Andhra Pradesh HC Dismisses Criminal Revision Against Rejection of Additional Evidence Application, Holds Order Purely Interlocutory

The Andhra Pradesh High Court ruled that an order dismissing an application to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage is purely interlocutory, barring revision under Section 397(2) CrPC, and distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling in Mohit Alias Sonu v. State of Uttar Pradesh on facts.

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by Kareti Venkata Vahini, a sitting Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), who challenged the rejection of her application seeking to adduce additional evidence before the XI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tenali. Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao, sitting singly, held on 9 July 2026 that the order under challenge was a purely interlocutory order and that Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 expressly bars revision against such orders. The petitioner's reliance on the Supreme Court's ruling in Mohit Alias Sonu v. State of Uttar Pradesh was found inapplicable on the facts.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioner, Kareti Venkata Vahini, is the de facto complainant in a criminal appeal bearing Crl.A. No. 106 of 2018 pending before the XI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tenali. During the pendency of that appeal, she filed a miscellaneous petition — Crl.M.P. No. 302 of 2025 — seeking permission to adduce additional evidence and have certified copies of certain documents considered by the appellate court.

The XI Additional District and Sessions Judge dismissed the application on 28 January 2026. The appellate court's reasoning was that a formal application under Section 391 of the CrPC was required, and that the applicant had to demonstrate that the evidence sought to be adduced was essential for a just decision, was previously unavailable despite due diligence, and was not merely to fill gaps in the existing record.

Dissatisfied with that rejection, the petitioner moved the High Court under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC, asking it to set aside the appellate court's order of 28 January 2026. The respondents included the State of Andhra Pradesh and five private respondents.

The Legal Question: Interlocutory or Intermediate Order?

The central question before Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao was whether the impugned order — the dismissal of an application to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage — was an interlocutory order barred from revision under Section 397(2) CrPC, or an “intermediate” order that substantially affects the rights of parties and is therefore amenable to revisional jurisdiction.

Section 397(2) CrPC provides that the revisional powers conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding. The petitioner's counsel, Sri J. Janaki Rami Reddy, argued that the rejection of the additional evidence application defeated a valuable right of the de facto complainant and was therefore not a mere interlocutory order.

In support, counsel relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Mohit Alias Sonu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported at (2013) 7 SCC 789, which held that an order refusing to issue summons on an application under Section 319 CrPC is an intermediate order and therefore amenable to revisional jurisdiction, not shielded by the bar in Section 397(2).

How the Bench Reasoned

Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao accepted the petitioner's characterisation of Mohit Alias Sonu as a correct statement of law in its own context but declined to apply it here. The court held that the decision was distinguishable on facts.

In Mohit Alias Sonu, the Supreme Court had dealt with an order refusing to issue summons on an application filed under Section 319 CrPC. Such an order, the Supreme Court observed, decides the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to their involvement in the case — it is not a mere step in the proceeding but one that determines whether additional accused persons will face trial. An order of that character, the Supreme Court held, substantially affects the rights of the parties and cannot be regarded as interlocutory within the meaning of Section 397(2) CrPC.

The High Court drew a sharp distinction between that fact-pattern and the present case. The order impugned here was the dismissal of an application to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage. The court held that such an order is purely interlocutory: it does not determine or affect any substantive rights of the parties. It is a procedural step in the conduct of the appeal, and its rejection does not terminate or conclusively decide any rights.

The court referred to a consistent line of Supreme Court authority in support. In Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam (2009) 5 SCC 153, Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. (2001) 7 SCC 401, Girish Kumar Suneja v. CBI (2017) 14 SCC 809, and Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137, the Supreme Court had categorically held that orders relating to the receiving of documents and summoning of witnesses are interlocutory in nature and not assailable in revision.

The High Court also relied on the coordinate bench ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Goli Satyanarayana Reddy v. G. Mahesh (MANU/AP/0346/2019). That bench had explained the distinction between interlocutory orders and what the Supreme Court termed “intermediate” or “quasi final” orders. An order qualifies as an intermediate order — and is therefore revisable — only if it has the effect of terminating the main proceedings once for all and puts a final end to the case. An order that does not carry that consequence remains interlocutory, and revision against it is barred by Section 397(2) CrPC.

On the question of the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao noted the settled position drawn from Mohit Alias Sonu itself: when an order is not interlocutory in nature and can be challenged before the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is barred. Conversely, inherent power can be exercised only when no remedy exists under the Code. Since the order here was held to be interlocutory — and the Code provides other avenues open to the petitioner — Section 482 could not be pressed into service to circumvent Section 397(2).

Outcome

Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao dismissed Criminal Revision Case No. 326 of 2026 as not maintainable. The court held that the impugned order dated 28 January 2026 was an interlocutory order against which revision did not lie under Section 397(2) CrPC.

While dismissing the revision, the court granted the petitioner liberty to file an appropriate application before the appropriate forum. No order as to costs was made. All pending interlocutory applications, if any, were directed to stand closed.