Andhra Pradesh HC Quashes Section 498A Trial After Co-Accused Acquittal, Finds Complainant's Own Evidence Exculpatory
The Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed dowry harassment proceedings against a husband residing in Australia, holding that the complainant's own deposition in an earlier trial effectively exonerated him and that continuing the prosecution would be an abuse of process.
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati has quashed criminal proceedings against Dama Sudhir, the husband in a matrimonial dispute, who faced charges under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Justice K. Sreenivasa Reddy, sitting singly, allowed the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after finding that the complainant's own testimony in an earlier trial — which had ended in the acquittal of two co-accused — contained no specific accusation of dowry demand against the husband and in fact supported his conduct. The court held that compelling the petitioner to face a fresh trial on the same evidence would serve no purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of court.
The Dispute Before the Court
The marriage between Dama Sudhir and the first respondent, B. Sai Chaithanya, was solemnised on 27 January 2008. Sudhir left for Australia on 18 February 2008, approximately 22 days after the wedding. A complaint was lodged with police on 25 March 2010, and Crime No. 39 of 2010 was registered at Mutyalareddipalli Police Station, Chittoor District, against Sudhir and two others — accused Nos. 2 and 3 — for offences under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The charge sheet was filed and the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupati, took cognizance. The case was originally numbered as Calendar Case No. 267 of 2010. By an order dated 15 December 2016 passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 3187 of 2016, the proceedings against Sudhir were split up and renumbered as Calendar Case No. 249 of 2014. The case against accused Nos. 2 and 3 proceeded to full trial in C.C. No. 267 of 2010.
On 11 August 2017, the trial court acquitted accused Nos. 2 and 3 of all charges under Section 248(1) of the CrPC. Sudhir, residing in Perth, Western Australia, then filed Criminal Petition No. 1148 of 2023 before the High Court seeking to quash C.C. No. 249 of 2014 still pending against him.
The Legal Issue
The central question the court framed was whether the prosecution evidence recorded in C.C. No. 267 of 2010 against accused Nos. 2 and 3 — which the trial court found insufficient to bring home the charges — could be treated as binding on Sudhir in the split-up case, C.C. No. 249 of 2014, and whether proceeding with that trial would constitute an abuse of process.
Counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Sodum Anvesha, argued that the prosecution had already led its evidence in the earlier trial and that evidence was found wanting. Allowing a fresh trial would give the complainant an opportunity to improve upon testimony already recorded and found untrustworthy. She contended that the same witnesses would have to be examined again, with no realistic prospect of conviction, making the continuation of proceedings a futile exercise.
Counsel for the first respondent countered that the acquittal of co-accused does not automatically bar a trial against another accused. The appreciation of evidence in one trial is not binding on the judge in a subsequent trial. The State, through the Special Assistant Public Prosecutor, supported the respondent's position and sought dismissal of the petition.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Sreenivasa Reddy began by restating the well-settled position that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings must be exercised sparingly, in the rarest of rare cases, and only to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The court referred to the categories identified by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajanlal (AIR 1992 SC 604), including the category where allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence.
The court then examined the actual evidence of the complainant, who was examined as P.W.1 in C.C. No. 267 of 2010. The findings from that deposition were significant. P.W.1 had deposed that she stayed at Pondicherry for 18 days after the marriage and then at Chennai for 10 to 12 days with the petitioner. She voluntarily stated that her mother bore the expenses for the first two semesters of her education and the remaining Rs. 30,000 was spent by her in-laws and the petitioner. She deposed that she had sent an email to the petitioner thanking him for not demanding dowry. She further stated that the petitioner applied for a visa for her from Australia and reserved tickets for her travel on three occasions. P.W.1 admitted in cross-examination that she deliberately did not utilise the business visa for her own reasons and that the spouse visa was cancelled by the Australian Embassy on her own requisition. She also acknowledged that the petitioner gave her a Citibank Spouse Card from which she withdrew substantial amounts, and that she had no documentary evidence to show she returned those amounts.
On the basis of this evidence, the court found that there was no specific accusation against Sudhir of demanding additional dowry. The complainant's own testimony showed that the petitioner had actively tried to bring her to Australia, that he had financially supported her, and that the visa cancellation was at her own instance.
The court also noted a further development. The complainant had filed D.V.C. No. 6 of 2023 against accused Nos. 1 to 3 under Sections 19 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupati. By an order dated 25 September 2025, the trial court observed that the complainant had suppressed the fact that she had already been granted permanent alimony of Rs. 25 lakhs by an order dated 17 June 2017 in F.C.O.P. No. 100 of 2016 by the Family Court-cum-V Additional District Judge, Tirupati, and that she could not be permitted to pursue a second round of litigation on the same relief.
The court considered the competing legal propositions carefully. The Kerala High Court's Full Bench decision in Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police was cited by the respondent for the proposition that an acquittal of co-accused is not a judgment relevant under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act and cannot bar a subsequent trial. The court acknowledged this principle. However, it drew a distinction between a case where the evidence is genuinely untested as against the remaining accused and a case where the same evidence has already been led, found untrustworthy, and the same witnesses would have to be examined again with no realistic prospect of a different outcome.
The court placed reliance on Thallapalli Rajaiah @ Pogula Rajaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1999 LawSuit (AP) 1190), where this court had held that there is no scope for the prosecution to improve upon evidence already found insufficient, and that compelling an accused to face a ritualistic trial in such circumstances is an abuse of process. It also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh (2023 INSC 829) and the principle of parity articulated in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, to the effect that where the same or similar evidence is ascribed against two accused with the same or similar role, the court cannot convict one and acquit the other.
The court further referred to Janyavula Rambabu v. State, represented by Inspector of Police, Jangareddigudem PS, West Godavari District (1992 Supreme (AP) 221), where the Supreme Court held that the absence of evidence implicating an accused and the futility of proceeding with a trial that would only result in abuse of process justified quashing.
The court also took note of the caution expressed by the Supreme Court in Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (AIR 2024 Supreme Court 4641) that High Courts must be extremely cautious before interfering with criminal trials and should keep their hands off where the FIR discloses commission of a crime. The court did not treat this as an absolute bar. It found that the present case fell within the exceptional category where the prosecution evidence, already on record, was found untrustworthy and the same witnesses would have to be re-examined, making any prospect of conviction remote.
Justice Sreenivasa Reddy concluded that the evidence of material prosecution witnesses recorded in the split-up case had been found untrustworthy in the earlier trial, that the same evidence would have to be led again, and that there were no realistic chances of conviction. Allowing the petitioner to face the entire ordeal of trial in those circumstances would be a waste of the court's time and an abuse of process.
Outcome
By order dated 17 June 2026, Justice K. Sreenivasa Reddy allowed Criminal Petition No. 1148 of 2023 and quashed the proceedings in Calendar Case No. 249 of 2014 pending on the file of the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirupati, Chittoor District, as against the petitioner Dama Sudhir. All miscellaneous petitions pending in the criminal petition were directed to stand closed as a consequence.