order in W.A. No. 1158 of 2016 dated 21 November 2016, which had relied on a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court. That writ appeal was subsequently dismissed as infructuous on 13 April 2022 after the individual concerned was promoted. The Division Bench decision in Abhimanyudu was never placed before the bench that made the interim order in 2016.
Justice Vijay distinguished the Madras Full Bench decision in Deputy Inspector General of Police v. V. Rani, reported at 2011 (3) CTC 129. In that case, the bar on promotion for one year was traceable only to a letter issued by the Secretary to Government with reference to GO Ms No 368 dated 18 October 1993 — a GO that itself did not prescribe any such bar. The Full Bench held that a circular from a Secretary to Government cannot supersede statutory rules. That reasoning has no application in Andhra Pradesh, where the bar flows from GO Ms No 53, issued in the name of the Governor, signed by the Chief Secretary, and held by a Division Bench of this court to have the force of law.
Issue (a) was accordingly answered: the penalty of censure is a bar for promotion for the period of one year specified in GO Ms No 53 dated 04.02.1997.
How the Court Reasoned on Issue (b): Validity of the Censure Itself
The court then turned to whether the censure imposed on Malathi was sustainable. The impugned order itself recorded that there was no deliberate denial of RTI information and no verbal altercation. The entire basis for the penalty was that Malathi had used the Telugu phrase “meeku cheppala” in a manner that the 77-year-old complainant perceived as disrespectful.
Justice Vijay applied what he described as the yardstick used in defamation cases: the conduct must be gauged from the standpoint of a normal prudent person, not solely from the subjective perception of the complainant. Viewed through that lens, the phrase, used in ordinary local dialect, did not objectively disclose a discourteous reply. The fact that the complainant personally perceived it as disrespectful could not by itself sustain a formal penalty.
The court set aside the penalty of censure as unwarranted. Issue (b) was answered in favour of the petitioner.
Order
The writ petition was disposed of with the following direction: since the order of penalty stood set aside, the respondents were directed to consider Malathi's case for promotion to the post of Tahsildar taking into account her seniority and in accordance with the rules. No order as to costs was made. Pending applications, if any, were closed.